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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO A CUMULATIVE 
DISSERTATION 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Posing the research problem 
Succession and inheritance issues, concerns over wealth taxes and matters related 
to the global economy have been identified as the three main factors threatening 
wealth creation over the past 10 years and for the coming decade.1 In many 
countries, trusts are used to cater for these concerns, as they can ensure the 
undivided, secure, and profitable placement of assets. In short, a trust has been 
described as “an equitable obligation, binding a person (called a trustee) to deal 
with property (called trust property) owned by him as a separate fund, distinct 
from his own private property, for the benefit of persons (called beneficiaries or, 
in older cases, cestuis que trust) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of 
whom may enforce the obligation”2 (a more thorough description of the trust 
concept will follow in subsection 1.4.1).  
Trusts have long played a significant role in common law3 systems such as 
England, the United States and most Commonwealth countries. The most 
important early trust-like institution in England was the feoffment to uses, a 
conveyance of land to someone (the feoffee) with a provision that the land would 
be held for the use (ad opus) of a beneficiary (the cestui que use). Various 
examples have been offered for the practice, including the Crusaders (who 
conveyed their land to a trustee to be held to the use of their family while they 
were in the military expedition); Franciscan Friars, whose vows of poverty 
prevented them from owning property, which resulted in conveying the land to 
the fiduciaries to be held to the use of the friars; avoidance of feudal dues; and 
evading the common law rule that prohibited testamentary devises of freehold 
                                                 
1  See A. Shirley (ed.). Wealth Report. Knight Frank 2016, p. 10. Available at:  
https://content.knightfrank.com/research/83/documents/en/wealth-report-2016-3579.pdf 
(most recently accessed on 8.1.2020).  
2  D. Hayton, P. Matthews, C. Mitchell. Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees 
18th ed. LexisNexis Butterworths 2010, p. 2. This definition has also been utilized by English 
courts – see D.W.M. Waters. The Institution of the Trust in Civil and Common Law. – 
Collected Courses, Volume 252, Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995, p. 215. Dr Waters also brings out other attempts to define the trust in the 
same paper. For more definitions, see e.g., M. McAuley. Truth and reconciliation: Notions of 
property in Lousiana’s Civil and Trust Codes. – in L. Smith (ed.). Re-imagining the Trust: 
Trusts in Civil Law. Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 140 ff.  
3  The term “common law” is used here to identify the legal tradition rather than the legal 
system within it. In other words, common law is mentioned as the opposite of civil law and 
not equity. 
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land. It can be said that the English use provided a way around inconveniences in 
the law4.  
There are many works that have aimed to demonstrate historical links and a 
common core between the English trust and continental fiduciary arrangements: 
as civil law lawyers usually try to trace the roots of any legal phenomenon back 
to Roman times, Roman law, especially the institute of fideicommissum, was long 
regarded as the original source of trust5. Fideicommissum was a testamentary 
disposition by which a person who gave something to another imposed on the 
latter the obligation of transferring it to a third person. It was a clever fraus legis 
fracta that enabled the transfer of property by will to those excluded from 
inheriting by law6 or the holding of certain property within family for gene-
rations7. Until the time of Augustus there were no legal means of enforcing the 
fideicommissum – it depended on fides (faith or trust) between the parties.8 Another 
Roman institute – fiducia, which, too, was based on interpersonal trust, has also 
been seen as a possible precursor to the trusts. There were two types of fiducia: 
the fiducia cum amico under which property was transferred to a friend, e.g. for 
safekeeping until the transferor returned; and the fiducia cum creditore under 
which property was transferred to a creditor as security for performance of some 
obligation, subject to being re-transferred to the transferor on completion of the 
obligation.9 
In contrast to the prevailing belief that the trusts originate from Roman law, 
in the 19th century, the theory that the English use, in its essence, corresponds to 
the institute of Salman of early Germanic law, began to spread.10 Like the fidei-
commisioner, the Salman(n) was an intermediary who was given some property 
to hand over to someone else. Again, the initial reasons were shortcomings in the 
law of succession, namely the lack of testamentary freedom. Later, the fiduciary 
was used when one would, e.g. travel, with reasonable belief that the traveller 
would not return.11 
                                                 
4  S. F. French, G. Korngold. Cases and Text on Property. Wolters Kluwer 2019, p. 313; 
R. Helmholz. Trusts in the English Ecclesiastical Courts 1300–1640. – in R. Helmholz, 
R. Zimmermann (eds.) Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective. 
Duncker & Humblot 1998, pp. 155–157.  
5  G. B. Verbit. The Origins of the Trust. Xlibris Corporation 2002, p. 77 ff. (referring to 
Bacon and Blackstone); See also R. Helmholz, R. Zimmermann. Views of Trust and 
Treuhand: An Introduction. – in R. Helmholz, R. Zimmermann (Note 4), p. 31 ff. 
6  D. Johnston. Trusts and Trust-like Devices in Roman law. – In R. Helmholz, R. Zimmer-
mann (Note 4), p. 45 ff.  
7  Ibid, p. 49. 
8  Ibid, p. 46; Verbit (Note 5), pp. 78–79. 
9  P. Stec. Fiducia in an Emerging Economy. – in E. Cooke (ed.). Modern Studies in Property 
Law Vol 2. Hart Publishing 2003, p. 44. 
10  R. Helmholz, R. Zimmermann. Views of Trust and Treuhand: An Introduction. – in 
R. Helmholz, R. Zimmermann (Note 4), pp. 32–33. 
11  Verbit (Note 5), p. 97 ff. 
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Based on the above examples, it can be said that there has always been a need 
for institutions that involve fiduciary ownership, and nothing seems to have 
changed. But even though trusts and the various similar civil law institutions 
might have commonalities or, indeed, the same ancestors, it has been generally 
agreed that it was in common law countries – starting from English law of the 
12–13th century – where the trusts developed into such a universal, flexible and 
efficient institution to which there is no equivalent in civil law countries, as the 
similar institutes in civil law countries usually (or at least originally) do not bear 
all the elements of a trust. This is why since the 20th century the trust concept 
has generated more and more interest beyond common law jurisdictions, and civil 
law countries have also started using trusts or devices inspired by trusts. In the 
first half of the century, Japan, Colombia, Panama, Liechtenstein, Mexico and 
Puerto Rico started either by enacting a set of provisions introducing the trust or 
developing or reforming existing fiduciary devices.12 Later, countries like Luxem-
bourg, France, San Marino, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic in Europe, 
China and Taiwan in Asia, several Latin-American countries13 and Quebec14 in 
Canada implemented trusts or trust-like devices. And then there are countries like 
Italy15 and Switzerland16 that do not have their “own” trust law, but that never-
theless have a prospering trust industry as they have ratified the Hague Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition,17 which 
facilitates the recognition and use of foreign trusts. Even the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR)18, which contains Pinciples, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law, has included Book X on trusts in order to 
“enhance freedom by opening up possibilities for setting property aside for 
                                                 
12  A. Braun. The State of the Art of Comparative Research in the Area of Trusts. – in 
M. Graziadei, L.D. Smith (eds.). Comparative Property Law: Global Perspectives. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 130, 122 ff. 
13  Ibid, p. 128.  
14  G. Fortin. How the Province of Quebec Absorbs the Concept of the Trust – Part I – Trusts 
& Trustees, Volume 5, Issue 2, January 1999, pp. 22–26.  
15  See, e.g., M. Lupoi. Trusts in Italy as a living comparative law laboratory. – Trusts & 
Trustees, Volume 19, Issue 3–4, April/May 2013, pp. 302–308. 
16  D. Jakob. Will-Substitutes in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. – in A. Braun, A. Röthel (eds.) 
Passing Wealth on Death: Will-Substitutes in Comparative Perspective, Hart Publishing 2016, 
p. 195. 
17 Available at: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=59  
(23.1.2020). The following countries have ratified the convention: Australia, Cyprus, Canada 
(8 provinces only), China (Hong Kong only), Italy, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, 
Monaco, the Netherlands (European territory only), Panama, San Marino, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom (including 12 dependent territories/crown dependencies). 
18  Which, however, is an academically, but not politically authorized text. C. von Bar, E. 
Clive, H. Schulte-Nölke (eds.). Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), outline edition, 2009. Available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/2009_02_DCFR_OutlineEdition.pdf 
(8.1.2020).  
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particular purposes (commercial, familial or charitable) in a flexible way which 
has been much used and much valued in some systems for a very long time and 
is gradually spreading to others”.19 
During almost thirty years since the restoration of independence, a number of 
Estonians have finally created a set of assets that, if managed in a sound and 
reasonable manner, would be sufficient to ensure regular income also for future 
generations. But when searching for solutions for asset planning, locals seem to 
prefer to use schemes offered by other countries20 – local law offices mediate 
foreign trustees and private foundations (needless to mention that Estonia’s 
export of the relevant service is a non-issue today). This is because the solutions 
for asset management provided by Estonian law are not sufficient to cover 
people’s needs. That this area is problematic is illustrated by the practice of 
notaries,21 law offices,22 the analysis-concept of the corporate law review team,23 
the activities of certain financial sector representative organisations24 and the 
author’s own practice as a notary candidate/legal adviser.  
Since finding a suitable asset management solution is problematic in Estonia 
and trusts are one of the most popular wealth management tools in the world25, 
which the common law lawyers even regard as “the greatest and most distinctive 
achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence26” and which 
civil law states have increasingly considered necessary to introduce, it is 
worthwhile exploring and comparing the trusts to the current solutions in Estonia 
that could be used for the same purposes. Even if it cannot be claimed that trusts 
                                                 
19  Ibid p. 71. 
20  R. Kreek. Ettevõtlusvarade pärimise teema Eestis vähetuntud (The subject of inheritance 
of entrepreneurial assets is little known in Estonia). – Äripäev 20.01.2011. Available at: 
https://www.aripaev.ee/uudised/2011/01/20/ettevotlusest-tulenevate-varade-parimise-teema-
on-eestis-uus (25.1.2020); Request for clarification of Law Firm Varul to Ministry of Justice 
(Ministry of Justice document register reference 10-4/14-5618-1; registration date 2.7.2014). 
21  Opinion of the Chamber of Notaries 8.10.14. regarding amending the regulation related to 
foundations (Ministry of Justice document register reference 10-4/14-7735-1; registration date 
08.10.2014); The inquiry of the Chamber of Notaries 11.09.18. regarding the institutes of the 
testamentary executor and preliminary/subsequent succession (Ministry of Justice document 
register reference 10-4/4851-1; registration date 12.07.2018); discussions in the notaries’ 
internet forum and e-mails in notaries’ e-mail list (materials in author’s possession).  
22  Request for clarification of Law Firm Varul to Ministy of Justice (Note 20). 
23  Ministry of Justice. Analysis-concept of the corporate law review team. Tallinn 2018. 
Available at: https://www.just.ee/sites/www.just.ee/files/uhinguoiguse_revisjoni_analuus-
kontseptsioon.pdf (8.1.2020), p. 163.  
24  Finance Estonia. Finance Estonia wants to bring investments of wealthy families to 
Estonia. Available at: http://www.financeestonia.eu/news/financeestonia-soovib-tuua-eestisse-
varakate-perede-investeeringuid/ (8.1.2020). 
25  B. Harrington. From trustees to wealth managers. – in J. Cunliffe, G. Erreygers (eds.). 
Inherited Wealth, Justice and Equality. Routledge 2012, p. 196. 
26  D. Runciman, M. Ryan (eds.). F. W. Maitland: State, Trust and Corporation. Cambridge 
University Press 2003, p. 52.    
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are absolutely the best legal arrangement for family wealth planning27, they are 
definitely one of the most suitable. 
Therefore, the main objective of this dissertation is to find out whether and to 
what extent the asset management solutions in Estonian law make family wealth 
planning goals in a trust-like manner possible.  
The first additional aim of the dissertation is to highlight the changes that need 
to be made to the existing legislation to cover the functions that family trusts 
cover in other jurisdictions. The second additional objective is to assess whether 
and to what extent existing trust-like arrangements in Estonian law should be 
subject to publicity for the purposes of the AML/CFT regulations of the EU – it 
is no secret that on the international scale, trusts have received negative attention 
as they have been used for unethical or illegal purposes, such as tax evasion and 
hiding property from creditors28 and there has long been a concern that trusts can 
be used for money laundering and/or terrorist financing.29 Consequently, directive 
(EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 
(AMLD4)30 required that trustees of express trusts obtain and hold adequate, 
accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership regarding the trust, 
make certain disclosures to counterparties and register the information in a central 
register (UBO register) (AMLD4 Art 31(1)(2)(4)). The same measures are 
applied to other types of legal arrangements “having a structure or functions 
similar to trusts” (AMLD4 Art 3(6)c), Art 31(8)).  
In order to achieve the objective, the dissertation focuses upon the following 
research questions:  
 
1. Are there succession law devices in Estonia that would make isolating the 
estate possible so that the third parties would have no direct impact on it? 
2. Could a mandate contract be used for family wealth planning (in a trust-like 
manner) and what are its main shortcomings? 
                                                 
27  Especially compared to foundations – nowadays a potential settlor/founder can probably 
find in one jurisdiction a trust that perfectly meets his needs and a very similar foundation in 
another jurisdiction. 
28  See, e.g., N. Forbes Stowell et al. Wills, Asset Protection Trusts and Financial Crime. – in 
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting Volume 9: Issue 1, January–June, 2017, pp. 
585 – 605; OECD. Behind the Corporate Veil. Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes, 
2001. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/43703185.pdf (11.11.2019), p. 25 ff.  
29  Financial Action Task Force. The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, Including Trust and 
Company Service Providers (2006). Available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu 
ments/reports/Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20including%20Trusts%20and%2
0Company%20Services%20Providers.pdf (8.1.2020).  
30  Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 5.6.2015, L 141/73. 
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3. What are the legal barriers to using foundations for family wealth planning 
and what changes should be made to existing legislation to overcome these 
obstacles? 
4. Whether and to what extent should the information concerning these trust-like 
asset management solutions be (publicly) accessible under EU anti-money 
laundering and anti-terrorism regulations? 
 
The dissertation consists of the current compendium, which, in itself, is based on 
the author’s five publications:  
 
1. “The Estonian Foundation – What is Missing for It to Be A Well-Designed 
Wealth-Management Vehicle for Local and Foreign High-Net-Worth Indi-
viduals?”31 The article has two authors: Katrin Sepp and Urmas Kaarlep. 
Urmas Kaarlep contributed to the tax law part of the article (Section 5) and 
suggested the formulae to calculate the possible effect on the state budget from 
the use of Estonian private foundations by non-residents (Section 6); Katrin 
Sepp carried out the research for Sections 3 and 4, structured the article and 
composed and edited the main part of the article’s text. 
2. “Legal Arrangements Similar to Trusts in Estonia under the EU’s Anti-money 
laundering Directive”32 
3. “Unblocking the bottlenecks of the Estonian wealth-management scene for 
private foundations”33 The article has three authors: Katrin Sepp, Urmas 
Kaarlep and Turgay Kuleli. Urmas Kaarlep contributed to the tax law part of 
the article, Turgay Kuleli contributed to revising of the manuscript and com-
munication with the journal. Katrin Sepp was the main author who made the 
most significant contribution to the research and also wrote and edited the 
major part of the work. 
4. “Estonian ‘trust’ – same same but different?”34  
5. “Estate planning beyond the grave: legal instruments comparable to testamen-
tary trusts in Estonian law”35 
 
The analytical compendium to this cumulative dissertation is structured as fol-
lows. After introducing the research problem, its relevance and outlining the main 
research questions, an overview is given of the current status of the field of 
research and the place of the research problem within it. Subsequently, the author 
sets forth the methods and resources used for the dissertation. At the end of the 
Introduction, the author further defines and narrows the topic. The research ques-
tions and the author’s corresponding main conclusions as can be drawn from the 
                                                 
31  Juridica International, Vol 24 (2016) 96−104, http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2016.24.10. 
32  Juridica International, Vol 26 (2017) 56−65, https://doi.org/10.12697/JI.2017.26.06. 
33  Trusts & Trustees, Vol 24, Issue 6 (2018), 558−564, https://doi.org/10.1093/tandt/tty093. 
34  Trusts & Trustees, Vol 24, Issue 9 (2018), 891–900, https://doi.org/10.1093/tandt/tty144. 
35  Trusts & Trustees, Vol 25, Issue 3 (2019), 303–311, https://doi.org/10.1093/tandt/tty187. 
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articles included in this compendium reflect the structure of the analytical 
summary presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 
 
1.2 Current status of the field of research and 
position of the research problem within it  
In Estonian case law and legal literature, the possibilities of fiduciary ownership 
have not been systematically analysed so far, as already indicated by Villu Kõve 
in his doctoral thesis in 2009,36 and the situation has not changed much since 
then. Kõve (2009) tackled the issue of trusts and similar institutions in chapter 
15.4 of his thesis,37 at the end of which he expressed some scepticism towards the 
latter, mentioning, inter alia, the possible necessity of forbidding the use of 
fiduciary collaterals, and asking whether § 626 (3) of the Law of Obligations Act 
(LOA),38 regulating the mandate agreement, which “factually distinguishes 
between the ownership of assets in relation to the creditors of the contracting 
parties from the ownership of the same assets in relation to other persons”,39 
might be too extensive.40  
Urmas Volens, in his doctoral dissertation,41 has examined borderline cases 
between contractual law and tort law based on the hypothesis that certain cases 
of liability – such as culpa in contrahendo, apparent authority, experts liability to 
a third person, claims for compensation for damage resulting from the cancel-
lation of a transaction due to a mistake – form an independent system of liability, 
a system of liability based on trust (reliance). Some of those issues might, to some 
                                                 
36  V. Kõve. Varaliste tehingute süsteem Eestis. Doktoritöö (System of Proprietary Trans-
actions in Estonia. Doctoral Thesis). Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus 2009, p. 307.  
37  Ibid, pp. 304–307. 
38  Võlaõigusseadus – RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 20.02.2019, 8. English text available at:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/507032019001/consolide. 
39  V. Kõve (Note 36), p. 305.  
40  Here, perhaps, it is possible to answer that yes, if the goal is to have completely transparent 
ownership systems. But this view is possibly too idealistic even for a country that has based 
its law system on German law. History has shown that there is a practical need for fiduciary 
ownership and trust-like structures, and they are recognized elsewhere in the world. And 
segregation is undoubtedly one of the most important components of a trust, without which it 
will not work. And, in a nutshell, it can be said that since § 626 (3) of the LOA extends only 
to claims and movables, the fiduciary title that is created over them probably does not create 
a considerable impression of ‘fake wealth’, all the more so that the movables transferred to 
the trustee may not be in his possession at all. And for specific third parties with whom the 
trustee deals, (at least in case of movables) the principle of good faith acquisition applies.  
41  U. Volens. Usaldusvastutus kui iseseisev vastutussüsteem ja selle avaldumisvormid. Doktori-
töö (Liability based on reliance as an independent system of liability and its forms of appearance. 
Doctoral thesis). Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus 2011.  
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extent, be associated with the fields of the application of constructive trusts,42 
which are not, however, in the scope of this dissertation.  
Aleksei Kelli, in his master’s thesis,43 has written about duty of confidentiality 
in a fiduciary relationship. As the main examples of fiduciary relationships in 
Estonia he has pointed out the relationships between a client and an attorney, 
between a patient and a doctor and between an expert and the person who relies 
on the expert’s opinion pursuant to § 1048 of the LOA. He has also referred to 
the mandate contract in general.44 In order to find legal relationships in the 
Estonian legal system that may be characterised as fiduciary, Kelli has also used 
common law principles that apply to trusts.  
The need to study those principles can also be seen in several other master’s 
theses, especially in cases where trusts have worked as a model for legal con-
structions that are used in Estonian legal practice (but are not sufficiently regu-
lated). For instance, there are two works from 2013 on using security agents for 
purposes of securing bond issuance,45 which reveal certain shortcomings in the 
Estonian financial market (compared to the principles and practice renowned in 
international financial markets that are based on English law) that can seriously 
undermine the rights of the parties to the legal relationship. Although trusts for 
security purposes are not in the scope of this dissertation, some of the issues (like 
the question of expanding the protection stemming from subsection 3 of § 626 of 
the LOA to all rights, not merely claims – see subsection 3.1) are similar.  
There also appears to be some confusion surrounding the intermediated holding 
of securities. In the case of nominee accounts, the question of who (the nominee 
account holder or the customer) actually “owns”46 the securities and holds the 
rights and obligations of a shareholder has been discussed.47 And, according to 
one master’s thesis from 2012, the Estonian regulation concerning the custody of 
                                                 
42  See, e.g., U&H (Note 2), pp. 587 ff.  
43  A. Kelli. Konfidentsiaalsuskohustus usaldussuhtes. Magistritöö (Duty of Confidentiality 
in a Fiduciary Relationship. Master’s thesis). TÜ Õigusinstituut 2005.  
44  Ibid, pp. 40, 50, 56. 
45  E. Pisuke. Võlakirjaemissiooni tagatisagent. Magistritöö (The Role of the Security Agent 
in the Issuance of Bonds. Master’s thesis.), TÜ Õigusteaduskond 2013; A. Kotsjuba. Tagatis-
agendiga kaasnevate riskide maandamine Eesti õiguses. Magistritöö (Mitigation of Legal Risks 
Related to Security Agent under the Estonian Law. Master’s thesis), TÜ õigusteaduskond 2013. 
46  Ownerhip is actually a property law term in Estonian law and strictly speaking should not 
be used in case of rights – see Note 101. 
47  K. Promet. Väärtpaberite esindajakontol hoidmisega seotud emitendi, investori ja esindaja-
konto omaja õigused ja kohustused. Magistritöö (Rights and Duties of Issuer, Investor and 
Holder of a Nominee Account Arising from the Holding of Securities on a Nominee Account. 
Master’s thesis). TÜ Õigusteaduskond 2015; G. Laub, K. Promet. Väärtpaberist tulenevate 
õiguste teostamiseks õigustatud isik (A Person Entitled to Exercise Rights Arising from 
Securities). – Juridica 2017/8, pp. 567–575. Without an in-depth knowledge about this subject, 
but based on the general principles of trust law, it could of course be argued that if a person 
wants to use a fiduciary to hold the title to an object, he could also agree that he does not have 
all the rights that a ‘full owner’ normally would. 
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the clients’ money and securities is unclear, too general and insufficient, and 
therefore client asset protection is not guaranteed.48 Again, these topics are not in 
the scope of this dissertation (due to the limitation in regard to the circle of 
fiduciaries and assets – see subsection 1.4.3); however, these works point to the 
problems with the understanding of trust-like institutes in our society.  
As far as foreign literature is concerned the historical roots of trusts (including 
the possible “ancestors” of trusts in Roman law) have been thoroughly studied. 
There are numerous studies on the concept or essential elements of trusts, whether 
and how civil-law systems could implement the doctrine of trusts, on how the 
common law trust would be treated in the context of private international law, 
and so on. Alexandra Braun has written a comprehensive paper on the state of the 
art of comparative research in the area of trusts,49 inter alia, summarizing the 
current stage on the compatibility of trusts with civil-law systems as follows: 
 
“Gradually an increasing number of authors explored the idea that, not only were 
there functionally similar instruments in civil-law countries, but also that most of 
the arguments against the trust were more apparent than real /…/. For example, a 
number of authors began to accept that some of the principles and doctrines of 
civilian property law generally treated as being ‘absolute’, such as the concept of 
‘ownership’ but also the numerus clausus principle of real rights, had already been 
eroded by the judiciary /../. These days, it has been quite established already that 
trusts are compatible with the civilian heritage, the question of whether trusts can 
operate in a civil-law context is now rarely raised /../.”50 
 
Estonian law has been most affected by the German legal system, which itself is 
influenced by ancient Rome; thus, the roots of Estonian law, too, can be found in 
Roman law.51 This is why the author chose not to incorporate in this dissertation 
                                                 
48  T. Säärits. Kliendi väärtpaberite ja raha hoidmise põhimõtted. Magistritöö (Principles of 
Custody of Client Assets. Master’s thesis), TÜ õigusteaduskond 2012.  
49  A. Braun (Note 12).  
50  Ibid, pp. 132–137.  
51  Until the beginning of the 20th century, Estonia was ruled by various invaders including 
German, Swedish, Danish, Polish and Russian. The first major written body of law, the Baltic 
Private Law Code (BPLC), the main source of which was Roman law, dates back to 1863. 
The BPLC actually included different types of fideicommissums: family fideicommissum 
(§ 2337 ff.) and fideicommissum for nobility (§ 2525 ff.) (J. Arro. Kas kustub aegumise läbi 
krepostiraamatutesse kantud kinnisvara (liikumata varanduse) omandusnõudmine? (Will the 
claim for ownership of real estate (immovable property) entered into land register disappear 
due to expiration?) – Õigus, juriidiline kuukiri (Law, monthly newsletter) 1921 No 4, pp. 74–81 
(in Estonian); E. Silvet. Pärimisseaduse eelnõu põhijoontest (The main features of the draft 
Succession Act). – Juridica 1995/7, pp. 282–288 (in Estonian)). In 1918, Estonia became inde-
pendent and the fideicommissum for nobility was abolished in 1919 with the Estonian Land 
Reform Act that expropriated land from Baltic-German landowners. In the area of private law, 
the preparation of the Estonian Civil Code commenced in 1920. The draft was prepared mainly 
on the basis of the BPLC and the German Civil Code (V. Kõve. Applicable Law in the Light 
of Modern Law of Obligations and Bases for the Preparation of the Law of Obligations Act.– 
16 
a study of Estonian legal history to examine (once more) the roots and develop-
ments of the concepts of the legal systems of the non-trust and trust jurisdictions 
and ask (again) what the doctrinal barriers are that hinder or prevent the application 
of the trust in non-trust jurisdictions, or in a particular jurisdiction – there would 
probably be not much to add to the countless works of this “legal archaeology” 
in the context of trusts. However, the dissertation brings out, rather pragmatically, 
concrete examples from Estonian law that should illustrate that the notion of the 
trust is not incompatible with our legal system52.  
Nevertheless, in the context of history, it may be pointed out that the slow 
development of trust-like institutes in Estonia is due to the Soviet era, which led 
to collective poverty, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union it has taken quite 
some time to collect property and for interest in trusts or similar institutions to 
emerge. 
 
 
1.3  Methods and sources 
As trusts are often used in other countries to manage family assets, it is important 
to understand what is so special about trusts. When a legal researcher is con-
fronted with the question of whether and how to change the national law, it is 
rather self-evident to look at how other countries have tackled the issue at stake 
to find the best solution. Therefore, it can be said that the main research method 
in this dissertation is the comparative law method. 
                                                 
in Juridica International 6/2001, p. 30). Family fideicommissums were excluded from the new 
Civil Code, mostly because they had not been used and were thus deemed unnecessary 
(Tsiviilseadustik: Vabariigi Valitsuse ettepanek (Civil Code: Proposal of the Government of the 
Republic) 11. XII 1939, p. 309. Available at https://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/et/raamatud/42352 
(in Estonian)). However, the new Civil Code never became an act because the Soviet armed 
forces occupied Estonia just before the draft was passed. When Estonia restored its 
independence at the beginning of the 1990s, one of the most important models for private law 
initially was the draft Civil Code of 1939. Through intensive discussions in the early 1990s, 
however, it became evident that the mere reintroduction of the old draft statutes would not 
serve the needs of society and that the goal should be to create a new, modern civil code. The 
working group decided to use other sources for better solutions – the basic model was the 
German system, but also legal acts of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Italy 
and the Nordic countries (I. Kull. Reform of Contract Law in Estonia: Influences of Har-
monisation of European Private Law. – in Juridica International 14/2008, p. 124). 
52 Overall, it can be said that the main reason why there are no trusts in Estonian law is 
probably that there are none in the countries that have been the main role models for Estonian 
legislation. In the 1990s, when Estonia’s private law was rebuilt, the pools of wealth that could 
have needed management were a seemingly unattainable dream, which did not need to be 
regulated in the first place; instead, there were many more issues that needed immediate 
handling. This points to the conclusion that the absence of trusts from our legal order is not so 
much based on the deep-rooted perceptions or well-considered decisions of Estonian legislators. 
However, as countries with different legal systems indeed have similar legal relationships, in 
some of which trust (in the broader meaning) is an important element, it is probably quite 
natural that the legislator has taken a somewhat casuistic approach to solve different matters.  
17 
The author has chosen English law53 as the main basis for describing and 
understanding the concept of the trust, as England is the birthplace of the common 
law trust, but also because English trust law has remained somewhat conservative – 
for example, where it relates to balancing the interests of different parties to trusts 
(and their creditors), and this may help to diminish certain fears related to the 
image of the trust, which probably have more to do with offshore solutions. For 
a civil-law lawyer, it is, of course, relatively hard to grasp the common law’s case 
law as well as the different terms, concepts and way of thinking. Therefore, in 
addition to English law – case law, legislation and legal literature – the author has, 
in parallel, used the DCFR, which has taken an approach to the English trust 
model that would also be understandable and applicable in a civil-law setting and 
helps to understand the basics of the complicated (English) trust in a compact form.  
When looking at various academic works of comparative nature, it may be 
noted that they often speak of an abstract common law or Anglo-American54 trust 
rather than proceeding from the trust law of one particular country. Since the trust 
law of other common law countries has its origins in English trust law, it can be 
said that the general principles are largely the same.55 This is why in this thesis 
the author also uses the term “common law trust” often instead of referring to 
English trusts. In addition, as Prof Hayton has said, in shaping English trust law, 
the English judges have to take into account changing practical realities and the 
characteristics of offshore trusts56 and it can be said that the trust law is of inter-
national character, and therefore trusts in other jurisdictions cannot be completely 
ignored. 
As the trust is a complex notion, which is hard to describe in short, the author 
considered it necessary to distillate the essential characteristics of the trust 
concept (these have been presented in 1.4). To do that, the author used the works 
of prominent trust-scholars – Prof Donovan Waters57, Prof Maurizio Lupoi58, 
                                                 
53  The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland contains three major legal 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. England and Wales form 
one jurisdiction: Wales has not had its own legal system distinct from England since medieval 
times. The law relating to trusts in Northern Ireland largely mirrors that of England and Wales 
(Society of Trusts and Estate Practitioners. Jurisdictional Reports, Northern Ireland. Available 
at: https://www.step.org/jr-northern-ireland (26.1.2020)). However, Scotland is a mixed law 
system and has its own trust law, which has certain differences – G. L. Gretton, A. J. M. Steven, 
Property, Trusts and Succession 3rd ed. Bloomsbury Professional 2017, p. 344.  
54  Waters (Note 2); A. E. von Overbeck. Explanatory Report on the 1985 Hague Trusts Con-
vention. HCCH Publications, 1985. Available at: https://assets.hcch.net/docs/ec6fb7e0-deda-
417f-9743-9d8af6e9e79b.pdf (8.1.2020). 
55  M. Lupoi. Trusts. A Comparative Study, Cambridge University Press 2000, p. 6–7; 
A. W. Scott, Fifty Years of Trusts. – 50 Harvard Law Review 60 (1936), p. 61.  
56  U&H (Note 2), Preface, p. vi.  
57  Waters (Note 2).  
58  Lupoi (Note 55).  
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Prof Lucina Ho59, Prof Tony Honoré60, Prof Marius J. De Waal61 and Prof David 
Hayton62 – who have tried to identify the core elements of either common law 
trusts in general or also of civil-law instruments that are similar to trusts. It is true 
that the views of those authors on the basic characteristics of trusts vary, but the 
author of this compendium has not intended to evaluate here who of those learned 
authors is right or wrong. Instead, the author has tried to point out most of the 
elements that were considered important by these scholars. However, it is worth 
noticing that the three most mentioned elements by these authors were the 
segregation of patrimonies, the beneficiaries’ specific rights to trust assets vis-à-
vis third parties, and the fiduciary ownership/position of the trustee.  
Understanding the concept of the trust is also important for identifying trust-
like arrangements in Estonian law from the viewpoint of the AML/CFT regu-
lations of the EU. However, under those regulations, the trust concept appears to 
be different from the trust concept in general. The AMLD4 and AMLD563 texts 
do not give a definition of a trust. Instead they equate it with instruments used in 
civil-law systems that have a similar structure or function, such as the Treuhand 
and fiducie. Therefore, the author used legal literature on the German Treuhand 
and French fiducie as well as French legislation to compare these intruments to 
trusts and highlight the similarities between these and trusts.  
After identifying the important elements of trusts, the author has tried to 
determine the trust-like instruments in Estonian law by finding the similarities 
and differences between trusts and their possible equivalents in Estonia. As it 
may be that although certain legal instruments are formally, doctrinally or 
structurally different, they might still be capable of carrying the same functions 
as a trust. Thus, the author considered not only the main elements of trusts, but also 
the functions.  
To analyse Estonia’s current law and to expound its meaning, the author has 
used a doctrinal method. In interpreting Estonian legislation, the author has 
investigated the legislative acts, the explanatory notes, case law and legal literature, 
but – since the volume of domestic material on the subject is very limited – also 
the law of the countries Estonian law has been modelled after – mostly German 
but also Austrian law in the case of private foundations (in the case of private 
                                                 
59  L. Ho. Trusts: the Essentials – in L. Smith (ed.). The Worlds of the Trust, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2013.  
60  T. Honoré. On Fitting Trusts into Civil Law Jurisdictions. – University of Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series, Paper No 27/2008.  
61  M.J. De Waal. Comparative Succession Law. – in M. Reimann, R. Zimmermann (eds.). 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 960–985.  
62  U&H (Note 2); D.J. Hayton, S.C.J.J. Kortmann and H.L.E. Verhagen. Principles of 
European Trust Law. Kluwer Law International 1999. 
63  Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 
2013/36/EU, 19.6.2018, L 156/43. 
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foundations, the author has also given examples of regulations in the Netherlands, 
Malta, Belgium and Luxembourg, as these countries are probably amongst the 
most competitive in the current European private foundation scene).  
The author has examined the existing legal provisions of Estonian law with a 
view to assess the efficacy of the law as an instrument of socio-economic neces-
sity, to identify possible bottlenecks and to find consistency of the law and its 
underlying policy. The analysis will help suggest how to interpret Estonian law – 
rephrase the legal norms with an eye on their coherence from a wider angle than 
the institutional role of a judge or other practitioner in a special case would prob-
ably allow.  
In summary, it can be said that although the author has generally followed 
Zweigert and Kötz’s64 guidelines for using the functional comparative method, it 
is intertwined with other methods: to present the way of solving the problem of 
wealth planning in common law systems and explain the nature of trusts, it was 
necessary to use the legal literature as a starting point, study the black letter law 
and of course, the court cases that reflect the law in action. In searching for similar 
instruments in Estonian law, the author proceeded from both functions and struc-
tural elements but in doing so, there is no way to bypass the study of Estonian 
legislation, legal literature and court decisions. It is also clear that a direct com-
parison of the legislation in this case would not have given any reasonable result, 
as totally different legal systems are under scrutiny and trust law in common law 
countries is largely based on court decisions rather than legal acts. At the same 
time, the comparison of court decisions would also not yield any results, as there 
is little case law on the matter in Estonia. Thus, it can be said that the structural 
method and analytical method are first used within one legal system to understand 
the law and how the law actually functions in a society and then again to detect 
common parts and differences in concepts that are functionally equivalent to those 
of the other system. 
After depicting the deficiencies in the area of family asset protection in Estonia, 
the author uses a normative approach to suggest how to rearrange the existing 
system by proposing specific amendments to the legislation. Hence, this research 
should fall into the category of reform-oriented research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64  K. Zweigert, H. Kötz. An Introduction to Comparative Law 3rd ed. Oxford University Press 
1998, p. 34 ff.  
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1.4  Defining the topic  
1.4.1 The notion of trusts65 
A common law trust is neither a legal entity nor a contract.66 In fact, common law 
lawyers regard the trust as a property law concept.67  
It is generally agreed that a trust is such a complex notion that it is hard to 
define.68 The definition given in Underhill and Hayton Law of Trusts and 
Trustees,69 which is recognised as the leading work in the world with expert com-
mentary on the law of trusts and trustees, was already given at the beginning of 
the Introduction. X.-1:201 of the DCFR defines the trust as “a legal relationship 
in which a trustee is obliged to administer or dispose of one or more assets (the 
trust fund) in accordance with the terms governing the relationship (trust terms) 
to benefit a beneficiary or advance public benefit purposes”.  
In addition to a trustee and beneficiary, normally, a trust has a settlor70 – the 
person who consitutes the trust. The roles of the parties can overlap: a settlor may 
also be a trustee,71 a settlor can also be a beneficiary and a trustee may also be a 
beneficiary (DCFR, X.-1:203(5)). However, under English law a person cannot 
be a sole trustee for that person’s sole benefit.72 Each of the various parties to a 
trust may either be a natural or a legal person.73 
While a trustee generally becomes the owner of the trust property74, his 
powers are subject to an important qualification: unlike full owners, he does not 
have the liberty to exercise his ownership rights as he pleases. He owes a duty 
towards the beneficiary to do so for the benefit of the beneficiary, and not for his 
own benefit75 (fiduciary ownership).  
                                                 
65  In English, the word is often used in plural – see Lupoi (Note 55), p. 5. 
66  The constitution of a trust requires unilateral declaration of the settlor. If it is not a self-
declaration trust, where the settlor is also the sole trustee, the transfer of the assets from the 
settlor to the trustee is the second prerequisite. See C. von Bar, E. Clive (eds.). Principles, 
definitions and model rules of European private law: draft common frame of reference 
(DCFR), Volume 6. Oxford University Press 2010, p. 5680.  
67  Ibid, p. 5680. 
68  M. McAuley (Note 2), Waters (Note 2), pp. 447 ff, 127–128.  
69  U&H (Note 2), p. 2. See also footnote nr 2. 
70  In DCFR the term ‘truster’ is used – X.-1:203(1). 
71  U&H (Note 2), p. 207 ff. 
72  In this case, the trust ends: X.-9:109 of DCFR; see also U&H (Note 2), p. 370.  
73  See I.-1:108(1) of DCFR and the definition of “person” in the list of definitions.  
74  Waters (Note 2), p. 428; Lupoi (Note 55), p. 271; D. Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 13 
(Art. 1).  
75  L. Ho. (Note 59), p. 5; Lupoi (Note 55), p. 271; D. Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 13 
(Art. 1); De Waal (Note 61), pp. 1088–1089. 
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Trust assets are separated from the trustee’s personal assets and cannot be 
claimed by the trustee’s creditors76 (special patrimony). Neither is the trust fund 
available for the creditors of the settlor or beneficiary, but the beneficiary’s 
creditors may invoke the beneficiary’s rights relating to the trust fund.77 However, 
many jurisdictions have made it possible to create special trusts, providing a 
measure of protection against creditors, for spendthrift relatives or dependants 
who need protection against their own improvident, foolhardy habits.78 
If a settlor created the segregated trust fund in contravention of laws protecting 
the settlor’s creditors (Insolvency Act 1986, ss 339–342 and 423–425), spouse 
(Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 37) or heirs (Inheritance (Provision for Family 
and Dependants) Act 1975, s 10) then the trust79 or the disposition to the trustee 
can be set aside, so as to make the fund available to satisfy the claims of such 
creditors, spouse or heirs. It is also considered important that the settlor80 or 
beneficiaries81 should not have the right to order the trustee around – the retaining 
of powers by the settlor includes the limit beyond which the trust can be deemed 
                                                 
76  Insolvency Act 1986 c 45 s 283(3)(a); Henry v Hammond (1913) 2 KB 515; R v Clowes 
(No 2) (1994) 2 All ER 316, CA; X.-1:202(1)(2)(a) of DCFR, X.-1:202(2)(b)(c) of DCFR; 
Waters (Note 2), p. 428; Lupoi (Note 55), p. 271; Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 13 (Art. 1); 
L. Ho. (Note 59), p. 5; T. Honoré (Note 60), pp. 3–4, 6; De Waal (Note 61), pp. 1088–1089.  
77  X.-10:101(1) of DCFR; Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 41. 
78  E.g., English protective trusts under s 33 Trustee Act 1925 c. 19 (Regnal 15 and 16 Geo 5); 
Spendthrift trusts in the USA – see C. Fox, R. Murphy. Are Spendthrift Trusts Vulnerable to 
a Beneficiary’s Tort Creditors? – Trusts & Trustees, Volume 16, Issue 8, 1 September 2010, 
pp. 672–681, https://doi-org.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/10.1093/tandt/ttq084; A.A. Bove, Jr. The United 
States as an offshore asset protection trust jurisdiction – the world’s best kept secret. – Trusts 
& Trustees, Volume 14, Issue 1, 1 February 2008, pp. 12–22, https://doi-org.ezproxy.utlib. 
ut.ee/10.1093/tandt/ttm122. For asset protection trusts in offshore jurisdictions see, e.g., 
P. Pusceddu. International Trusts and assets protection. – Trusts & Trustees, Volume 20, Issue 
7, 1 September 2014, pp. 739–745,  https://doi-org.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/10.1093/tandt/ttu070. 
79  Midland Bank plc v Wyatt (1995) 1 FLR 697. 
80  Waters (Note 2), p. 428; Lupoi (Note 55), p. 271; Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 13 
(Art. 1); L. Ho. (Note 59), p. 5.  
81  Re Brockbank, Ward v Bates (1948) Ch 206: beneficiaries of a trust cannot direct a trustee 
as to exercise of a direction vested in him. However, this decision has been reversed by 
legislation so far as it applies to the power to appoint new trustees: by virtue of s 19 of the 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, beneficiaries who are all of sound 
mind and full age and between them absolutely entitled under the trust can require trustees to 
retire and appoint new trustees nominated by the beneficiaries. The statute applies only, 
however, in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the trust instrument. See also 
Waters (Note 2), p. 428. 
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“sham”.82 However, some jurisdictions (mainly offshore) allow trusts that would 
probably be considered void in others.83 
The trust fund consists not only of the original assets and those subsequently 
added and the fruits thereof, but also of those assets from time to time replacing 
the original or added assets84 (the principle of real subrogation). This does not 
include only the authorised substitutions that the trustee has made, but the 
beneficiaries are entitled to claim that the trust fund comprises the unauthorised 
assets acquired by the trustee on behalf of the trust and any assets purportedly 
acquired by the trustee for himself on the account of or in connection with the 
trust fund or from his misuse of his position as trustee.85  
In case of the misappropriation of the trust assets to third parties, a beneficiary 
can “follow” or “trace” trust property.86 “Following” is the process of following 
the same asset as it moves from hand to hand and when the transferee is not an 
acquirer for value in good faith,87 the beneficiary can require the asset to be 
restored to the trust. “Tracing” is the process of identyfing a new asset as the 
substitute for the old. Thus, where one asset is exchanged for another, a claimant 
can elect whether to follow the original asset into the hands of the transferee or 
to trace its value into the new asset in the hands of the transferor.88  
Courts have supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of trusts.89 The 
trustee can ask advice or consent from the court for certain issues and for taking 
decisions.90 Under certain circumstances the court also has the power to vary trust 
terms.91 It can also have the power to release a trustee from office and appoint a 
new trustee (S 41 of the Trustee Act 1925; DCFR X. – 8:203; X. – 8:402) – a 
                                                 
82  Certain rights can still be reserved by the settlor (and in the DCFR some of the powers of 
the settlor to intervene in the administration of the trust go beyond the powers possessed by 
an English settlor), but it is important that the fiduciary should not be just a man of straw, who 
only appears to own some property that is actually controlled by someone else. See, e.g., U&H 
(Note 2), pp. 88–97. 
83  J. P. Webb. An ever-reducing core? Challenging the legal validity of offshore trusts. – Trusts 
& Trustees, Volume 21, Issue 5, 1 June 2015, pp. 476–487,   
https://doi-org.portaal.nlib.ee:2443/10.1093/tandt/ttv010. 
84  DCFR Book X, Ch. 3 S. 2; De Waal (Note 61), pp. 1088–1089.  
85  A-G of Hong Kong v Reid (1994) 1 All ER 1; Foskett v McKeown [2000] UKHL 29, 
[2000] 3 All ER 97; see also U&H (Note 2) pp. 2, 83–84; DCFR X. – 3:201.  
86  Waters (Note 2), p. 428. 
87  Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch 259; Re Diplock (CA) [1948] 1 Ch 465, Ministry of 
Health v Simpson [1951] AC 251. 
88  In Foskett v McKeown [2000] UKHL 29; [2000] 3 All ER 97. 
89  T. Honoré (Note 60), pp. 3–4, 6.  
90  Civil Procedure Rules Practice Directions 64, 64A, 64B; see also U&H (Note 2), p. 1088 ff.  
91  In England under Section 57 (1) of the Trustee Act 1925, which permits the court to give 
trustees additional powers if it is expedient, and Section 1 of the Variation of Trusts Act 1958, 
which permits the court to consent to a variation on behalf of minor, unborn and unascertained 
beneficiaries; DCFR X. – 9:202 – X. – 9:204. 
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trust does not end in the case of a trustee’s death or incapacity; trusteeship is seen 
as an office.92 
English law prevents a trust, other than a trust for exclusively charitable 
purposes, from lasting longer than a perpetuity period, which generally is 125 
years from the date the instrument takes effect (Perpetuities and Accumulations 
Act 2009, ss 5, 6). This is to prevent the dead from ruling the living for too long.93 
Also, in England, under the so-called principle of Saunders v Vautier94, 
notwithstanding the terms of the trust, where all the beneficiaries are in existence, 
have been ascertained, and are of full capacity, then, if all such beneficiaries are 
in agreement, they can require the trustee to terminate the trust and distribute the 
trust fund between themselves. Both, the rule of perpetuities as well as the Saunders 
v Vautier principle have been abolished in many other trust jurisdictions.95  
 
 
1.4.2 The existence of the basic elements of a trust in Estonian law 
The following section explores whether the three (most) important elements of 
trusts – namely, the unique notion of a trustee’s ownership (holding title for 
another’s benefit), the segregation of funds and beneficiaries’ special rights – can 
be found in Estonian law. This is the starting point for looking for arrangements 
that could be trust-like from the perspective of family asset-management, but it 
also helps to show that even though the institution is of common law origin, its 
characteristic elements are not alien to our legal system.  
Holding property for another’s benefit. Although Estonian law, namely 
§ 68 of the Law of Property Act96 (hereinafter “LPA”) defines ownership as full 
legal control by a person over a thing, where an owner has the right to possess, 
use and dispose of a thing and to demand the prevention of violation of these 
rights and elimination of the consequences of violation from all other persons, a 
situation where an owner is not using something he owns or is not benefitting 
from it, is not unusual or unfeasible.97 For example: 
                                                 
92  De Waal (Note 61), pp. 1088–1089. 
93  Hayton, Principles (Note 62), p. 63. 
94  Saunders v Vautier [1841] EWHC J82. 
95  In the US, if some material purpose of the settlor remains to be served then the bene-
ficiaries may not be permitted to terminate the trust – called the Claflin doctrine in US trust 
law. See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis. The New Direction of American Trust Law. – Iowa Law Review, 
Vol. 97, 2011– pp. 227, 231.  
96  Asjaõigusseadus. RT I 1993, 39, 590, 11; RT I, 29.06.2018, 7. English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/502012019009/consolide.  
97  As Prof I. Kull has said: “Considering the abundance of different constraints nowadays, 
ownership should also be regarded as a limited right over a thing, as calling it full and unlimited 
is misleading. Thus, the ownerhip is the most extensive right, but not an unlimited right over a 
thing.” – in P. Varul et al. Asjaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud vln (Property Law I. Commented 
Edition), Juura 2014, p. 284.  
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a) According to § 81 (6) of the Law of Succession Act98 (hereinafter “LSA”), an 
executor of a will is required to take an object forming part of the estate into 
his possession or to ensure in other ways the separation of the object from the 
property of the successor (who is the owner) if it is necessary for the perfor-
mance of the duties of the executor of the will.  
b) It is possible to establish a restricted real right on behalf of a beneficiary; for 
example, the usufruct99 or a personal right of use in a residential building.100  
c) It is possible to conclude different contracts under the law of obligations. 
According to § 619 of the LOA via the authorisation contract (hereinafter the 
“mandate”), the agent undertakes to provide services to the principal. These 
services can vary greatly, including creating trust-like devices where the title 
of assets is transferred to the agent who is obliged to exercise the owner’s 
rights for the benefit of the transferor (or a third person); for example, by 
letting him use the asset. The services may also include negotiating and 
entering into contracts with third parties as well as services that do not include 
the conclusion of contracts or performing other juridical acts; for example, the 
maintenance of property, collecting rent or other proceeds from the property, 
making distributions from it, etc. If the agent’s obligations involve entering 
into transactions in his own name, the provisions regulating the contract of 
commission, which is one of the subspecies of the mandate agreement, also 
apply as lex specialis. 
d) In the case of contractual investment funds (common funds), the money col-
lected through the issue of units and other assets acquired through the invest-
ment of such money are owned101 jointly by the unit-holders, and the manage-
ment company shall conclude transactions with the assets of the fund for the 
                                                 
98  Pärimisseadus. – RT I 2008, 7, 52. English text available at:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/528032016001/consolide.  
99  Kasutusvaldus; § 201 et. seq. of the LPA: a usufruct encumbers immovables in such a way 
that the person for whose benefit the usufruct is established is entitled to use the immovable 
and to acquire the fruits thereof. 
100  Isiklik kasutusõigus elamule; § 227 of LPA: a personal right of use in a residential building 
encumbers the immovable so that the person for whose benefit it is established has the right 
to use the residential building, or a part of it situated on the immovable, for habitation. 
101  To be exact, “ownership” as a term in Estonian civil law should relate to corporal objects, 
i.e. things – either movables (§§ 92–115 of the LPA) or immovables (§§ 119–142). In certain 
cases, provided by law, provisions concerning things can also apply to rights (e.g. the 
provisions concerning immovables apply to a right of superficies (hoonestusõigus)). In 
general, however, the use of the concept of “ownership” in relation to incorporeal objects is 
inaccurate in the Estonian property law context, although it is rather customary when dealing 
with various types of rights (e.g. securities). In the case of rights (and claims), it would be 
more appropriate to speak of the rights “belonging” to someone. This is why in this paper the 
common law term “title” is often used instead of “ownership”. However, for the title-holders 
of incorporeal objects, it can also be said that they have the most extensive rights in relation 
to that object, compared to other persons, including the right of disposal.  
25 
account of all the unit-holders collectively, but in its own name (§ 4 (1) of 
Investment Funds Act (IFA)102). 
e) The component of fiduciary ownership also emerges in the case of the 
intermediated holding of securities, to which the specific provisions of the 
Securities Register Maintenance Act (SRMA)103 and Securities Market Act 
(SMA)104 apply. Securities that are registered in the Estonian Central Register 
of Securities (ECRS), such as the shares of most public limited companies as 
well as private limited companies that have chosen registration in the 
ECRS,105 can be accomplished through a nominee account (§ 6 of the SRMA). 
When exercising the rights and performing the obligations arising from the 
securities, the holder of the nominee account has to follow the instructions of 
the client. A notation shall be made in the register indicating that the account 
is a nominee account (the identity of the client will not be disclosed).  
f) While in the case of a trust it is the trustee who owns the trust property, a 
foundation, as a legal person, can itself own property. But just like the trustee, 
a foundation administers assets not for its own benefit, but in order to achieve 
certain objectives, including benefitting certain (set of) people – the bene-
ficiaries.106 
 
Segregation of funds. Next, the author will try to find examples of separate 
patrimony – another essential characteristic of trusts – from Estonian law.107  
Although Estonian law takes unity of patrimony as its starting point – meaning 
that generally a person will be liable for his obligations with all of his assets – the 
segregation of patrimonies within one person’s property is also not alien to 
Estonian law and there can be a pool of assets in the composition of a person’s 
property which have a specific purpose and/or to which the creditors of the person 
cannot have recourse: 
 
a) According to § 626 (3) of the LOA, claims and movables which a mandatary 
acquires when performing a mandate in the mandatary’s name but on account 
of the mandator are not included in the bankruptcy estate of the mandatary 
and they cannot be subject to a claim against the mandatary in an enforcement 
                                                 
102  Investeerimisfondide seadus. RT I, 31.12.2016, 3; RT I, 04.12.2019, 6. English text 
available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512122019002/consolide. 
103  Väärtpaberite registri pidamise seadus. RT I 2000, 57, 373; RT I, 28.02.2019, 9. English 
text available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/517122019003/consolide. 
104  Väärtpaberituru seadus. RT I 2001, 89, 532; RT I, 10.01.2019, 14. English text available 
at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/517012019004/consolide.  
105  The registration of the shares of a private limited company in the ECRS is a possibility, 
not a must. Less than 2% of private limited companies are currently registered in the ECRS.  
106  Sihtasutuste seadus (Foundations Act). RT III 2005, 29, 300; 18.12.2012, 32. English text 
available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515012018008/consolide.  
107  For the concept of special patrimony in Estonian law, see also P. Varul et al. Tsiviilõiguse 
üldosa. Õigusteaduse õpik. (General part of Civil Law. Textbook of Law), Juura 2012, p. 315. 
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procedure. The same applies to claims and movables which the mandator 
himself transfers to the mandatary for the performance of the mandate.  
b) Common funds also provide a trust-like segregation of patrimonies: claims of 
creditors of the management company cannot be satisfied out of the assets of 
a fund (IFA § 23 (4) (6)). The assets of the fund are also immune from the 
claims of creditors of unit-holders (IFA § 13 (4), § 15 (3)).  
c) With regard to the creditors of the holder of a nominee account, the securities 
are deemed to be those of the client and not the holder of the nominee account 
(§ 6 (4) and (6) of the SRMA); the exclusion of the securities from the 
bankruptcy estate of the custodian is also provided in § 88 (6) of the SMA.  
d) In order to prevent the provisional heir’s personal creditors from satisfying 
their claims from the property to be handed over to the subsequent heir, § 48 
(3) of the LSA stipulates that the disposition of an object forming part of an 
estate made in the course of compulsory execution or by a trustee in bankruptcy 
is void upon fulfilment of the condition on subsequent succession or on the 
due date. 
e) The foundation, as a separate legal person, has a distinct patrimony independent 
of its founder, administrator or beneficiaries. In contrast to a company, a 
foundation has neither shareholders nor owners; it also has no members. Thus, 
the founder/beneficiaries also do not directly acquire proprietary rights in the 
foundation that would be seizeable and transferable to meet their creditors’ 
claims.  
 
The special rights of beneficiaries. When it comes to the special interests of 
beneficiaries in misappropriated assets, then, generally, when the title of assets 
has been transferred to a person, he will have exclusive powers characteristic to 
ownership, including alienating the property and if he breaches his contractual 
duty not to dispose of the property, the validity of his act of alienation will not be 
affected (§ 76 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act (GPCCA)108). However, 
there are provisions elsewhere in private law that allow for the design of a legal 
relationship where a person who is not the owner has rights over a particular asset 
that can be characterised as placing between personal and property rights as they 
may affect third parties:  
 
a) First, in the case of immovables it is possible to enter in the land register a pre-
liminary notation, which would render the subsequent disposals void (LPA, 
§ 63 (3) and (5)).  
b) The disposing of the shares of a private limited company can be limited by 
prescribing in the articles of association that the transfer of a share shall be 
permitted only on certain conditions; for example, depending on the consent 
                                                 
108  Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus, RT I 2002, 35, 216; RT I, 30.01.2018, 6. English text 
available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/501082019001/consolide.  
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of another person – under § 149 (3) of the Commercial Code (CC).109 A trans-
action performed without the condition shall be null and void.  
c) Objects other than immovables can be transferred conditionally under the 
provisions of Chapter 6 (“Conditional Transaction”) of the GPCCA: the 
person who, as an obligor, has entered into a conditional transaction for the 
transfer of an object, is prohibited from disposing of the object to third persons 
(§ 106 (2) of the GPCCA). Thus, when the parties have agreed that upon 
arrival of a certain condition an asset automatically transfers back to the initial 
transferor, a disposition made by the fiduciary owner (or his bankruptcy 
trustee or a bailiff) during the period between the conclusion of the conditional 
transaction and the fulfilment of the agreed condition shall be void unless the 
recipient is a bona fide purchaser of a movable (§ 106 (3)). 
d) According to § 48 (2) of the LSA, a disposition by the preliminary successor 
of an object forming part of an estate without charge will be void if the 
disposition precludes or restricts the rights of the subsequent successor. 
e) According to § 79 of the LSA, a successor does not have the right to dispose 
of objects forming part of an estate which the executor of the will requires to 
perform the obligations thereof. If the successor violates this rule, it is the 
disposition by person not entitled thereto, which is, as rule, invalid (GPCCA, 
§ 114).  
f) As to the transactions concluded by a member of a foundation’s management 
board in violation of his obligations with mala fide acquirers, the transaction 
could be cancelled under § 131 (1) of the GPCCA.110  
 
Even if the transfer to the third party is valid, a claim for damages against the trans-
feree could be (hypothetically) filed on the basis of tort law – if it can be said that 
he intentionally behaved contrary to good morals111 (LOA, § 1045 (1) 8)) or 
behaved violating a duty arising from law112 (LOA, § 1045 (1) 7)). In this case it 
is not entirely impossible that the application of § 136 (5) of the LOA could lead 
to a situation where the third party has to transfer the acquired object to the 
beneficiary to compensate for damages.113  
                                                 
109  Äriseadustik; RT I 1995, 26, 355; RT I, 20.12.2018, 2; English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/507012019006/consolide.  
110  See CCSCd 14.10.2015, 3-2-1-110-15, para. 10–13; CCSCd 29.09.2015, 3-2-1-81-15, 
para. 15. But see also, P. Varul et al. Tsiviilõiguse üldosa. Õigusteaduse õpik. (General part 
of Civil Law. Textbook of Law), Juura 2012, p. 216; P. Varul et al. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa 
seadus. Kommenteeritud vln (General Part of the Civil Code Act. Commented Edition), Juura 
2010, p. 382. 
111  See CCSCd 15.4.2015, 3-2-1-18-15, para. 10.  
112  For example, if the third party’s activity could be classified as a criminal offense.  
113  For the implementation practice of § 136 (5) of the LOA, see CCSCd 27.9.2017, 2-15-
18478, para 14; CCSCd 19.4.2011, 3-2-1-12-11, para. 29; CCSCd 4.3.2010, 3-2-1-164-09, 
para. 31. See also S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (eds.). Cases, Materials and Text on Property 
Law. Hart Publishing 2012, p. 585. 
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Based on the above, it can be said that at least the following institutes in 
Estonian law combine more than one characteristic of the trust: the mandate 
contract, the executor of will, the provisional/subsequent heirship, the foundation, 
the common fund and the intermediated holding of securities.114 
 
 
1.4.3 Possible functional equivalents to family trusts in Estonian law 
In common law countries trusts are used for a great variety of purposes: protection 
of (family) assets; administration and providing for vulnerable persons (minors, 
addicts, the disabled); preserving an object or appropriating property to a specific 
use; investment (unit trusts/mutual funds);115 providing for employees on retire-
ment (pension trusts);116 charity; to manage the collateral in cases where there is 
a large number of creditors or where the same security is to benefit successive 
groups of creditors (syndicate loans, secured bond issuance)117, etc. Testamentary 
trusts are created by a person’s will and arise upon the death of the testator. 
While the abovementioned trusts are express trusts; that is, knowingly created 
by a person, there also exist trusts that are imposed by law or court: constructive 
trusts, statutory trusts and resulting trusts.118 Statutory trusts arise under statutes 
which stipulate that under certain circumstances the property shall be held in trust, 
like trusts arising in respect of legal estates co-owned, or on intestacy.119 Con-
structive trusts are imposed by courts as a remedy; for example, to prevent unjust 
enrichment.120 Resulting trusts can be imposed (in a transferor’s favour) in cases 
where property is gratuitously transferred and there is insufficient evidence to 
                                                 
114  If a legal instrument contains several elements or just one feature of the trust, is it enough 
to qualify it as a trust-like instrument? The answer to this question is not straightforward. As 
will be shown later in the thesis, for the purposes of AMLD containing just one feature - the 
fiduciary ownership - will probably suffice. However, for family wealth management 
purposes, if there is no protection against the claims of the trustee’s creditors, an instrument 
is unlikely to be widely used. Nevertheless, it could probably not be said that all three elements 
must necessarily exist in order to be able to claim that an instrument is trust-like in terms of 
family planning. The recognised trust scholars tend to disagree on the nature and extent of the 
claims of the beneficiary towards third-party transferees. And although the institute of the 
executor does not entail the fiduciary ownership (because the executor does not become the 
owner – the successor will remain the owner, but will be stripped of the rights to use, possess 
or dispose of the property), it probably cannot be said that it is not a trust-like instrument for 
family estate planning as obviously its function is similar to the function of testamentary trusts 
in common law. 
115  U&H (Note 2), p. 67. 
116  Ibid, p. 69. 
117  Ibid, p. 60. 
118  Ibid, p. 420. 
119  Ibid, p. 420. 
120  Ibid, p. 83; Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. 
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ascertain the transferors intention; that is, that the transferor meant to make a gift 
or loan and abandon his beneficial interest.121 
This dissertation focuses on the functional equivalents of express trusts for 
family wealth management. Therefore, both non-express trusts and express trusts, 
which are used for other purposes do not get much attention. 
As “family asset management” is itself a rather ambiguos concept, for the sake 
of clarification, the dissertation focuses on trusts with the following objectives122 
(in a trust jurisdiction, all of the purposes can be attained by setting up just one 
trust): 
 
a) preventing the dispersal of the estate (business) after one’s death; 
b) ensuring continuity in management of business after one’s death. This could 
be useful when a settlor has no children or if he considers some of his heirs 
not fit to run the business or they do not wish to do so; 
c) providing for the settlor’s incapacity. Nowadays, people are tending to live 
longer, and there is an increase in the number of people who are affected by 
conditions such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, which can result in 
restricted active legal capacity. If a trust has been created beforehand, the 
settlor can set out the terms concerning the management of trust assets as well 
as the distributions made out of the trust exactly according to his/her wishes;  
d) providing for a relative’s incapacity or lack of financial maturity. For example, 
parents with a disabled or minor child can be concerned with who will manage 
their child’s assets, and how they will be managed, when they die or perhaps 
become disabled themselves (as in the previous case). If the parents have 
separated and one of them has concerns about handing over a substantial 
amount of wealth to the other (who is the child’s legal representative), the 
former might wish to appoint a third-party trustee who can release funds for 
the needs of the beneficiary when he sees fit. As told earlier, many jurisdictions 
have made it possible to create special trusts, providing a measure of protection 
against creditors, for spendthrift relatives or dependants who need protection 
against their own improvident, foolhardy habits123; 
e) protecting specific assets, as in the case of keeping the family home out of the 
reach of creditors. This could be especially attractive for businessmen or for 
those whose professions open them up to the risk of civil liability (e.g., doctors 
or lawyers), but in light of today’s economic and financial instability – and, in 
some regions, political instability – it could be attractive for anyone. It should 
be kept in mind, though, that there are usually some specific rules protecting 
                                                 
121  Ibid, p. 81. 
122  For a discussion of the different uses of trusts, including family trusts, see, e.g., Waters 
(Note 2); also D. Hayton. The Future of the Anglo-Saxon Trust in the Age of Transparency. 
Paper prepared for the STEP Caribbean Conference 2015 at St Maarten May 4, 2015. 
Available at: https://ccj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Future-of-the-Anglo-Saxon-trust-
in-the-age-of-transparency-.pdf (8.1.2020). 
123  See note 78. 
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creditors in a case wherein a trust is set up to harm existing creditors or with 
no actual change in the control of the property.124  
 
Although it is true that tax optimisation is often one of the goals of the creation 
of trusts, this disseration focuses primarily on private law matters and not tax law. 
However, in two of the articles this compendium is based on and subsection 4.3, 
the problems with the current taxation of private foundations have been tackled.  
When selecting specific institutes enabling family asset management for a 
more thorough examination, the author proceeded from the premise that the 
object of the arrangement could be any transferable asset125 and that there are no 
restrictions as to the circle of fiduciaries (i.e., the fiduciary could be a friend, a 
relative or another person, who does not (necessarily) provide the service as his 
professional activity). Having that in mind, which of the arrangements in 
Estonian law mentioned in the previous subsection could function like (family) 
trusts?  
In the field of succession law, the office of the executor of will (subdivision 8 
of the LSA) can carry similar functions as those of the testamentary trustee in 
England. The institution of the executor of the will as well as the subsequent 
successor126 can also serve as means for intergenerational wealth planning. As 
was already shown in the previous subsection, the latter two institutes also hold 
certain structural elements similar to trusts, which are dealt with in more detail in 
subsection 2 of this compendium.  
As was also already brought out in the previous subsection, common funds 
embody several trust-specific qualities and are probably one of the most trust-
like instruments in Estonia; however, they are not an effective means for 
intergenerational assets planning, which is the focus of this dissertation.  
As was likewise mentioned in the previous subsection, the mandate agreement 
entails both holding title for another’s benefit as well as (at least, a partial) 
segregation of patrimonies. As this type of contract can have different purposes 
and thus can also cover the area of intergenerational wealth planning, the author 
chose to explore them further (subsection 3.1).  
As to the intermediated holding of securities, both the component of fiduciary 
ownership and segregation of patrimonies could be determined. However, the list 
of possible holders of nominee accounts is limited – it includes professional 
participants in the Estonian securities market, operators of a securities settlement 
system, foreign legal persons and other institutions if they meet the criteria set 
                                                 
124  Lupoi (Note 55), pp. 135–136; S.E. Sterk. Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to 
the Bottom. – 85 Cornell Law Review 1035 (2000). 
125  Certain rights and obligations are inseparably bound to the person pursuant to law and thus 
cannot be transferred (§ 6 (1) of the GPCCA). See also P. Varul et al. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa 
seadus. Kommenteeritud vln (Note 110), p 20 and P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus I. Kom-
menteeritud vln (Law of Obligations I. Commented Edition), Juura 2016, pp. 834, 861. 
126  In case of arrival of a particular date or fulfilment of a condition the estate or a share 
thereof transfers from a provisional successor to a subsequent successor (LSA’s § 45 (1)).  
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out in § 6 (1) of the SRMA. It is concluded that persons not specified in § 6 (1) 
of the SRMA may not act as the holders of those securities.127 The circle of 
persons who can act as custodians and administrators of other securities (i.e., 
those not registered in the ECRS but correspond to the definition of securities 
within the meaning of § 2 of the SMA) is not limited until their activity can be 
considered only as ancillary services to an investment service (in the meaning of 
§ 44 of the SMA) and not as an investment service (within the meaning of § 43).128 
Again, as the purpose of this dissertation is to look for family-trust-like arrange-
ments (and thus holdings of different kinds of property, not only securities), these 
arrangements will not get thorough attention. However, as the SMA’s rules do 
not apply if the service provider is not providing investment services as a 
permanent activity, the mandate/commission contract provisions in the LOA 
apply and thus, partly, Section 3 might cover the issues that come up regarding 
the holding of securities.  
As it may be that although certain legal instruments are formally, doctrinally 
or structurally different, they might still be capable of carrying out the same 
functions as a trust. Thus, the author subsequently analyses certain arrangements 
under Estonian law that may not share the main elements of trusts based on their 
potential functional similarity to trusts. 
In the field of administration and providing for vulnerable persons, the 
guardian of vulnerable persons (§§ 171–209 of the Family Law Act (FLA)129) 
might have similar obligations as the trustee, and the institute of representation 
(Chapter 8 of GPCCA) can also carry certain functions that trusts have. Espe-
cially when considering use case c) described earlier in this subsection, for the 
purposes of a person’s incapacity, giving of a power of attorney could be con-
sidered, as under Estonian law the principal’s incapacity is not a ground for 
extinguishment of the right of representation (§ 125 of the GPCCA). The prin-
cipal can enter into an agreement with the representative that determines the 
conditions for, for example, asset management and details of personal care. A 
proxy may be issued to the representative with the condition that the represent-
ative has the right of representation only in case the mental health of the principal 
is such that it precludes his or her ability to make transactions in his or her 
interests. Regarding the appointment of a guardian, an adult can make a proposal 
concerning the person to be appointed as his guardian according to § 204 (3) of 
the FLA or his child’s guardian according to § 177 of the same act. If, the parents, 
for example, have separated and one of them has concerns about handing over 
wealth to the management of the other (who is the child’s legal representative), 
                                                 
127  V. Kõve (Note 36), p. 305.  
128  As a rule, only persons specified in § 45 of the SMA can provide investment services as a 
permanent activity, but § 47 (1) also gives rise to a number of exceptions, which essentially 
allows the services that can be qualified as an investment service to be provided in certain 
cases by other persons. 
129  Perekonnaseadus. RT I 2009, 60, 395; RT I, 09.05.2017, 29. English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/507022018005/consolide.  
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appointing a third-party special guardian (§ 209 of the FLA) might be of help. 
Neither the institute of guardianship or of representation entail the features of 
fiduciary ownership and segregation of patrimonies as the person under guardian-
ship or the representative is regarded as the owner although he does not have the 
right to enter into transactions by himself. Also, the appointment of a represent-
ative or a guardian (for an incapacitated adult) alone is not sufficient for making 
dispositions concerning the property in the event of one’s death. Thus, it can be 
said that both the institute of representation as well as guardianship are struc-
turally quite different from trusts and functionally cannot be used in most of the 
use-cases described earlier in this subsection, and thus will not get further attention 
in this dissertation.  
Another institute that might be worth mentioning in the estate-planning context 
is (life) insurance.130 On the one hand, different life insurance services certainly 
act as an estate-planning tool, as their purpose can be ensuring the standard of 
living of the policyholder or his/her dependents. On the other hand, special rules 
apply to insurers,131 and under the insurance contract, the insurer must make 
monetary payments and cannot transfer other assets. In addition, insurance com-
panies do not assume discretionary duties, like making payments to others on 
behalf of beneficiaries, or to see that the funds are used for a stated purpose.  
Limited partnership funds established under the IFA might, in some cases, 
also be available as an alternative to trusts. According to § 125 of the CC, a limited 
partnership is a company in which two or more persons operate under a common 
business name, and at least one of the persons (general partner) is liable for the 
obligations of the limited partnership with all of the general partner’s assets, and 
at least one of the persons (limited partner) is liable for the obligations of the 
limited partnership to the extent of the limited partner’s contribution. Pursuant to 
§ 8 (2) of the IFA, a limited partnership fund may manage its own assets or enter 
into a management contract with a fund manager. According to the same provision, 
the circle of persons who can act as a limited partnership fund manager or a 
general partner of a limited partnership fund which manages its own assets, is 
limited: only a fund manager which has received an activity licence pursuant to 
the IFS or which has been issued an activity licence of a UCITS or alternative 
fund manager in another EEA Member State or which has registered its operation 
with the Financial Supervision Authority may act as a limited partnership fund 
manager or a general partner of a limited partnership fund which manages its own 
assets. Pursuant to § 2 (1) of the IFA, an investment fund has to involve the capital 
of a number of investors with the view of investing it in accordance with a defined 
investment policy for the benefit of the investors in question and in their common 
interests. Under § 20 (1) of the IFA, a limited partnership fund may only engage 
                                                 
130  Articles 535–547 of the LOA, § 13 of the Insurance Activities Act (Kindlustustegevuse 
seadus; RT I, 07.07.2015, 1; RT I, 20.02.2019, 6) English text available at: https://www. 
riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/526032019002/consolide. See also J. Lahe, O.-J. Luik. Kindlustusõigus 
(Insurance Law). Juura 2018, p. 48–50.  
131  J. Lahe, O.-J. Luik (Ibid.), p. 57 ff. 
33 
in the management of its own assets. Thus, a limited partnership fund established 
under the IFS cannot deal with other activities, and rather it could be concluded 
that a limited partnership fund cannot be used simply to hold a family property – 
the main purpose being to preserve existing assets (such as renting real estate), 
where making payments and investing is only one of the ancillary activities. Per 
se, the regulation of limited partnership funds allows for great flexibility in the 
formation of partners’ rights, including, for example, voting rights as well as the 
size of payouts and termination of the company. These issues can be decided in 
the partnership agreement. The partnership agreement may provide for restric-
tions on transfer and encumbrance of the units of the limited partnership fund and 
other conditions and procedures (§ 21 (2) of the IFA). In regard to the fund 
manager’s creditors, the principle of separation of assets under IFA § 23 (4) and 
(6) also applies to limited partnership funds. In addition, limited partnershp funds 
are subject to a special tax regime and the CC does not require disclosure of the 
partners of the fund in the register. Instead, the list of partners is held by the fund 
manager. However, the obligation to present the information concerning the 
beneficial owners to the relevant register may result from the MLTFPA if the 
partner corresponds to the definition of beneficial owner. 
As mentioned earlier, in common law countries trusts also arise in cases where; 
for example, the land is owned by more than one person.132 In the Estonian context, 
co-owners (§ 70 (3) of the LPA), spouses (§ 25 of the FLA), co-successors (§ 147 
of the LSA) and an “ordinary” partnership (seltsing; Ch.-s 30–34 of the LOA), 
could be mentioned here. However, in Estonia, when a right or a thing belongs to 
several persons at the same time, it is usually manifested by an entry in the register 
(Land Register Act (LRA)133 § 14 (2); § 70 of the LPA) – if the object of shared 
ownership (LPA § 70 (1)) or community (ühisus134) has to be registered – or, in the 
case of movables, by joint possession. Thus, it can be said that these devices lack 
of an essential component of a trust – there is no fiduciary ownership. There are 
two exceptions though: silent partnership and common funds. 
If in the cases of “ordinary” partnership the parties to it are visible outside, in 
the case of silent partnership (Ch. 34 of LOA; modelled after German Stille 
Gesellschaft) to a third person, only one of the parties (the “proprietor”) is visible, 
but there exists an internal relationship that offers privacy to the other party of the 
contract – the silent partner. The silent partner makes a contribution (cash, services 
or other assets) to the business of the proprietor and in return is entitled to share 
in the profits arising from the business. The contribution normally becomes the 
property of the proprietor. With respect to third parties, the proprietor is the owner 
of the commercial enterprise and carries on business in his own name. Under the 
partnership agreement the silent partner might have the right to participate in the 
                                                 
132  Lupoi (Note 55), p. 19. 
133  Kinnistusraamatuseadus. – RT I 1993, 65, 922; 28.6.2016, 8. English text available at:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515122016002/consolide. 
134  If a right belongs to several persons – LPA § 70 (7). 
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decision-making.135 For certain operations, the proprietor should obtain the 
consent of the silent partner, but not having consent does not affect the validity 
of the transactions concluded (the silent partner will only have a personal claim 
against the proprietor).136 The silent partner is generally not liable for third-party 
claims arising from the business.137 Nevertheless, if not agreed otherwise, he has 
to participate in the losses of the business (LOA, § 614 (1), § 618 (2)). The partner-
ship comes to an end when either of the parties goes bankrupt (LOA, § 618 (1), 
§ 596 (1) 7)) and in the case of the proprietor’s bankruptcy, the silent partner may, 
on the basis of the silent partner’s contribution, file a claim against the proprietor 
as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings (on an equal footing with other 
creditors) to the extent which the contribution of the silent partner exceeds the 
share of the silent partner in the covering of losses. Thus, the assets contributed 
to the enterprise by the silent partner are not ring-fenced: when the proprietor 
(either a natural or legal person) has several enterprises or personal creditors, there 
is no segregation and the silent partner (or the contribution) has no specific pro-
tection. Thus, the silent partnership would not qualify as a trust when considering 
the important elements of a trust (namely regarding the segregation of patri-
monies) and is therefore not studied further as a family asset management vehicle. 
In addition to the purposes of management or the mere holding of assets, the 
fiduciary ownership for security purposes – assignment of rights or transfer of 
ownership of things in order to provide collateral – is used in Estonia.138 Using a 
security agent for the purposes of securing bond issuance and syndicate loans can 
contain a mix of the mandate and the assignment of rights or transfer of ownership 
of things to the security agent. To third persons, the security agent is the holder 
of a restricted real right (pledge, mortgage) or an object that has been transferred 
to him, but he has to exercise the associated rights in the interests of the investors/ 
lenders.139 Again, examination of the trust-like arrangements for security pur-
poses does not fit into the scope of this dissertation.  
The use of a notary’s deposit can also be related to providing additional 
security – according to § 35 (2) of the Notaries Act140 a “deposit is an official duty 
accompanying a notarial act if it is connected with a transaction authenticated by 
the same notary and the persons applying for deposit have a legitimate interest 
                                                 
135  P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud vln. (Law of Obligations II. 
Commented Edition). Juura 2007, p. 717. 
136  Ibid, p. 713. 
137  Ibid; LOA § 610 (3). 
138  P. Varul et al. Asjaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud vln. (Property Law II. Commented 
Ed.). Juura 2014, p. 434; K. Toommägi. Vallasasjade tagatisomandamine – selle olemus ja 
realiseerimine (Security ownership transfers of movable assets – essence and enforcement. 
MA Thesis). Tallinn 2014. Available at: http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/43015/ 
toommagi_ma_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (8.1.2020).  
139  See E. Pisuke (Note 45); A. Kotsjuba (Note 45).  
140  Notariaadiseadus. RT I 2000, 104, 684; RT I, 29.06.2018, 35. English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/526032019006/consolide (11.1.2020).  
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arising from the transaction to ensure performance of the transaction by deposit”. 
According to § 120 (1) of the LOA, money, securities, other documents or valu-
ables can also be deposited with a notary if an obligee delays acceptance or if the 
obligor does not know and does not have to know the identity of the obligee. 
Depositing money (except cash), securities and documents with a notary is 
possible also in other cases (§ 35 of the Notaries Act). It seems that the legislation 
related to notaries’ activities does not directly regulate to whom the items 
deposited with a notary belong or that they are excluded from the private property 
of a notary in the event of his/her bankruptcy. Possibly, in some cases the LOA’s 
provisions of the mandate agreement may apply and in others, the provisions of 
deposit contract (hoiuleping). However, notaries are not generally involved in 
asset management and deposits are made primarily for the purpose of securing a 
transaction.  
On the basis of a deposit contract, one person (the depositary) undertakes to 
keep a movable delivered to the depositary by another person (the depositor) and 
return it to the depositor upon termination of the deposit (LOA, § 883). The 
depositary, like a trustee, must ensure that the thing is not damaged, destroyed or 
lost and that it is subsequently returned to the depositor (or third party). Like a 
trustee, the depositor may not use the deposited thing for his own benefit. The 
similarity between trusts and deposit agreements can also be seen in the fact that 
the (legal) owner of the deposited object is not recognisable to third parties. 
However, unlike with trusts, the circle of items that can be the object of the 
deposit contract is much narrower: only movables can be deposited. If money or 
fungible things are deposited such that the depositary undertakes to return things 
of the same kind, quality and quantity, it is presumed that the ownership and the 
risk of accidental loss of and damage to the things will be transferred to the 
depositor upon delivery of the things, and the provisions concerning loans apply 
correspondingly (LOA, § 896 (1)). The main difference compared to a trust is 
that in the case of a trust, the trustee is given the title of the item; that is, the 
trustee becomes the owner; however, in case of the deposit contract, only the 
possession of the thing is given to the depositary. In addition to that, the duties of 
the trustee are generally wider than securing that the thing is not damaged, 
destroyed or lost. 
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2. Legal institutions comparable to 
testamentary trusts  
2.1 Testamentary executor and subsequent 
succession as estate-planning devices  
Description of the problem. Although trusts do not exist under Estonian law in 
the strictest sense, there are similar devices under succession law that should or 
could cover the same functions as testamentary trusts do in common law 
countries – namely the institutions of testamentary executor and subsequent 
succession. This subject matter has not been previously explored in Estonian legal 
literature, but the practice of legal professionals indicates that this area might be 
problematic.141 Concerning the regulation of testamentary execution, it is, first of 
all, not entirely clear if the appointment of a testamentary executor excludes the 
heirs’ participation in making decisions concerning the estate and their right of 
disposal of the assets. For example, there are controversial provisions in family 
law leading to practical problems. Second, it is not clear whether a new executor 
should be appointed if the previous one willingly or involuntarily vacates the 
position. Third, the law does not directly regulate the issue of the protection of 
property administrated by the executor from the heirs’ creditors. Regarding the 
subsequent succession, the biggest problem is that it is uncertain whether and to 
what extent the testator can restrict the rights granted to the provisional heir by 
law. There is also some uncertainty regarding unauthorised transactions made by 
the provisional heir.  
Statement set forth for defence. Estonian succession law does not enable the 
isolation of the estate in a separate “vehicle” on the operation of which third 
parties have no direct impact.  
Reasoning. In principle, the appointment of a testamentary executor should 
exclude the heirs’ participation in making decisions concerning the estate and 
their right of disposal of the assets – despite having the title, the heir has no right 
to dispose of the objects that the executor requires in order to perform his/her 
obligations (LSA, § 79). Instead, the executor has the right to dispose of and 
possess the objects, separate them from the rest of the property, and assume obli-
gations with respect to the estate if necessary for the performance of the duties 
assigned by the testator (LSA, § 81 (7)).  
According to § 81 (2) of the LSA, the executor of a will may only “derogate 
from the duties assigned in the will with the consent of interested persons if this 
is in the interest of executing the testamentary intention of the testator.” This 
provision should probably be understood so that the executor may deviate from 
individual specific orders if this is consistent with the testator’s will in a broader 
sense. In essence, this provision seems rather to be about (additional) inter-
pretation of the testator’s will than deviation from his wishes. Thus, this should 
                                                 
141  Notes 21, 22, 23 and 24.  
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apply to cases where circumstances at the time the will was signed have substan-
tially changed by the time of the execution of the will and the testator could not 
have foreseen the changes.142 However, if a testator’s direction seems unreason-
able to the others, but is not made due to the testator’s misconception of future 
circumstances, it should probably still be followed. Even if the testator’s wishes 
are somewhat detrimental to the heir’s interests, they should be respected (unless 
the heir is entitled to a compulsory portion – one of the few tools established by 
the LSA to limit testamentary freedom143). One could also conclude that if the 
testator has appointed an executor, the beneficiaries cannot terminate the execution 
and require the executor to transfer the estate to them even if every beneficiary 
agrees.  
However, questions arise regarding the relationship between the LSA and the 
FLA if the heir is a person with limited legal capacity. Section 185 of the FLA 
reads as follows:  
“(1) A guardian shall administer the property which a ward receives by 
succession or as a gift in accordance with the dispositions included in a gratuitous 
contract, will or succession contract. A guardian’s right or representation arising 
from law cannot be extended by dispositions. (2) A guardian may derogate from 
the dispositions with the consent of the court if adherence thereto could damage 
the interests of the ward.” Does this mean that, according to subsection 2, the 
heir’s interests should prevail instead of the testator’s wishes? Should it be 
understood in a way that, for example, legacies144 for third persons cannot be 
fulfilled in the wake of the ward’s interests? This interpretation certainly does not 
fit the principle of testamentary freedom.  
The relations between the institute of executor and provisions of the FLA also 
cause confusion in light of the second sentence of § 185 (1) (which states that “a 
guardian’s right or representation arising from law cannot be extended by 
dispositions”) as well as § 209, § 179 (2) and § 122 (1) of the FLA. Normally, an 
executor does not need the court’s consent to enter into transactions while 
fulfilling the obligations specified in the will. On the other hand, the legal 
representative of a person with limited legal capacity generally needs the court’s 
consent for transactions listed in §§ 187 and 188 of the FLA. The author would 
suggest that if the testator explicitly stipulates the fulfilment of testamentary 
orders by the executor of the will (rather than generally prohibiting the parent or 
                                                 
142  I. Mahhov, E. Silvet. Kuidas pärida ja pärandada (How to Inherit and Bequeth) (Õigus-
teabe AS Juura, 1997), pp. 34‒35. See also G.S. Alexander. The Dead Hand and the Law of 
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century. – (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review, p. 1261. 
143  Along with the numerus clausus principle and maximum time limits for certain dispositions. 
144  LSA § 56 (“Definition of legacy”): (1) If in a will a testator does not give all his or her 
property or a legal share thereof to a person but gives a particular proprietary benefit without 
regarding the recipient of the benefit as his or her legal successor, the benefit shall be deemed 
to be a legacy and the recipient of the benefit shall be deemed to be a legatee. A disposition to 
give a legacy entitles a legatee to demand transfer of an object given as a legacy from the executor 
of the legacy. (2) A legacy may be a thing, a sum of money, a right, a claim, exemption from an 
obligation or any other transferable benefit. 
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guardian from administering the property), one should probably proceed from the 
provisions of the LSA that do not stipulate an obligation to receive the court’s 
consent. That the executor does not require the court’s consent in the case of a 
minor heir also seems to be the dominant position in German law.145  
Overall, it seems logical to conclude that the purpose of the FLA’s regulation 
of guardianship or legal representation should not interfere with a person’s 
testamentary freedom.  
Concerning the termination of the office of executor, although not directly 
regulated by the law, it seems logical to conclude that a new executor should be 
appointed if the previous executor dies, his legal capacity is restricted, he 
renounces the duty, or the court releases him due to a breach (LSA, §§ 80 and 
86). However, this is not entirely certain, as the legislator’s explanatory com-
ments regarding § 86 of the LSA imply that the execution of the will might 
terminate entirely if a court removes an executor.146 Thus, it is worth suggesting 
that the testator explicitly indicates in his will that a new executor be appointed 
in the abovementioned cases; furthermore, he should consider specifically naming 
an alternative executor (§ 78 (1)). 
Unlike in German law, where the term for the execution of a will is 30 years 
(BGB147, § 2210), the LSA does not stipulate a maximum period. However, it 
might depend on the type of disposition needing execution; for example, § 63 (2) 
of the LSA stipulates that if a legacy is given with a suspensive condition that is 
not fulfilled within twenty years after the opening of the succession, the legacy is 
invalid; also, under § 155 (3) of the LSA, the testator can prohibit the division of 
the estate for up to 30 years. 
Regarding the segregation of assets, since objects forming part of the estate 
belong to the heir and not to the executor, they are excluded from the executor’s 
estate in case of his bankruptcy or an execution of enforcement proceedings against 
him. As to the heir’s creditors, unlike German law (BGB § 2214), Estonian law 
does not explicitly stipulate that creditors of the heir have no recourse to the 
objects of the estate subject to administration by an executor. The exclusion could 
be deduced from the nemo plus principle, under which an heir’s bankruptcy trustee 
or bailiff should not have a right of disposal greater than what the heir himself 
initially had. Also, the general principle in the LSA is that the heir’s creditors 
may demand the heir’s debts be paid from the share of the estate to which that 
heir is entitled only after all other obligations regarding the estate have been 
performed (LSA § 126, § 142 (1)). The latter includes the testator’s debts and his 
                                                 
145  D. Schwab, P. Gottwald, S. Lettmaier. Family and Succession Law in Germany. Kluwer 
2012, p. 180. 
146  Pärimisseaduse (56 SE) seletuskiri (in Estonian). Available at: https://www.riigikogu.ee/ 
tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/bf9178a0-a068-736c-7b0f-654c7b4fa81f/Pärimisseadus (11.1.2020), 
p. 16.  
147  German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 
2. Januar 2002), English text available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ 
(11.1.2020).   
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last wishes concerning the estate: the execution of legacies, testamentary obli-
gations (sihtkäsundid) and testamentary directions (sihtmäärangud) (the last two 
concepts being broad enough to cover many orders made by a testator).148 
However, since there is no relevant case law, there is insufficient certainty to say 
that such a segregation of assets applies in all cases.  
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the executor should act in his name or as a 
representative of heirs149. Concerning unauthorised dispositions made by the 
executor, it is, however, possible to conclude that heirs can have claims against 
third-party transferees in both cases; however, there are differences, e.g., when it 
comes to the possibility of bona fide acquisition.  
With subsequent succession the biggest problem seems to be that it is 
uncertain whether and to what extent the testator can restrict the rights granted to 
the provisional heir by law. 
The LSA gives the provisional heir the right to use and consume the objects 
belonging to the estate (LSA, § 53 (1)), collect all benefits receivable from the 
estate (LSA, § 52 (3)), and dispose of the objects belonging to the estate (except 
for immovables and gratuitous disposals – LSA, § 48 (2)). 
Can, the testator, for example, stipulate that the provisional heir has no right 
to all the benefit from the estate, but may only receive a certain monthly amount? 
Could the provisional heir’s expenses be reimbursable from the estate? In this 
case, the provisional heir would have a position more similar to the executor of the 
will.  
On one hand, the LSA’s explanatory memorandum150 states that “as with the 
provisional heir, the rights and obligations of the executor of the will depend on 
the testator’s wishes”. On the other hand, one aim of the changes to the institute 
of subsequent succession in 2008 was to give the provisional heir greater rights 
(compared to the previous act) so as to become more of a “full owner”.151  
It should also be noted that in Estonian succession law, the numerus clausus 
principle applies, under which the testator can only make orders of the type and 
content the LSA provides. Consequently, it should not be possible to alter the 
nature of provisional or subsequent heirship compared to the LSA’s regulation, 
except to the extent the law provides. On the other hand, when considering the 
                                                 
148 According to § 73 (1) of the LSA “a testamentary obligation is a disposition by a testator 
whereby he or she places an obligation on a successor or legatee in a will or succession contract 
without the creation in any person of a right corresponding to the obligation”. According to 
§ 76 (1) “a testamentary direction is a disposition by a testator whereby he or she obliges a 
successor or legatee in a will or succession contract to use the estate or legacy for the 
designated purpose”. 
149  See § 81(9) of the LSA; T. Mikk, Pärimisõigus (Succession Law), Sisekaitseakadeemia 
2012, p. 63; P. Varul et al. The General Part of the Civil Code Act. Commented Edition (Note 
110), pp. 352, 359; Ministry of Justice 12.09.2018 response to 12.07.2018 inquiry by Chamber 
of Notaries. 
150  Note 146, p. 15. 
151  Ibid., p. 7. 
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concept of “testamentary direction” (sihtmäärang) 152, which is one direction a 
testator can make in a will, it is broad enough to accommodate many possible 
aspirations by testators, making it difficult to take numerus clausus very seriously 
in succession law. It is also possible to use tools outside succession law for the 
desired solution, such as entering into a mandate contract for a third party’s 
benefit (and transferring the principal’s assets to the mandator and foreseeing that 
the contract continues even after the principal’s death); or to set up a foundation 
(either inter vivos or mortis causa) for the testator’s family. This again raises 
questions about there being any sense in the strict application of numerus clausus. 
Indeed, the principle is also blurring in other areas, such as property law. And, if 
an “ordinary” heir’s rights can be restricted, why should a provisional heir be 
different? However, there still is uncertainty about the permissibility of restricting 
the rights of the provisional heir under Estonian law. 
Another question is to what extent it is possible to deviate from the testator’s 
orders if subsequent succession is stipulated, such as transferring the estate to a 
subsequent heir before the due date. Under § 48 of the LSA, it seems theoretically 
possible, because only transactions restricting the rights of the subsequent suc-
cessor are declared void. To avoid this, the testator should rule it out expressis 
verbis in the will; for example, foresee another subsequent successor in case such 
things happen.  
Regarding unauthorised transactions made by the provisional heir the fol-
lowing can be said. According to the LSA § 48 (2), a transaction to transfer an 
object forming part of an estate without charge or disposition of an immovable 
or real right by a provisional heir is void upon fulfilment of the condition on 
subsequent succession or on the due date, if the disposition precludes or restricts 
the subsequent heir’s rights. It should be noted, however, that the transaction 
becomes void only “upon fulfilment of the condition on subsequent succession 
or on the due date”. If the thing is still in the third-party transferee’s possession, 
the subsequent heir may vindicate it pursuant to § 80 of the LPA.153 But once 
transferred further, the situation becomes more complicated: the law does not 
provide for the invalidity of the next transaction. Since at the moment the object 
was further disposed of, the condition triggering the subsequent succession had 
not yet arrived (meaning the transfer transaction by the provisional heir was valid 
at that moment?), it is unclear whether the third-party transferor disposed of the 
object as an entitled or an unentitled person (in the meaning the GPCCA § 114). 
Under the principle of fairness, this situation should be interpreted in such a way 
that he was a (conditionally) unentitled person, and therefore the acquisition on 
the basis of the disposition he made depends on the good faith of the new acquirer.  
 
 
                                                 
152  See note 148. 
153  In the case of immovables, entries in the land register concerning third parties as owners 
are incorrect and subsequent heirs can request the correction of entries under § 65 of the LPA.  
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2.2 The need for registration in the UBO register 
Description of the problem. As already mentioned in subsection 1.1, the 
AML/CFT regulations of the EU require that Member States identify trust-like 
arrangements used in their countries and assure the submission of the data of 
related beneficial owners to the register.154  
This has revealed a certain amount of confusion in Estonia concerning the 
concept of trust. In the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention 
Act155 (MLTFPA), which was adopted for the implementation of the AMLD4, 
with regard to trusts and other similar arrangements (that are not legal entities), 
the following instruments are named: the trust fund156, (civil law) partnership 
(seltsing), community (ühisus) or any other association of persons not having 
legal personality (muu juriidilise isiku staatust mitteomavate isikute ühendus) 
(subsection 6 of § 9 (“Beneficial owner”)). The aforementioned selection of 
instruments is not explained in the explanatory memorandum of the MLTFPA. 
Furthermore, the MLTFPA foresees that in the case of the legal arrangements 
                                                 
154  AMLD5 Recitals 26–29. Recital 29: “In order to ensure legal certainty and a level playing 
field, it is essential to clearly set out which legal arrangements established across the Union 
should be considered similar to trusts by effect of their functions or structure. Therefore, each 
Member State should be required to identify the trusts, if recognised by national law, and 
similar legal arrangements that may be set up pursuant to its national legal framework or 
custom and which have structure or functions similar to trusts, such as enabling a separation 
or disconnection between the legal and the beneficial ownership of assets. Thereafter, Member 
States should notify the Commission the categories, description of the characteristics, names 
and where applicable legal basis of those trusts and similar legal arrangements in view of their 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in order to enable their identi-
fication by other Member States. It should be taken into account that trusts and similar legal 
arrangements may have different legal characteristics throughout the Union. Where the 
characteristics of the trust or similar legal arrangement are comparable in structure or function 
to the characteristics of corporate and other legal entities, public access to beneficial owner-
ship information would contribute to combating the misuse of trusts and similar legal 
arrangements, similar to the way public access can contribute to the prevention of the misuse 
of corporate and other legal entities for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.” 
155  Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus. RT I, 04.01.2019, 17; RT I, 
17.11.2017, 2. English version available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518012019004/ 
consolide.  
156  Usaldusfond in Estonian, which, according to the explanatory memorandum (available at: 
https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/fb03e20e-caf7-463d-9b60-ddf6021742b2/ 
Rahapesu%20ja%20terrorismi%20rahastamise%20tõkestamise%20seadus (most recently 
accessed 11.1.2020) – pp. 31–32), is used in the meaning of “trust” and does not have the same 
meaning as limited partnership funds as defined in subsection 2 of § 2 of the Investment Funds 
Act (although the term in Estonian is the same).  The use of the term “usaldusfond” as probably 
one of the best equivalents to the “trust” was proposed by the author herself in one of her first 
articles about trusts (K. Sepp. Good to Know – Trusts. (Kasulik teada: usaldusfondid). – 
Juridica 2011/7, in Estonian).  However, the IFA that was established in 2016 started to use 
the term instead to define a new type of investment fund that is founded as a limited partner-
ship (§ 8 of the IFA).    
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mentioned in § 9 (6), the obliged entities157 must identify the beneficial owner 
(§ 20 (1) 3), § 21 and § 28), register the fact that the transaction was made with 
such a legal arrangement or its representative / trustee (§ 46 (1) 6)) and retain the 
collected data (§ 47); however, there is no obligation to submit information con-
cerning the beneficial owners to any registries or databases. Only legal entities 
must disclose the data of their beneficial owners through the information system 
of the commercial register. 
The draft act158 for changing the MLTFPA for implementing AMLD5 removes 
the above list from § 9 (6) as such, mentioning only trusts (usaldushaldus159) and 
associations of persons not having legal personality (muu juriidilise isiku staatust 
mitteomavate isikute ühendus). According to the draft act, the registration of the 
ultimate beneficial owners will be made compulsory for the trustees of foreign 
trusts residing in Estonia. According to the explanatory memorandum of the draft 
act, Estonia has notified the European Commission that there are no legal instru-
ments in our law whose structure and function are similar enough to those of the 
trusts to be subject to Article 31 of the AMLD.160 
As has been shown earlier in this compendium, in the field of succession law, 
the offices of the executor of a will and the subsequent successor hold a number 
of structural elements similar to trusts and can, with certain deficiencies, also 
serve as a means for intergenerational wealth planning. 
The question is if these arrangements should be considered in the listing of 
similar arrangements in the AMLD context?  
                                                 
157  As defined in § 2 (1) of the MLFTPA. Pursuant to § 2 (1) 9) and § 3 of the MLTFPA, 
“obliged entities” are (among others) persons who provide trust and company services as their 
economic and professional activities and they also need a license for their activities under 
§ 70 (1) 2) of the MLTFPA. The definition of the provider of trust and company services is 
provided by § 8 according to which it means a natural person or a legal person who in its 
economic or professional activities is acting as a representative or trustee of a trust, except for 
a trust within the meaning specified in subsection 2 of § 2 of the Investment Funds Act, or that 
of a civil law partnership, community or another association that does not have legal person-
ality, or the appointment of another person to such position. 
158  Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise seaduse, audiitortegevuse seaduse ja teiste seaduste 
muutmise seadus. Draft and explanatory memorandum available at: https://eelnoud. 
valitsus.ee/main#bogZnv22 (most recently accessed 23.1.2020).  
159  New term invented instead of using the “usaldusfond” to avoid the confusion described in 
note 156. 
160  Note 156, p. 7; list of trusts and similar legal arrangements governed under the law of the 
Member States as notified to the Commission (2019/C 360/05, OJ C 360, 24.10.2019, p. 28–
29). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C.2019. 
360.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2019:360:TOC (11.1.2020). With regard to AMLD, the 
Commission has already initiated a number of infringement proceedings, but to the author’s 
knowledge none of them specifically concern legal arrangements similar to trusts (or infor-
mation provided about them); nor is the author aware of any rulings of the Court of Justice of 
the EU regarding trust-like arrangements in connection to applying of the AML regulations.  
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Statement set forth for defence. Regarding the office of the executor of a 
will161 and the subsequent successor162 that hold certain structural as well as 
functional elements similar to trusts, in the AML/CFT context, we can presum-
ably exclude those devices as there is no “hidden” beneficial owner.  
Reasoning. As AMLD5 lists such contractual devices as fiducie, Treuhand 
and fideicomiso as examples of arrangements similar to trusts,163 highlighting the 
similarities and differences between these and the trust should aid in ascertaining 
what the legislator meant under “arrangements similar to trusts”.  
While the assets constituting the trust fund are ring-fenced in a trust, such that 
protection is included in the event of the insolvency of the settlor from his 
creditors, the Treuhand ends in the consequence of insolvency of the Treugeber 
and the assets may then be reclaimed from the Treuhänder. Thus, we can say that 
the segregation of property is not an obligatory feature for an arrangement to be 
treated as similar to trusts under the AMLD. Also, the beneficiaries’ rights against 
third persons in cases of the misappropriation of property by the trustee are 
generally stronger in the case of trusts compared to fiducie and Treuhand.164 This 
basically leaves us with one common characteristic: the property is entrusted to 
one person, who holds the title to it for the benefit of one or more other persons 
or for a specific purpose.  
Although an executor of a will might have the right to possess, use, or dispose 
of the property (while the successor does not have the right to dispose of it), the 
successor – and not the executor – will be recorded as the owner of the property 
in the respective registers. In the case of a subsequent trustee, the arrangement 
may resemble an interest-in-possession trust165, but until the relevant date or 
condition has come to pass (and the subsequent successor is to be transferred the 
ownership), the subsequent successor, in that capacity166, will have no hidden 
beneficial rights with regard to the estate and the provisional successor is the full 
(and recorded) owner. In addition to that, in the case of immovables the fact of 
the future subsequent succession is recorded in the land register (§ 491 of the 
LRA), and therefore is visible to everyone. Needless to say, the use of those devices 
can only arise in the case of someone’s death, which probably makes it an inef-
fective means for money laundering.  
 
 
                                                 
161  Subdivision 8 of the LSA. 
162 In the case of the arrival of a particular date or fulfilment of a condition, the estate or a 
share thereof transfers from a provisional successor to a subsequent successor (LSA’s §45(1)).  
163  Amendment to Article 31 p 1 of the AMLD4. 
164  S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note 113), p. 613. 
165  In the case of an interest-in-possession trust, one beneficiary is granted a right to the 
income from the trust or the right to use it, by the settlor. Upon the death of said (first) 
beneficiary, the rest of the fund may pass to another beneficiary. 
166  He might be, at the same time, e.g. a legatee. 
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3. The mandate contract 
3.1 The mandate contract as a family asset 
management device  
Description of the problem. As stated at the outset, many legal practitioners in 
this field are of the opinion that there are no good means (comparable to trusts) 
for family asset planning in Estonia.167 When searching for trust-like arrange-
ments in civil-law countries, contractual solutions – and in particular, mandate 
contracts – are often highlighted.168 As outlined in 1.4.2, the mandate agreement 
under the LOA does have similar features to a trust. Therefore, the question arises 
what are the legal issues that come up when using a mandate agreement for family 
asset management, and can they be overcome. 
Statement set forth for defence. Although the “default rules” concerning 
mandate contracts in the LOA by themselves do not provide all the features that 
would be desirable for a trust-like family property management, stretching the law 
using a broader interpretation and/or using other means provided by the legis-
lation could help achieve the similar goal. However, it seems that it is not possible 
to obtain a situation where the assets would be protected simultaneously from 
both the creditors of the third-party-beneficiary and that of the person who settles 
the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.  
Reasoning. According to the definition given by § 619 of the LOA, under a 
mandate contract, the agent undertakes to provide services to the principal.169 The 
services that can be rendered could be various. They may include negotiating and 
entering into contracts with third parties (the agent can be required to act in the 
name of the principal or in his own name) as well as services that do not include 
the conclusion of contracts or performing of other juridical acts; for example, the 
maintenance of property, collecting rent or other proceeds from the property, 
making payments from it,170 etc.  
An essential feature of a trust is that the title to the trust fund is vested in the 
trustee. The LOA does not foresee the transfer of title to the agent as an insepar-
able characteristic of a mandate contract, but it certainly does not exclude this 
possibility. In fact, there are provisions (namely § 626 (3) of the LOA, see below) 
indicating that the legislator took into account that the transfer of title might 
occur. This dissertation proceeds from the presumption that the title to the assets 
                                                 
167  Notes 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
168  M. Graziadei, U. Mattei, L. Smith (eds.). Commercial Trusts in European Private Law. 
Cambridge University Press 2009, pp. 104 ff, 111 ff, 135 ff, 140 ff, etc. 
169  The official translation of Estonian käsundusleping is actually ‘authorisation agreement’, 
but ‘mandate contract’ seems to be more common for these types of legal relationships. Also, 
instead of ‘the mandatary’ ‘the agent’ and instead of ‘the mandator’ ‘the principal’ is used in 
this compendium. 
170  In this case, the provisions of support contracts (LOA, §§ 568–577) should also be con-
sulted. 
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managed under a mandate contract is vested in the agent, which results in him 
acting in his own name not as the principal’s representative. If the agent’s obli-
gations involve entering into transactions in his own name, the provisions regu-
lating the contract of commission, which is one of the subspecies of the mandate 
agreement, also apply as lex specialis.171  
Position of parties. In the case of trusts, three parties – the settlor, the trustee 
and the beneficiary – are usually distinguished. Although the LOA provisions on 
mandate contracts as such are based on the existence of two parties – the principal 
and the agent – it is possible under Estonian law to achieve a similar triangular 
relationship by concluding the contract for the benefit of a third party (LOA, § 80).  
Compared to trusts, the overall division of responsibilities and rights between 
parties involved is, however, rather different under the LOA. In the case of a trust, 
the primary relationship is between the trustee and the beneficiary; the settlor 
generally drops out of the picture after the trust has been set up.  
Under the LOA regulation of mandate contracts, the central relationship is 
between the agent and the principal, the latter having an active role throughout 
the duration of the contract. The agent has to provide the principal information 
on all material circumstances related to the execution of the mandate (LOA, § 624 
(1)) as well as an overview of all income and expenses related to the mandate 
(§ 624 (2)). The principal can give instructions to the agent (§ 621 (1) I).172 He 
can terminate the contract under the terms prescribed in § 630 or § 631 of the 
LOA or it can be agreed that the principal can modify and terminate the contract 
according to his wishes and changed circumstances. The principal is also the one 
that can require the performance of the obligations of the agent. 
The position of a third-party beneficiary under the default rules of the LOA, 
on the other hand, is weaker when compared to that of an English trust bene-
ficiary. Under § 80 (2) and (3) of the LOA, the third-party beneficiary has no right 
to require the performance of an agent’s obligation even if that obligation is to be 
performed for his benefit. The law does not provide for the obligation of the agent 
or the principal to inform the third-party beneficiary of signing the agreement in 
his favour. According to § 80 (6) of the LOA, the parties to the contract may 
amend or terminate an agreement entered into for the benefit of a third party wit-
hout the consent of the third party, unless otherwise provided by the contract or 
by law.173 However, if the principal so wishes, the beneficiary can be given a 
stronger position. In order for the beneficiary to have the right to require the 
                                                 
171  Under § 692 (2) of the LOA the provisions regulating mandate agreements apply to 
contracts of commission unless the provisions of the commission agreement chapter provide 
otherwise. Therefore, when writing the dissertation, both the provisions of the commission and 
the mandate agreement were taken into account. However, most of the issues that are essential 
in the context of comparability to trusts, are regulated in the mandate contracts’ chapter. 
172  However, if the agent must fulfill the mandate based on his professional knowledge or 
ability, the principal cannot provide detailed instructions concerning the manner and con-
ditions of execution of the mandate (LOA § 621 (1) II). 
173  But see P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Note 125), pp. 384–385. 
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performance of an agent’s obligation, it must be explicitly provided for in the 
mandate agreement. In that case, the beneficiary also has the right to demand 
damages and penalty for late payment, but the right to require the performance 
does not give him the right to modify or cancel the contract.174 However, he may 
be authorised by the principal to do so as the principal’s representative or, possibly, 
under § 26 (1) of the LOA, which prescribes that the parties may leave some of 
the terms of a contract to be determined by one party or a third party. 
Segregation and subrogation. Considering that the rules on mandate contract 
grant the principal the opportunity to influence the agent’s activities during the 
lifetime of the contract, it is understandable that the assets subject to the mandate 
agreement are not protected from the principal’s creditors in the case of the 
principal’s bankruptcy – in that case the mandate contract expires under § 632 
(2) of the LOA, the agent has to transfer the assets back to the principal and they 
shall be included in the latter’s bankruptcy estate. There is less logic in the fact 
that the same provision seems to apply if the execution of the mandate contract 
continues after the principal’s death – as his heir(s) will be the new principal(s), 
in the event of the heir’s bankruptcy his creditors also have the right to satisfy 
their claims from the assets subject to the mandate agreement, even when the 
principal has limited the heirs’ rights to terminate or change the contract or to 
give instructions to the principal. However, this risk can be somewhat decreased 
if the principal makes certain testamentary dispositions in addition to the con-
clusion of the mandate contract.175 
In the case of a mandate agreement for the benefit of a third party, the benefi-
ciary’s creditors should be able to satisfy their claims only at the expense of the 
assets that are already transferred to the beneficiary, insofar as these are not yet 
the beneficiary’s property. Whether the beneficiary’s (contingent) future interest 
is alienable is debatable. First of all, as was shown earlier in this subsection, the 
beneficary’s right can be wholly dependant on the wishes and decisions of the 
parties to the contract, which undoubtedly decreases its value. Second, if the legal 
relationship between the principal and the beneficiary has the nature of a donation 
contract,176 the interest could be deemed as “inseparably bound” to the benefi-
                                                 
174  Ibid. 
175  Depending on the circumstances, of course, it is probably possible for the beneficiary of 
the contract to be appointed, for example, as a legatee and the successor’s creditors do not 
have the right to receive the property until all obligations have been fulfilled. Becoming a 
successor can also be linked to a condition – e.g., to assign a subsequent successor in case the 
heir does something unacceptable. 
176  In the case of a contract for the benefit of a third party, in addition to the legal relationship 
between the stipulator and the promisor (in our case the mandate contract between the prin-
cipal and the agent) and the relationship between the promisor and the third party (the agent 
and the beneficiary), a third legal relationship can be distinguished. This is the relationship 
between the stipulator and the third party, which in a trust-like situation is probably a 
gratuitous contract (kinkeleping, hereinafter also the “gift contract”) if the aim of the principal 
is to enrich the third-party beneficiary gratuitously (§ 259 (1) of LOA).  
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ciary under Estonian law (§ 6 (1) of the GPCCA), as donations usually have 
personal reasons.177 
If one of the objectives of the contract is to protect the assets from the principal’s 
creditors (or those of his heirs), the rearranging of legal relationships involved, 
including the parties to those relationships, could somewhat help. For example, 
the person who wants to transfer the assets could, first of all, conclude a donation 
agreement with the beneficiary, who (as the principal) would conclude a mandate 
contract with the agent concerning the object(s) of the donation contract. Instead 
of transferring the asset (the gift) to the donee, the parties would agree that the 
donor’s obligation to deliver the gift is fulfilled by transferring it to the agent, 
who is to transfer the asset to the donee on the terms set out in the mandate contract. 
To ensure the protection of the donor’s wishes, this kind of a mandate agreement 
would probably also include certain limits to the termination and modification of 
the contract by the donee-principal as well as to his right of giving instructions to 
the agent. The donor could withdraw from the contract and reclaim the gift from 
the donee on the bases provided by the provisions concerning gift contracts (e.g. 
if the donee behaves in a manner displaying gross ingratitude towards the donor – 
§ 268 (1) and § 267 (1) of the LOA) or on terms agreed in the contract(s), but it 
must be kept in mind that the donor should have no actual control over the assets 
or the agent’s activities. He should not be a “shadow-principal”. With the bene-
ficiary being the principal instead of the donor, § 632 (2) of the LOA would not 
have an effect on the occasion of the donor’s bankruptcy (the rules on recovery 
(tagasivõitmine) in Bankruptcy Act178 (BA) or Code of Enforcement Proceed-
ings179 (CEP) could nevertheless be relevant). However, the termination of the 
contract could be triggered by the donee/principal’s bankruptcy.  
When it comes to the segregation of assets (transferred under a mandate con-
tract to the agent) from the personal patrimony of the agent, the central provision 
is § 626 (3) of the LOA, which stipulates that claims and movables which an 
agent acquires when performing a mandate in the agent’s name but on account of 
the principal, and claims and movables which the principal transfers to the agent 
for performance of the mandate, are not included in the bankruptcy estate of the 
agent and they cannot be subject to a claim against the agent in an enforcement 
procedure. Apparently, the provision does not provide protection from the agent’s 
creditors to immovables or rights other than claims,180 for example, the shares of 
private limited companies.  
                                                 
177  Which is why a donor may refuse to perform a contract before transferring a gift to a donee 
and withdraw from the contract if the donee dies (§ 267 (5), LOA). This is also why gifts are 
regarded as separate property of the spouses who have otherwise chosen a joint property regime. 
178  Pankrotiseadus. – RT I 2003, 17, 95; 26.6.2017, 29. English text available at: https://www. 
riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/516102017003/consolide 
179  Täitemenetluse seadustik. – RT I 2005, 27, 198; 3.4.2018, 24. English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/509042018004/consolide  
180  However, money on a bank account is protected as it is seen as a claim in Estonian legal 
practice – see decision in case no 2-15-4349 of 3.2.2018 of the Tallinn District Court.  
48 
It is not entirely evident if this exclusion was clearly acknowledged by the 
legislator while formulating the wording of § 626 (3). What is known is that the 
provision was modelled after Art 401 of the Swiss OR181, which also speaks only 
of claims and movables. The problem of the wording of that article was also 
raised182 in Switzerland in the context of trusts and the ratification of the Hague 
Trusts Convention. To clear the issue, Art 284B was added to Swiss Debt 
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act,183 which explicitly states that, in the event of 
a trustee’s bankruptcy, all the trust assets are distinct from those of the trustee. 
It is difficult to find any reasonable justification why other rights (with, 
maybe, the exception of (restricted) real rights entered in the land register) should 
be treated differently from claims and movables here. There is no doubt that 
objects other than movables and claims can be the subject of mandate and 
commission contracts. For example, § 697 of LOA (on commission agreements) 
regulates the sale and purchase of securities. As both, the SMA and SMRA (see 
subsection 1.4.2) foresee the exclusion of the securities from the bankruptcy 
estate of the holder of securities, it can be concluded that the legislator does not 
hold a radical position that rights (other than claims) could not be treated as 
belonging to a special patrimony. Therefore, § 626 (3) of the LOA could be 
interpreted as stretching to rights other than claims despite its wording.  
The desired result can also be achieved via careful designing of the contract. 
First, in the case of immovables, it is possible to enter a preliminary notation in 
the land register to guarantee that any disposal of the immovable after entry in 
the register of the notation is void if it violates the rights of the person whose 
claim is secured by the notation (LPA, § 63 (3) and (5)). In the case of other 
objects; for example, shares of a limited liability company, the conclusion of a 
conditional transfer transaction of the object (under the provisions of Chapter 6 
of the GPCCA; see also subsection 1.4.2) can offer protection from the agent’s 
creditors as, pursuant to the 2nd sentence of § 106 (2) of the GPCCA, the dis-
positions made by the bankruptcy trustee or bailiff are void upon the arrival of 
the condition.184 The disposing of shares of a private limited company can be 
                                                 
181  Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht. Bundesgesetz vom 30. März 1911 betreffend die 
Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht). Avail-
able in English: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/2017040100 
00/220.pdf (11.1.2020). 
182  L. Thévenoz. Trusts in Switzerland. Ratification of the Hague Convention on Trusts and 
Codification of Fiduciary Transfers. Schultess 2001, p. 307. 
183  Bundesgesetz vom 11. April 1889 über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (SchKG). Avail-
able at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/18890002/index.html (11.1.2020).  
184  However, it should be noted that the transaction with a third party will become void only 
at the time the condition is fulfilled. It is doubtful that the principal can submit a claim for the 
exclusion of an asset from the bankruptcy estate (BA, § 123) or an application for release from 
seizure (CEP, § 77 (2)) having only the quasi in rem right but not being the actual owner or 
title-holder. The parties could therefore agree that the automatic transfer of the object to the 
principal also takes place if the agent goes bankrupt or an enforcement procedure is initiated 
against him, which would allow the release of seizure or the exclusion of the object. 
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limited by prescribing in the articles of association that the transfer of a share 
shall be permitted only on certain conditions – for example, depending on the 
consent of another person – under § 149 (3) of the CC. A transaction performed 
without the condition shall be null and void.  
In addition to creating the status of special patrimony over the assets trans-
ferred to the agent, § 626 of the LOA entails the concept of subrogation. Sub-
section 1 stipulates that the agent has to hand over anything received or created 
in connection with performance of the mandate to the principal, along with 
anything the agent received to perform the mandate and did not use to perform 
the mandate. Thus, the principal’s right to claim the assets under this provision 
expands to the new objects that the agent receives when performing the mandate. 
The question is whether the principal can claim the objects (under § 626 (1)) or 
segregate the claims and movables (under § 626 (3)) that are acquired by the 
agent in breach of the mandate contract but at the expense of the assets received 
for performance of the mandate. The wordings of those provisions are quite 
ambiguous on this matter: “anything received or created in connection with per-
formance of the mandate” in subsection 1 and “acquires when performing a 
mandate” in subsection 3.  
For example, if an agent uses the money he should invest to buy himself a car 
(knowing obviously that he had not been given a mandate to buy a car), it could 
be somewhat difficult to argue that he acquired it “when performing a mandate”. 
However, a broader interpretation, which is subsequently offered, could help 
reach the conclusion that subrogation also applies in the case of unauthorised185 
transactions.  
First of all, in other special patrimony cases Estonian law does not make a 
difference, whether the object was acquired with good or bad intentions.186 Thus, 
it could be concluded that the wording of § 626 of the LOA was supposed to 
indicate a difference between the agent’s personal property and the assets he has 
received with the means from the set of assets transferred to him in connection 
with the mandate.  
Second, the principal’s right to choose could be deduced from § 693 of the 
LOA, which allows the principal to deem a transaction made by an agent not to 
have been entered into on the principal’s account if the agent has failed to comply 
with the principal’s instructions – and vice versa, if the principal decides not to 
reject the transaction (even if the agent did not intend to conclude it on the 
principal’s account), it can be considered that the transaction has been made on 
the principal’s account and in that case his right of recourse and the status of 
special patrimony resulting from § 626 of the LOA extends to the object acquired 
by the agent in breach of the mandate contract. This would be a trust-like 
approach as in the case of trusts, the beneficiary can also choose to adopt an 
unauthorised transaction/gain.187  
                                                 
185  Not in line with the terms of the mandate contract, that is.  
186  For example, see § 52 (2) of the LSA.  
187  L. Ho (Note 75), pp. 9–10. 
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Third, given that the law should be interpreted in light of the principle of justice, 
it would be unfair to conclude that the privileged position of the principal com-
pared to other creditors of the agent provided by § 626 (3) of the LOA is valid 
only if the agent is well-behaved and that in the case of a malicious agent the 
principal’s position should be weaker and the possibilities of other creditors to be 
enriched on his behalf should be greater. 
A similar conclusion can be reached through an interpretation of § 108 (7) of 
the LOA, which speaks of the creditor’s right to claim the transfer of the compen-
sation or assignment of the claim for compensation that the obligor has received or 
may receive in lieu of the initial object – this seems to be the German view for 
interpreting § 285 of BGB, which served as a model for § 108 (7) of the LOA.188  
To make the situation clearer, the agent and principal could explicitly agree 
on the principal having rights in personam ad rem towards the objects acquired 
against the principal’s instructions.  
The claims against a third-party transferee in case of misappropriation of 
assets by the agent. As to the principal’s/beneficiary’s rights affecting third-party 
transferees, the regulation of mandate contracts does not in itself create rights in 
rem. When assets have been transferred to the agent, he will have exclusive 
powers characteristic to the ownership, that is to use, manage and alienate the 
property, as well as the right to prohibit third parties from interfering with his rights 
over the property. If he breaches his contractual duty not to alienate the property, 
the validity of his act of alienation will not be affected (§ 76 of the GPCCA). 
Relying on the nullity of the transaction due to its ostensibility (§ 89 of the 
GPCCA), being contrary to law (§ 87 of the GPCCA), good morals or public 
order (§ 86 of the GPCCA) seems also rather difficult taking into account current 
legal practice.189 In principle, the recovery of an asset under CEP or BA190 could 
be possible, but only if the agent was not able to satisfy the principal’s/benefi-
ciary’s monetary claim (e.g. for damages). Whether this involves the return of the 
particular item, is another question.191  
                                                 
188  B. Häcker. Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfer. A Structural Comparison of 
English and German Law. Hart Publishing 2013, p. 308.  
189  P. Varul et al. The General Part of the Civil Code Act. Commented Edition (note 110), pp. 292–
293, 282ff, 273–274. See also V. Kõve et al. Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik II. Kommenteeritud 
väljaanne. (Code of Civil Procedure II. Commented Edition). Tallinn 2017, pp. 408–409. 
190  Depending, of course, on the date and type of the transaction between the agent and the 
third party (see §§ 109–116 of BA and §§ 187–191 of the CEP). 
191 As a result of the recovery process, the transaction could be declared void, which in turn 
should result in the return of the asset by the third party to the obligor (§ 19 (1) of the BA, 
§ 195 (1) (2) of the CEP). For claims and movables that are identifiable as an object of the 
mandate, it could be claimed that the special status provided by § 626 (3) of the LOA remains 
(although this can be arguable when looking at § 195 of CEP that provides for the con-
sequences of recovery and keeping in mind that the recovery has been initiated on the basis of 
a monetary claim not on a court decision requiring the transfer of ownership). For other types 
of objects, the result is the sale of the item and the payment money received from the sale in 
proportion to the claims of other creditors. 
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Even if the transfer to the third party is valid, a claim for damages against the 
transferee could be hypothetically filed on the basis of tort law – if it can be said 
that he intentionally behaved contrary to good morals192 (LOA, § 1045 (1) 8)) or 
behaved in violation of a duty arising from law193 (LOA, § 1045 (1) 7)). In this 
case, the application of § 136 (5) of the LOA could lead to a situation where the 
third party has to transfer the acquired object to the beneficiary to compensate the 
damages.194  
However, as already mentioned, there are provisions elsewhere in private law 
that allow for the formation of a legal relationship in which the principal / benefi-
ciary has rights regarding a particular item between personal and ownership rights 
as they may affect third parties. 
First (as was also mentioned earlier in this subsection), in the case of immov-
ables it is possible to enter in the land register a preliminary notation, which 
would render the subsequent disposals void. The disposing of the shares of a private 
limited company can be limited by prescribing in the articles of association that 
the transfer of a share shall be permitted only on certain conditions under § 149 
(3) of the CC. And again, objects other than immovables can be transferred con-
ditionally under the provisions of Chapter 6 (“Conditional Transaction”) in the 
GPCCA. The person who, as an obligor, has entered into a conditional transaction 
for the transfer of an object, is prohibited from disposing the object to third 
persons (§ 106 (2) of the GPCCA).  
Termination and changing of the contract. Unlike a trusteeship, the role of an 
agent is not seen as an office. This means that a court cannot replace him. Thus, 
the death or incapacity of the agent or the possibility for him to unilaterally 
terminate (under the terms set in § 630 or § 631 of the LOA) the mandate contract 
could mean that the achieving of the purpose of the contract becomes impossible. 
Also, the death or incapacity of the principal can pose certain risks. For example, 
as under § 632 (1) of the LOA it is presumed that the mandate agreement will not 
end upon the death of the principal, the heirs will replace the principal as his 
general legal successors (§ 6 of the GPCCA, § 12 of the LOA). With careful 
designing of the contract it is, however, probably possible to mitigate these risks.  
Regarding the death of the principal and the fact that the mandate agreement 
for the benefit of a third party is, essentially, an intermediated gift contract (see 
footnote 176), the question arises whether § 262 of the LOA (‘Donatio causa 
mortis’), which states that if a gratuitous contract is entered into causa mortis, the 
provisions of the LSA concerning the last will or legacy apply thereto, should be 
applied. This would, first of all, mean that the contract is void if not concluded in 
                                                 
192  See CCSCd 15.4.2015, 3-2-1-18-15, para. 10.  
193  For example, if the third party’s activity could be classified as a criminal offense.  
194  For the implementation practice of § 136 (5) of the LOA, see CCSCd 27.9.2017, 2-15-
18478, para 14; CCSCd 19.4.2011, 3-2-1-12-11, para. 29; CCSCd 4.3.2010, 3-2-1-164-09, 
para. 31. See also S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note 113), p. 585. 
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the format prescribed for the last will (LSA §§ 21–24). 195 Second, the application 
of the provisions of the LSA implies that the terms of the contract must be 
reclassified according to the principles of succession law: the agent would be a 
testamentary executor, the transfer of a thing would be a legacy, etc.  
The question of the application of § 262 of the LOA should not come up in 
cases where the gift contract (or the mandate agreement) is conditional, but the 
arrival of the legal consequences do not depend on whether the donor is dead or 
alive; for example, when the contract stipulates that an asset shall be transferred 
to the beneficiary when he becomes 25 years old (even if the donor / principal 
dies before that). 
But the fact that both the chapter of the mandate agreement (§ 632 (1)) as well 
as § 80 of the LOA regulating the contract for the benefit of a third party include 
special provisions dealing with the death of the obligee-principal, implies that 
§ 262 of LOA should not be applied even when the transfer of assets to the bene-
ficiary is related to the death of the obligee-principal (§ 632 (1) of the LOA 
presumes that the mandate agreement will not end upon the death of the principal; 
§ 80 (5) of the LOA stipulates that if an obligor must perform an obligation for 
the benefit of a third party after the death of the obligee, the third party may 
require performance of the obligation as of the death of the obligee unless the 
contract or the nature of the obligation indicates that the obligation must be per-
formed later). The same conclusion (that such contracts are not subject to the 
special provisions on testamentary dispositions) has been reached in German 
law,196 which contains both an equivalent to § 262 of the LOA (BGB, § 2301) as 
well as to § 80 (5) of the LOA (BGB, § 331 (1)).  
 
 
3.2 The need for registration in the UBO register 
Description of the problem. As shown in the previous subsection, mandate 
contracts can be considered trust-like because they can (with certain difficulties) 
be used for the same purposes and they also share certain elements characteristic 
to trusts. The question is if these types of arrangements should be considered in 
the listing of arrangements similar to trusts in the AMLD context.  
Statement set forth for defence. The author is of opinion that mandate 
contracts should be added to the listing of trust-like arrangements in MLTFPA. 
However, which contracts should be registered should not only be based on the 
(formal) type of contract, but additional criteria should be applied. 
Reasoning. As already highlighted in the previous subsection, the services 
that can be rendered under mandate contracts could be various and the objective 
of the transaction might not include the transfer of title to the agent. As in the 
                                                 
195  See also P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud vln. (Law of Obligations II. 
Commented Edition). Juura 2019, p. 218.  
196  A. Dutta. Will-Substitutes in Germany. – in A. Braun, A. Röthel (eds.) Passing Wealth on 
Death: Will-Substitutes in Comparative Perspective, Hart Publishing 2016, pp. 183–184. 
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UBO-registration context (see subsection 2.2) we can presumably exclude those 
arrangements where there is no ‘hidden’ beneficial owner, the first criteria for 
seeing a mandate contract as trust-like would be that the contract includes the 
feature of fiduciary ownership.  
In addition to that, the object of the contract and its value should be considered. 
As was mentioned in subsection 2.2, the MLTFPA currently requires the explicit 
submission of the UBO data to the relevant register in the case of legal entities, so 
if the object of the mandate contract is, for example, a share of a limited liability 
company, it is required already under current regulation to register the beneficial 
owners. As also mentioned earlier in this subsection, to protect the principal’s or 
a third-party beneficiary’s rights in case of the agent’s insolvency, as well as to 
avoid the possible unauthorised transfer in the case of immovables, these rights 
have to be made visible in the land register. Thus, it might not be necessary to 
duplicate this public information in the UBO registry. But what if the object of 
the contract is not a share of a limited liability company or an immovable – should 
the mandate contracts that include the fiduciary transfer of title be registered? 
One option is to tie the registration obligation to the value of the transaction 
(object); for example, to proceed from the 15,000 eur threshold that the AMLD 
(and the MLTFPA) has set for the application of due diligence measures (Art 11 
of the AMLD and § 19 (1) 2) of the MLTFPA respectively). 
The parties to the transaction may also be set as a criterion for the registration 
obligation. For example, if the agent can be regarded for the purposes of the 
MLTFPA as an obliged entity, who has to identify the beneficial owners, register 
and retain relevant information, assess the client’s risk profile, perform a risk 
analysis, draw up rules of procedure and internal control, inform the relevant 
supervisory institution in case of doubt and obtain a licence for his/her activities, 
the ML/TF risk should in itself be smaller. Pursuant to § 2 (1) 9) and § 3 of the 
MLTFPA, “obliged entities” are amongst others persons who provide trust and 
company services as their economic and professional activities (and they also 
need a licence for their activities under § 70(1)2) of the MLTFPA). The definition 
of the provider of trust and company services is provided by § 8 according to 
which it means a natural person or a legal person who in its economic or pro-
fessional activities is acting as a representative or trustee of a trust, (except for a 
trust within the meaning specified in subsection 2 of § 2 of the Investment Funds 
Act), or that of a civil-law partnership, community or other association that does 
not have legal personality, or the appointment of another person to such position. 
It is difficult to match the person acting as an agent under the mandate agreement 
with the institutes explicity named in the provision – this could be possible based 
on the spirit of the AMLD. But keeping in mind that Estonia has at the moment 
notified the Commission of not having trusts or any similar arrangements, this is 
questionnable. 
However, in certain fields where mandate (and commission) contracts are 
often used – as in trading on stock exchanges and in other regulated markets, 
specific provisions apply. For example, the list of possible holders of nominee 
accounts is limited (see 1.4.3), and as under the MLTFPA many of these possible 
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holders are obliged entities who have to maintain information identifying their 
nominator, the money laundering risk might not be particularly high. The circle of 
persons who can act as custodians and administrators of other securities (i.e. those 
not registered in the ECRS but that correspond to the definition of securities 
within the meaning of § 2 of the SMA) is partly limited – as a rule, only persons 
specified in § 45 of the SMA can provide investment services as a permanent 
activity. Again, the persons normally licenced to provide investment services as 
a permanent activity are also obliged persons under the MLTFPA, and this should 
result in lower risk. However, the circle of persons who can act as intermediaries 
in the securities market is not limited until their activity can be considered only 
as ancillary services to an investment service (in the meaning of § 44 of SMA, 
which includes safekeeping and administration of securities for a client and 
activities related thereto) and not as an investment service (within the meaning of 
§ 43). To these arrangements, the specific provisions of the SMA and SMRA do 
not apply and they should fall under the general regulation of mandate or com-
mission contracts in the LOA. However, as access to the exchange and multi-
lateral trading facility requires opening an account with an intermediary (system 
participant)197 – normally credit institutions or investment firms – their due dili-
gence obligations should include identifying the client and possible UBOs. 
Furthermore, it is unclear, how the UBO-registration requirement would work in 
the context of long and possibly cross-border intermediated chains and in that of 
changing ownership as a result of (high frequency) trading. In such contexts it 
may be impractical, if not impossible to continuously keep full track of the ulti-
mate beneficial owners, while the available information in the register may well 
be outdated or otherwise inaccurate. 
Thus, it can be said that the criteria of registration should, in addition to the 
mandate contract having a nature of fiduciary ownership, proceed from charac-
teristics like the arrangement’s object, its value, the parties, the duration of the 
agreement and possibly also the proportionality of costs of registering and 
monitoring the UBO information and of the infringement of the right to privacy 
of decent citizens. Just as not all trusts contain comfortably hidden and untaxed 
piles of valuable property, not all similar arrangements of civil-law countries are 
ill-intentioned – many may well, for example, only hold an item with a very small 
value for a very short time as an object. It is hard to believe that the drafters of 
the AMLD really meant that all instruments that somehow resemble a trust should 
be entered in UBO registries as it would be an incredible burden to start 
registering them all and later supervise the fulfilment of the obligation of 
registration causing a disproportionate administrative hassle, cost, and loss of 
privacy for decent citizens, while the actual money-launderers would in the future 
refrain from enaging in arrangements deemed (officially) trust-like and find other 
means.  
                                                 
197 SMA § 151 (3), § 1633 (1); Nasdaq rulebook 3.1.2 – Available at: https://nasdaqcsd.com/wp- 
content/uploads/Chapter_I_Rulebook_Sept14_2017.pdf; list of participants: https://nasdaqcsd. 
com/services/services-to-account-operators/list-of-account-operators/ (9.10.2019).  
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4. Private foundations 
Description of the problem. While many countries have chosen the implemen-
tation of the Anglo-American trust for family asset management, the (European 
as well as the world’s) private foundation landscape has also been evolving in 
recent decades.198 One of the reasons is definitely the foundation’s suitability as 
an instrument for succession planning in which the foundations are successfully 
competing with the trusts.199 The leanings towards the private foundation model 
rather than the trust model might be related to private foundations being a more 
familiar and a clearer structure for civil-law countries. Many would-be settlors 
may be baffled to learn that trusts do not exist as separate legal entities and that 
the proposed estate-planning exercise consists of an assignment of valuable and 
hard-earned property to a stranger, who will then hold it in his own name.  
Estonia has had its foundation regulation – in the form of the Estonian Foun-
dations Act (FA) – in place since 1995. While some countries require their 
foundations to be dedicated to public benefit purposes only and some have different 
laws or categories for public benefit foundations and private foundations,200 in 
Estonia the regulation on foundations in principle caters for both public and 
private benefit purposes and no specific restrictions are imposed on the purpose 
of a foundation. Thus, they could be (theoretically) used to protect private wealth 
or benefit present or future generations of a family.  
However, it seems that foundations in Estonia are not very often used for 
family asset management today. There are about 800 foundations in Estonia, and 
it can be concluded from their fields of activity that most of them are established 
for the public interest and/or to engage in economic activities.201 Based on hearsay 
                                                 
198  Whereas in Austria before 1993, foundations had no choice except to be charitable, the 
Private Foundations Law of 1993 enabled private foundations. In Belgium, the private 
foundation was introduced in 2002, and the foundation sector in Belgium has been growing 
ever since. Malta enacted specific foundation legislation in 2007. The legal and tax landscape 
surrounding Dutch private foundations dramatically changed with the introduction of a new 
tax doctrine on ‘segregated private capital’ as of 2010. Even before that, one specific foun-
dation form, the so-called ‘depository foundation’ (stichting administratiekantoor, STAK) for 
the purpose of acquiring and administering assets (shares) was widely used. Regarding com-
mon law countries, see P. Panico. New foundation legislation in common law jurisdictions: a 
‘second generation’? – in Trusts & Trustees, Vol. 24, No. 6, July 2018, pp. 511–518. 
199  F.A. Schurr. Liechtenstein: Beneficiaries’ rights and foundation governance in Liechten-
stein. – Trusts & Trustees, Volume 21, Issue 6, July 2015, Pages 674–678, https://doi-org. 
portaal.nlib.ee:2443/10.1093/tandt/ttv062, p. 674. 
200  K.J. Hopt et al. (eds.). The European Foundation: A New Legal Approach. Cambridge 
University Press 2006, p. 38. 
201  According to the statistics of the e-Business Registry: https://www2.rik.ee/rikstatfailid/ 
failid/tabel.php?url=19_02tg.htm (11.1.2020). See also Granting and appropriate use of 
support given to foundations established by the state. Is the use of public money transparent 
and verifiable? – Report of the National Audit Office to the Riigikogu, Tallinn, 14 April 2014. 
Available at: https://www.riigikontroll.ee/tabid/215/Audit/2315/WorkerTab/Audit/WorkerId/ 
28/language/et-EE/Default.aspx (11.1.2020).  
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in legal circles, local high-net-worth individuals202 seem to prefer to use schemes 
offered by other countries. This is because there exist certain bottlenecks in 
Estonian law which hinder the establishment of private foundations. These 
include the current taxation of private foundations, public accessibility of docu-
ments and the number of people involved in the administration of foundations.  
 
 
4.1 Excessive publicity  
Statement set forth for defence. One of the main problems regarding the 
establishment of foundations for private purposes is the current over-disclosure 
(of documents) compared to other countries and also considering AML/CFT 
regulatory requirements. The author suggests that a new special type of foun-
dation should be introduced in Estonian legislation – a private foundation with 
limited economic activity, non-public documents and compulsory annual review 
by an auditor. 
Reasoning. With the MLTFPA enacted to implement the AMLD4, an 
exception was made regarding the registration of ultimate beneficiary owners of 
private foundations: according to § 76 (3) 4) a foundation the purpose of whose 
economic activities is the keeping or accumulating of the property of the 
beneficiaries or a circle of beneficiaries specified in the articles of association and 
who has no other economic activities, does not have the duty to submit UBO data 
to the commercial register. However, this regulation is not enough to guarantee 
the privacy of the private foundations’ stakeholders as according to the rules of 
the FA and related acts, the information on a private foundation is still available 
to everyone from the register.  
According to § 6 (1) of the FA, the foundation resolution shall set out the data 
(name, address, etc.) pertaining to the foundation, along with the founders, the 
members of the management/supervisory board, and the assets to be transferred 
to the foundation by the founders.  
Under § 8 of the FA, other terms shall be set forth in the bylaws: the objectives; 
the (set of) beneficiaries; the distribution of the assets of the foundation upon 
dissolution of the foundation; the procedure for the appointment and removal of 
members of the management or supervisory board; the procedure for the 
amendment of the bylaws; the conditions for the dissolution of the foundation; 
the remuneration of the board members; the procedure for use and disposal of 
assets; and any other conditions provided by law or that are not contrary to the 
law. This also means that the conditions for how the distributions to the bene-
ficiaries are to be made must be laid out in the bylaws. The FA does not foresee 
the possibility of a separate “letter of wishes”, which, in the case of trusts (and in 
some countries also private foundations), is an indication by the settlor of the 
manner in which he wishes the trustees to exercise their discretion in relation to 
                                                 
202  HNWIs are defined as those persons having investable assets of US$ 1 million or more, 
excluding their primary residence and collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables. 
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a trust. Even if there exists such a letter, its binding nature might be question-
able.203 Decisions contrary to such a letter probably cannot be challenged under 
§ 38 (1) of the GPCCA.204 
A foundation resolution and the articles of association approved thereby shall 
be notarised (§ 6 (3) of the FA) and the notary shall submit the petition for entry 
in the register (§ 11 (1) and (4) of the FA). After the private foundation is 
registered, both the resolution and the bylaws are accessible to anyone (for a fee 
of two euros) from the register of not-for-profit associations and foundations (as 
they are included in the “public file”).205 Furthermore, under § 34 (4) of the FA, 
Estonian private foundations have to submit annual accounting reports to the 
register, and these, too, are publicly available from the register. Hence, everybody 
can access all the information pertaining to the financial situation, economic 
performance, and cash flows of any private foundation.  
In addition, the terms “interested person” and “person with a legitimate interest” 
pop up here and there in the FA, the meaning of which is not clear. For example, 
a “person with a legitimate interest” may, pursuant to § 39 (1) of the FA, demand 
information from a foundation, including the information pertaining to fulfilment 
of the objectives of that foundation, the sworn auditor’s report, and accounting 
documents. Section 39 (2) of the FA grants the same right to “all interested 
persons” if the bylaws do not determine a set of beneficiaries.206  
If we look at the regulations for private foundations in other countries, we can 
see that they offer more privacy.  
In Austria, the declaration of establishment can be split into two documents: 
the statutes and the bylaws.207 The nomination of beneficiaries and giving 
                                                 
203  In the case of trusts, the “letter of wishes” might be of more or less binding character 
(U&H (Note 2, p. 888 ff). In the case of Estonian law, the format probably also plays a role, 
since the bylaws of the foundation must be notarised. 
204  An interested person may file an action for repeal of a resolution of a body of a legal person 
which is contrary to law or the articles of association in court.  
205  § 77 (1) and § 85 of Non-profit Associations Act (Mittetulundusühingute seadus. RT I 
1996, 42, 811; RT I, 09.05.2017, 21; English text available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ 
en/eli/515012018007/consolide; § 217 (1) 2) 3) of the rules of procedure of the court regist-
ration department (Kohtu registriosakonna kodukord. RT I, 28.12.2012, 10; RT I, 11.01.2019, 
8); § 14 (3) of FA. 
206  Grammatically, one might conclude that the coverage of the term “interested persons” 
could be wider than the “person who has legitimate interest”. But according to our legal practice, 
an “interested person” has the same meaning in Estonian civil law as a person who has a 
“legitimate interest”, “justified interest”, “legal interest”, etc., and this should not be simply a 
curious person but a person whose subjective rights could be influenced by a certain situation 
(who, in this case, should generally be the beneficiaries – § 9 of FA defines beneficiaries both 
in a more specific (the first sentence) and in a more general (the second sentence) manner) – 
CCSCd 10.01.2007, 3-2-1-135-06, p. 9.; CCSCd 14.11.2002, 3-2-1-135-02, p. 13; CCSCd 
11.03.2015, 3-2-1-167-14, p. 14 ff. 
207  § 10 of Bundesgesetz über Privatstiftungen (Privatstiftungsgesetz–PSG) StF: BGBl. Nr. 
694/1993; 112/2015; M. Petritz, A. Kampitsch. Austria: The Austrian private foundation. – 
Trusts & Trustees 20/6 (July 2014), pp. 543–544. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttu075.  
58 
directions as to distributions to be made to the beneficiaries can be settled in the 
bylaws, which are not open to the public for inspection.208 However, based on EU 
rules on the combat of money laundering and terrorist financing, Austria intro-
duced the transparency register for beneficial owners of Austrian entities in 2018 
with the Beneficial Owner Register Act (BORA).209 Initially, the information in 
the register was not publicly available and access was limited to obliged entities, 
other authorities and persons with legitimate interest (Art 9 (1) and (2), Art 10 
(1) and Art 12). However, in July 2019 the BORA was amended and it seems that 
the amendments open access to the private foundation’s beneficial owners’ 
information to the public at large210. 
Nevertheless, information on the UBO register is only available about the bene-
ficial owners and not for the entire activities of the foundation: Austrian private 
foundations are subject to bookkeeping and financial reporting in the same 
manner as a corporation, but the public has no access to the reports of a private 
foundation and only the tax authorities are aware of its income, wealth, and 
assets.211 A private foundation is, however, subject to an annual audit by an inde-
pendent professional auditor, who has to assess whether the private foundation’s 
activities have been in line with its purpose as stated in the private foundation 
documents, whether its funds have been managed properly and wisely, whether 
all housekeeping tasks have been correctly performed, and whether the private 
foundation is fully compliant with the law (including tax regulations). The auditor 
is also to review the private foundation’s compliance with the AML/CFT rules.212  
In Belgium, the bylaws of a private foundation are public,213 but the accounting 
obligations depend on the size of the foundation,214 which also determines where 
the relevant information has to be filed, as there is no central database for the 
                                                 
208  § 10 of PSG; F. Schwank. The Austrian private foundation as a holding structure for global 
family wealth. – Trusts & Trustees 20/1–2 (February–March 2014), p. 173. DOI: http://dx. 
doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttt247. However, if the private foundation is to qualify for tax advan-
tages, the documents must still be disclosed to the Austrian tax authorities – Hasch & Partner 
Anwaltsgesellschaft. The Austrian private foundation: A brief guide for the investors, p. 4. 
Available at: http://hasch.eu.dedi2098.your-server.de/files/channels/publikationen/Austrian_ 
Private_Foundation_Brochure__E_.pdf (11.1.2020). 
209  Wirtschaftliche Eigentümer Registergesetz (WiEReG). BGBl. I Nr. 136/2017; BGBl. I Nr. 
62/2018.  
210  Art 10 of WiEReG. BGBl. I Nr. 136/2017; BGBl. I Nr. 23/2020. 
211  F. Schwank. The Austrian private foundation: Between transparency and bank secrecy. – 
Trusts & Trustees 16/6 (July 2010), p. 418. 
212  Ibid, p. 416. 
213  A. van Zantbeek, J. Drayey. The Belgian private foundation. – Trusts & Trustees 16/6 
(July 2010), p. 511. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/tts052. 
214  O. Farny et al. Taxation of foundations in Europe, p. 12. Available at: https://www. 
arbeiterkammer.at/infopool/akportal/Studie_Stiftungsbesteuerung_in_Europa_englisch.pdf 
(11.1.2020).  
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foundation sector.215 Only “large”216 foundations are to be audited. From 
31 October 2018 onward, private foundations have to register the data of ultimate 
beneficial owners to the General Treasury Administration (GTA) under a new 
Belgian royal decree of 30 July 2018 creating the Ultimate Beneficial Owner 
Register.217 The data can be accessed by: a) the competent authorities (including 
the Belgian tax authorities); b) entities such as the National Bank, financial insti-
tutions, insurance companies, notaries, accountants and lawyers; c) any other 
person or organisation with a legitimate interest relating to the prevention of 
money laundering or the finance of terrorism; d) any other person who submits a 
written access request to the GTA for foundations that exert control over a 
company, non-profit-association, trust or foundation (Art 7 ff).  
In Malta218 and the Netherlands,219 the private foundations’ deeds are not 
public, and there is no need for annual reporting. Up until the EU’s new UBO-
rules, there was no disclosure of founder or beneficiary names. The UBO register 
came into effect in Malta on 1 January 2018. The Maltese UBO information is 
publicly accessible only in case of companies, not trusts or foundations.220 How-
ever, it seems that new regulations in the Netherlands will make the UBO infor-
mation (at least partly) public also in case of foundations221.  
From various versions of AMLD, it is somewhat confusing whether infor-
mation on the actual beneficiaries of foundations should be publicly accessible 
or not. According to AMLD4, foundations rather belonged to the category of 
trusts (recital 17 and Art 3 (6) c)) and the information concerning UBOs of trusts 
(and similar arrangements) was to be made directly accessible only to competent 
authorities and financial intelligence units; Member States could decide them-
selves whether to provide access also for obliged entities (Art. 31 (4)); the persons 
                                                 
215  V. Xhauflair et al. Belgium Country Report, EUFORI Study, p. 10. Available at:  
http://euforistudy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Belgium.pdf (11.1.2020).  
216  Private foundations that fulfil one or more of the following three criteria: 50 full-time staff, 
EUR 6,250,000 in annual revenue, and EUR 3,125,000 in total assets. – Ibid, p. 10. 
217  Royal Decree of 30/07/2018, Belgian Official Gazette of 14/08/2018. Unofficial English 
translation available at: https://finance.belgium.be/sites/default/files/20180817_AR%20UBO 
_EN.PDF (11.1.2020). 
218  A. Cremona. Malta: Foundations – the new vehicle of choice? – Trusts & Trustees 16/6 
(July 2010), p. 481. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttq046. 
219  M. Vogel. The Dutch foundation: The solution in tax planning, estate planning and asset 
protection for high net worth individuals worldwide. – Trusts & Trustees 21/6 (July 2015), 
pp. 686–690. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttv067; M. Bergervoet, J. Starreveld. How 
private is the Curaçao private foundation, Curaçao trust, and the Dutch private foundation? – 
Trusts & Trustees 19/6 (July 2013), pp. 577–583. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttt080. 
220  PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, The UBO register: an update, Dec 2019, 
p. 16. Available at: https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/the-ubo-register-update-december-
2019.pdf (29.5.2020). 
221  Deloitte Netherlands. UBO Registration in the Netherlands: Update Fall 2019. Available 
at: https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/legal/articles/ubo-registration-in-the-netherlands.html 
(31.1.2020). 
60 
with “legitimate interest” were not mentioned222. According to the AMLD5 in 
addition to competent authorities, financial intelligence units and obliged entities, 
the information in relation to the UBOs of trusts (and similar arrangements) 
should be accessible to any natural or legal person that can demonstrate a legiti-
mate interest and any natural or legal person that files a written request in relation 
to a trust/similar arrangement where the latter has direct or indirect controlling 
interests in certain companies. In the case of foundations, it is confusing whether 
they should be treated in the same way as trusts or as companies (insofar as they 
are legal entities – see Art 30 (1)), whose UBO information should be publicly 
accessible. In essence, private foundations pursue the same purpose as trusts – 
the administration of assets for the benefit of others – and there is therefore no 
reasonable justification for treating them differently. The initial proposal for 
AMLD5 suggested allowing public access to the data on those trusts and foun-
dations that are ‘business-type’ and/or administered by professionals and granting 
it to those persons ‘with legitimate interest’ in the case of others223 and it is not 
clear whether the reference to foundations in this context has been omitted 
intentionally or unintentionally from the final version of AMLD5. 
In any case, even if the information of the actual beneficiaries should, in prin-
ciple, be publicly disclosed, the disclosure of other documents (bylaws, financial 
statements, etc) seems excessive. Publicity on that level could be explained in the 
case of foundations with a public purpose (like charities) that have external donors 
or maybe in cases in which a foundation has engaged heavily in business activities 
(to protect possible creditors), but in cases of a classical family foundation with 
an objective of holding property, it raises the question of whether there are third 
parties actually needing that kind of protection.  
The author is of opinion that the founder of a private foundation should be 
able to stipulate that the foundation documents (foundation resolution, bylaws, 
documents certifying the transfer of assets to the foundation, accounting reports) 
are not accessible to everyone. In order to draw as well as to simplify the 
                                                 
222  It may be recalled here that the initial introduction of UBO registries opened up a heated 
debate about privacy. In a PwC study addressing the impact of the UBO register, the following 
was stated: “It goes without saying that the interests of those involved may be seriously 
prejudiced by the careless or incompetent processing of personal details […]. [E]ntre-
preneurial and high-net-worth families fear that the public information will lead to undesirable 
mentions on ‘lists of millionaires’ and the not-inconceivable risk of blackmail, violence, 
intimidation, kidnapping or fraud. This is particularly so in the case of minors or other 
vulnerable individuals”. See PwC Netherlands. Finding a balance between transparency and 
privacy – a study of the impact of the UBO register on high-net-worth families and family 
businesses in twelve European countries, p. 16. Available at: https://www.pwc.nl/en/assets/ 
documents/pwc-finding-a-balance-between-transparency-and-privacy.pdf (11.1.2020). 
223  Explanatory memorandum to the European Commission’s ‘Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing 
and amending Directive 2009/101/EC of 5 July 2016’, p. 16. Available: https://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0450&from=EN (29.5.2018). 
61 
distinction between private foundations and other foundations, it would be 
advisable to give a separate definition of a private foundation as a new special 
type of foundation. For that, the author is proposing a new subsection (11) to § 1 
of the FA, which would set out the most important difference between a private 
foundation compared to other types of foundations: namely that the documents 
of a private foundation – in contrast to all other foundations should not be publicly 
available. In order to reduce the number of business relations and creditors that 
could be affected by not having access to the foundation’s documents, the new 
definition should also set out that a private foundation is not allowed to engage 
in economic activities that are not directly related to the maintenance and 
accumulation of assets in the interests of its beneficiaries. Thus, a private 
foundation must meet the following conditions: 1) the foundation operates on 
behalf of private interests and in accordance with the purpose specified in its 
bylaws; 2) the foundation is established for the purpose of administering assets 
obtained from its founders or other persons; 3) the foundation does not receive 
income from active business activities; that is, it does not provide services or sell 
goods to earn profit. Hence, the private foundation may, for example, invest in 
securities or conduct some real estate transactions, but not open an online store 
“in the sole interest of the beneficiaries”. If the foundation does not carry on an 
economic activity, it also generates a minimal number of creditors or other 
persons who might be interested in obtaining information on the foundation from 
the registers. However, if it emerges that a foundation whose documents are not 
publicly available in accordance with the articles of association is carrying on an 
economic activity as its principal activity, it should be possible to decide on the 
compulsory dissolution of the foundation in accordance with § 46 (1) 1) of the 
FA. To ensure that the private foundation is not engaged in unauthorised 
economic activities, all private foundations should be subject to a review of their 
annual accounts by an auditor, and the auditor shall additionally give an opinion 
on whether the activities of the private foundation comply with the law. 
The author also proposes that if according to the articles of association, the 
documents of a private foundation are not subject to disclosure, the documents 
that would be otherwise kept in the public file shall be kept in a registry file 
accessible only to persons with a legitimate interest (§ 77 (4) of Non-profit Asso-
ciations Act, § 61 of the rules of procedure of the court registration department). 
Such persons having a legitimate interest would include, first and foremost, the 
persons referred to in § 61 (2) of the rules of procedure of the court registration 
department (competent authorities, court, bailiff, trustee in bankruptcy), benefi-
ciaries and people who have reason to believe that they might be beneficiaries, 
members of the bodies of the foundation, auditor of the foundation, founder, 
persons entitled to access the information pursuant to the foundation’s bylaws224 
                                                 
224  The author also proposes to clear the confusion stemming from § 39 of the FA and to 
include only beneficiaries in this provision – this would also cover beneficiaries in a wider 
sense (based on the 2nd sentence of § 9 of FA). Other people can obtain information about a 
foundation from the register. It would also be advisable to give the founder the right to 
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and obliged entities under the AML/CFT regulations. It is probably not sensible 
to give an exhaustive list of persons with a legitimate interest in the legislation, 
since in the case of foundations which are established for private interest but 
which do not have clearly identifiable (set of) beneficiaries pursuant to the 
objectives of the foundations (e.g. a pet care foundation), it is necessary that the 
circle of persons with legitimate interest would be wider in order to maintain 
control over the bodies of the foundation. It is also reasonable to provide that the 
court hears the members of the management board and supervisory board of the 
foundation whenever possible in order to determine the person’s legitimate interest.  
 
 
4.2 Bodies of a foundation: Two boards, four people 
Statement set forth for defence. The author suggests that, in the case of private 
foundations, the supervisory board requirement be relaxed to a minimum of one 
member.  
Reasoning. At the moment, § 16 of the FA foresees two mandatory organs: 
the management and the supervisory board. According to § 17 (7) and § 18 (3) of 
the FA, the management board manages and represents the foundation but has to 
adhere to the lawful orders of the supervisory board. The management board may 
consist of one or several members, who must be natural persons. Subsection 5 of 
§ 17 of the FA prohibits beneficiaries or persons with an equivalent economic 
interest from being members of the management board. Also, a member of the 
supervisory board shall not be a member of the management board (under § 17 
(6) of the FA). 
According to § 24 of the FA, the supervisory board plans the activities of the 
foundation, organises the management of the foundation, and supervises the 
foundation’s activities. Subsection 1 of § 26 of the FA foresees that the super-
visory board must have at least three members (again, natural persons). The 
founder and the beneficiaries can be members of the supervisory board (if this is 
not prohibited by the bylaws). 
Consequently, the founder has to find at least three trustworthy persons (in 
addition to himself) – one to be a member of the management board and three for 
the supervisory board – to set up a private foundation. For a small family-wealth-
protection vehicle, this might be too much.  
In Malta, only the board of administrators is mandatory. The founder is the 
one who may exercise supervision over the administration of the private foun-
dation. He is also entitled to intervene in the appointment of administrators or in 
the disposal of the assets, when a court is dealing with these issues. Adminis-
trators of a private foundation may be either natural or legal persons. In the latter 
case, there must be at least three directors. Administrators do not need a licence 
to act as such. A founder may be an administrator of a foundation and may also 
be a private foundation’s beneficiary within his lifetime: if the founder is a 
                                                 
establish a wider set of persons in the articles of association, having this right to obtain 
information, including the founder himself or herself. 
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beneficiary, that founder may not, at the same time, act as the sole administrator 
of the private foundation. The terms for the private foundation may provide for 
the establishment of a supervisory council consisting of at least one member or 
for the office of one or more protectors with similar functions.225 
In Belgium, having a supervisory board is not mandatory, but a private foun-
dation must have at least three directors (either individuals or legal entities).226 
The existence of a supervisory board is voluntary also in the Netherlands.227 
In Austria, the board of directors has to consist of at least three members. The 
founder normally appoints the members of the board in its initial composition, 
and the court subsequently appoints any new members. A (current) beneficiary, 
a spouse or partner thereof, other relatives (as far as the third degree), and legal 
persons may not be members of the board. The founder is not generally excluded 
from membership of the board unless he is a current beneficiary. A supervisory 
board is mandatory only if the private foundation has more than a certain number 
of employees.228  
The author suggests that, in the case of private foundations, the supervisory 
board requirement be relaxed to specify a minimum of one member. Removing 
the supervisory board completely would significantly lessen the internal control 
system, and this is not desirable. The (greater) involvement of external bodies was 
also considered, but this role would not comply with the scope of responsibilities 
that auditors currently have in Estonia, and the imposition of more extensive judi-
cial supervision would probably be too much of a burden for the Estonian courts.  
 
 
4.3 Double taxation 
Statement set forth for defence. Another major issue hindering the establish-
ment of private foundations today is the current double taxation. To ensure com-
petitiveness with other well-known foundation jurisdictions, Estonian legislators 
should abolish double taxation of private foundations and establish rules similar 
to those applicable to holding companies.  
Reasoning. In practice, private foundations are often used for holding the 
shares of a company, exercising shareholders’ rights, and passing on the dividends 
received to the beneficiaries. When an Estonian company pays dividends (or makes 
payments from the equity of the company, liquidation proceeds, or other sources 
listed in § 50 (2) of the Income Tax Act (ITA) 229), it has to pay income tax 
                                                 
225  J. Scerri-Diacono. Malta: A synopsis of the basic rules regulating private foundations. – 
Trusts & Trustees 14/5 (June 2008), pp. 320–333. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tandt/ttn029. 
226  A. van Zantbeek, J. Drayey (see Note 213), p. 510. 
227  M. Vogel (see Note 219), p. 686. 
228  C. Prele (ed.). Developments in Foundation Law in Europe. Springer Netherlands 2014, 
p. 16. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9069-7. 
229  Tulumaksuseadus – RT I 1999, 101, 903; RT I, 28.12.2018, 51. English text available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/529012019001/consolide 
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(§ 50 (1)). According to § 50 (11) and § 50 (21) of the ITA, no income tax is to be 
charged if the parent company of the relevant company makes further 
distributions from that profit. These exemptions cannot be applied to a foun-
dation, as it does not have owners and the payments cannot be regarded as divi-
dends or any other type of payments from equity. There is no fundamental dif-
ference in the case of the private foundation owning shares of a non-Estonian 
legal entity, as non-resident companies also normally pay taxes in their countries 
of tax residency before transferring dividends to the private foundation. Hence, a 
second taxation of the relevant income takes place when the private foundation 
transfers funds to beneficiaries. It is not entirely clear how the payment should be 
defined under the ITA, but there are two options: it is more likely that the payment 
should be regarded as a gift (which under § 49 (1) of the ITA is taxable if made 
by a legal entity). The second alternative would be to define the payment as an 
expense not related to business or activities specified in the bylaws and tax it 
accordingly (under § 51 (3) of the ITA). Under both options, there is no further 
taxation if the beneficiary is a resident natural person (see § 12 (2) and § 19 (3) 6) 
of the ITA). When the beneficiary is a non-resident, further taxation depends on 
the country of residence.  
When a private foundation sells shares of a company and subsequently dis-
tributes the gains to beneficiaries, taxation of the distribution takes place in the 
same way as in the example above. As the gain is already taxed at the level of the 
investee, double taxation takes place here also, and the same problem is applic-
able for companies.230 
The solution for resolving the first issue would be to treat distributions to 
private foundation beneficiaries made in accordance with the bylaws as if they 
were dividends of a company. With this approach, all exemptions that are applic-
able to dividends would be applicable also to payments to beneficiaries from the 
profits. Payments to third parties or expenses not related to activities specified in 
the bylaws would be treated in the way they are now.  
Another issue is the distribution of endowments to beneficiaries. Payments of 
this nature are currently taxed similarly to payments from dividend income, as 
described above. However, there is no gift or inheritance tax in transactions 
between natural persons,231 and when a company decreases its share capital and 
distributes the funds to owners, no tax is charged on the portion not in excess of 
the contributions made to the equity of the company.  
 
                                                 
230  See E. Uustalu. Põhimõtteline muudatus maksusüsteemi konkurentsivõime suurendamiseks: 
vabastame osaluste võõrandamise topeltmaksustamisest (‘A fundamental change in the tax 
system to increase competitiveness: Getting rid of the double taxation of transfer of shares’). – 
MaksuMaksja 2008/4 (in Estonian). Available at: http://www.maksumaksjad.ee/modules/ 
smartsection/item.php?itemid=730 (11.1.2020). 
231  However, we need to take into account that the acquisition cost for the beneficiary is zero 
and there could be tax consequences at the point of sale of the asset (e.g., with respect to real 
estate and investments). 
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5. Conclusions 
When considering different elements and functions of the trust it can be con-
cluded that there are various arrangements in Estonian legal regulation and 
practice that are similar to trusts, like common funds, nominee accounts, mandate 
agreements, foundations, testamentary executor, subsequent succession, etc.  
From the AML/CFT perspective, this does not necessarily mean that they 
should all be registered in the UBO register – in the AMLD context being ‘trust-
like’ rather boils down to situations wherein from the outside the property has 
one person as an owner but there also exists an internal relationship that obliges 
the title-holder to observe certain duties and that may enable another person with 
economic benefit from the property. In addition, the registration obligations 
should also be foreseen only if it is, per se, achievable and proportionate. Thus, 
the current list of trust-like devices brought out in the AMLTF should, on the one 
hand, be broadened (including the mandate contract) and, on the other hand, 
probably narrowed.  
For family asset management, the author concluded that the mandate agree-
ment, the institutes of the pre-/subsequent successor and testamentary executor 
and private foundations would be most suitable institutes in Estonian law. 
However, under the current regulations, all of these have deficiencies compared 
to trusts. 
A legal relationship resulting from a mandate contract under Estonian civil 
law can be rather similar to a common law trust – 1) it can be concluded so that 
the title to the assets is transferred to the agent; 2) the assets can be segregated 
from the agent’s personal patrimony; 3) the possibility for the beneficiary to 
obtain the assets from a third-party transferee when the agent has made an 
unauthorised disposal can be created; 4) there exists a check and balance 
mechanism between the parties. However, some of those elements are not written 
in the “default” rules of the Mandate Contract chapter of the LOA and can be 
achieved only via other means provided in Estonian private law with extremely 
careful preparing of the contract and the help of a legal professional who can take 
into account the widest possible spectrum of circumstances that can arise. In 
addition to covering the “core elements” of a trust-like relationship, specific 
attention needs to be given to other factors that can be detrimental to the prin-
cipal’s objectives if left unregulated, such as the questions related to the termina-
tion of the contract, whether it be due to the death, mental incapacity or the uni-
lateral decision of either of the parties. However, even with careful preparation, 
a mandate contract concluded under Estonian law would probably not be a perfect 
equivalent to a trust in every situation. For example, the assets obtained by the agent 
in connection to the mandate agreement are not protected from the principal’s 
creditors in case of the principal’s bankruptcy. Sometimes, the rearranging of the 
legal relationships involved, namely the parties to those relationships, could help. 
But it seems that it is not possible to achieve a situation where the assets would 
be protected simultaneously from both the creditors of the third-party beneficiary 
and that of the person who settles property for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
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Regarding solutions comparable to testamentary trusts under Estonian law, a 
great deal of uncertainty also emerges. In principle, the appointment of a testa-
mentary executor should exclude the heirs’ participation in making decisions 
concerning the estate and their right of disposal of the assets. However, there are 
controversial provisions in family law leading to practical problems regarding the 
impact of third parties on the estate. Another issue with the testamentary execu-
tion is that although the legislator has not explicitly excluded administration of 
the estate over a longer period nor prescribed a clear time frame, the lack of regu-
lation in important questions shows that the executor’s office was seen as a 
temporary position, with his being a person that divides the estate according to 
the orders of the testator within a short period of time. For example, it is not clear 
whether a new executor should be appointed if the previous one willingly or 
involuntarily vacates the position. The main problem with testamentary execution 
seems to be that the law does not directly regulate the issue of the protection of 
property administrated by the executor from the heirs’ creditors.  
In the case of subsequent succession, this question is clearer: until fulfilment 
of the condition triggering subsequent succession, the estate is protected from the 
creditors of the provisional heir. The estate is also protected from the subsequent 
heir’s creditors. But the problem with subsequent succession is that it is uncertain 
whether and to what extent the testator can restrict the rights granted to the pro-
visional heir by law. The LSA gives the provisional heir the right to use and 
consume the objects belonging to the estate, collect all benefits receivable from 
the estate, and dispose of the objects belonging to the estate (except for immov-
ables and gratuitous disposals), and it is quite likely that the restriction of those 
rights can be deemed contrary to numerus clausus. There is also some uncertainty 
regarding unauthorised transactions made by the provisional heir. 
With private foundations, one of the problems is the current double taxation 
as the exemptions designed for companies to avoid double taxation of distri-
butions made from already taxed income (such as dividends) do not apply. The 
next major problem is the excessive accountability and publicity currently 
involved: an Estonian foundation is registered in a public register from which the 
information on that foundation is accessible to everyone. The author also 
questioned the necessity of the current two-tier structure and the number of 
people involved in operating a private foundation.  
Coming back to the goals of family trusts presented in the use-cases in sub-
section 1.4.3, the conclusions would be as follows: for cases a (preventing the 
dispersal of the estate or business after death) and b (continuity in management, 
e.g. when heirs are deemed unfit), the use of a mandate contract would be proble-
matic, as it would require the exclusion of the heirs’ rights to give instructions or 
modify or cancel the contract after the principal’s death. The use of an executor 
in those cases should be possible in theory; however, the question of the pro-
tection of property from the heirs’ creditors remains. The use of provisional/ 
subsequent heirship would certainly help; however, it must be kept in mind that 
the preliminary heir’s position is more of an owner than an administrator of the 
estate. For use case c (the settlor’s incapacity), neither of the succession law devices 
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would be suitable, but the use of a mandate contract would be possible. For case 
d (providing for a relative in the case of the latter’s incapacity or lack of financial 
maturity), the use of a mandate contract would again be problematic – if the 
settlor dies and the relative is an heir, their bankruptcy can trigger the cancellation 
of the mandate contract. Also, the provisions of family law would need to be taken 
into account (such as appointing a third-party special guardian). The conflict with 
family law provisions also makes the use of an executor ambiguous in this case. 
The institute of a preliminary/subsequent heir could be beneficial here; however, 
here, too, it must be borne in mind that the preliminary heir’s position is more of 
an owner than an administrator and that the period for nominating a preliminary 
heir is limited to 20 years. In use case e (asset protection during a person’s life-
time), neither a mandate contract nor the succession law devices would be of any 
help. A private foundation could, in theory, be used in all cases provided that the 
settlor does not care about double taxation and privacy and has a sufficient 
number of people in reserve to take care of the management of the foundation.  
In some cases, the combined or sequential use of these instruments would 
probably help reduce certain problems. For example, in order to deal with cases 
(a), (b) and (c) at the same time, consideration should be given to first concluding 
a mandate agreement with the trustee for the duration of the principal’s lifetime 
and making a will for the event of the principal’s death, appointing either the 
same trustee or a third party as an executor. This would reduce some confusion 
about the continuation of the mandate after the death of the principal but would 
not eliminate the main problem of using the mandate – protection of the assets 
from the principal’s creditors during the principal’s lifetime. In some cases, 
combining the institutes of succession law could be considered: a testator can 
assign both subsequent succession and testamentary execution (until the sub-
sequent succession) for the estate. In this case, the property would be protected 
against the creditors of both the provisional and subsequent heir (as well as the 
creditors of the executor). Furthermore, the provisional heir could not dispose of 
objects belonging to the estate.  
It would likely not be justified to use a private foundation alongside other 
institutes – the problem of double taxation could not be eliminated this way. At 
best, it might be possible to avoid disclosure to a certain extent through a scheme 
whereby a principal transfers a certain asset to the trustee who undertakes to set 
up a foundation in their own name and for their own benefit (at least according 
to the articles of association), but this structure seems too complex, requires in 
essence the involvement of several trustees and according to AMLD rules, in the 
UBO register, the actual beneficiaries must be registered one way or another. 
Overall, creating hugely complex constructions may make a lawyer feel more 
like a plumber (‘trying to repair the many leaks in the system’232) than a legal 
architect.  
                                                 
232  E McKendrick, ‘Taxonomy: does it matter’ in D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), 
Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p. 627. 
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As the foundation is probably the most similar device to trusts in the Estonian 
legal scene at the moment, making amendments to the legal acts regarding the 
abovementioned issues concerning the foundations would probably be the most 
logical as well as acceptable solution for a civil-law state (even if integration of 
a trust into the Estonian legal system does not require fundamental changes in 
our legal thinking and is rather a question of legal policy). The proposals for 
amendments concerning private foundations made by the author can be sum-
marised as follows:  
 
1. First of all, the author proposes a new, special type of foundation – the private 
foundation. The biggest difference between private foundations and other 
foundations is that the documents of the former should not be publicly 
accessible.  
2. To reduce the number of business relations and creditors that could be affected 
by not having access to the foundation’s documents, this new special type of 
foundation may engage in commercial activities only to fulfil its main pur-
pose: the maintenance and accumulation of assets in the interests of its bene-
ficiaries. 
3. To ensure that the private foundation is not engaged in unauthorised economic 
activities, all private foundations shall be subject to a review of their annual 
accounts by an auditor, and the auditor shall additionally give an opinion on 
whether the activities of the private foundation comply with the law. 
4. For the sake of objectivity and transparency and considering the value of the 
assets that might be involved in a public foundation’s (e.g. a hospital’s) 
activities, it may be justified that the administration bodies of public foun-
dations – which operate in the public interest – be required to include a large 
number of members. However, as confidentiality, effectiveness and privacy 
regarding assets are in the foreground when it comes to private foundations, 
reducing the minimum number of members of the supervisory board to one 
person would be beneficial.  
5. To ensure competitiveness with other well-known foundation jurisdictions, 
Estonian legislators should abolish double taxation of private foundations and 
establish rules similar to those applicable to holding companies.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AML/CFT Anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing 
AMLD Consolidated version of AMLD4 and AMLD5 
AMLD4 The Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 
AMLD5  The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 
BA Bankruptcy Act 
BGB German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) 
CC Commercial Code (Äriseadustik) 
CEP Code of Enforcement Proceedings (Täitemenetluse seadustik) 
DCFR Draft Common Frame of Reference 
ECRS Estonian Central Register of Securities 
FA Foundations Act (Sihtasutuste seadus) 
FLA Family Law Act (Perekonnaseadus) 
GPCCA General Part of the Civil Code Act (Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa 
seadus) 
IFA Investment Funds Act (Investeerimisfondide seadus) 
ITA Income Tax Act (Tulumaksuseadus) 
LOA Law of Obligations Act (Võlaõigusseadus) 
LPA Law of Property Act (Asjaõigusseadus) 
LRA Land Register Act (Kinnistusraamatuseadus) 
MLTFPA Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act (Raha-
pesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus) 
SMA Securities Market Act (Väärtpaberituruseadus) 
SRMA Securities Register Maintenance Act (Väärtpaberite registri pida-
mise seadus) 
UBO Ultimate Beneficial Owner (i.e. any natural person who 
ultimately owns or controls a legal person or arrangement or 
benefits of its activities) 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Family trust’ide233 sarnased varahalduslahendused Eesti õiguses  
Siinses väitekirjas analüüsitakse, kas Eesti õigus võimaldab pakkuda üldise õiguse 
(common law) süsteemiga riikides kasutatavate trust’idega sarnaseid varahaldus-
lahendusi. Küsimus on muutunud aktuaalseks olukorras, kus pea 30 taasise-
seisvusaasta jooksul on paljud Eesti ettevõtjad loonud varakogumi, mis oleks 
tervikliku ja mõistliku haldamise korral piisav, et tagada regulaarne sissetulek nii 
ettevõtjale enesele kui ka tema järeltulevatele põlvedele.  
Lihtsustatult on trust’i näol tegemist õigussuhtega, kus üks isik omab vara ja 
valitseb seda teise isiku kasuks või kindlal eesmärgil. Trust’i mõiste selgitamisel 
eristatakse harilikult kolme poolt: 1) asutajat, kes trust’i asutab 2) usaldusisikut, 
kellele vara üle antakse, ning 3) kasusaajat, kes saab trust’i paigutatud varalt kasu 
ja kellel on õigus nõuda usaldusisikult kohustuste täitmist234.  
Angloameerika õigussüsteemiga riikides ei ole trust’i näol tegemist lepin-
guga235. Trust ei ole ka juriidiline isik, s.t trust ise ei ole õigusvõimeline ning 
                                                 
233  Inglise keeles kasutatakse sõna „trust“ erinevate õiguslike nähtuste nimetuses ja seetõttu 
on sellele ka eesti keeles pakutud väga erinevaid vasteid, nagu näiteks „investeerimisfond“, 
„sihtfond“, „usaldusfond“ ja „usaldusühingu vormis asutatud fond“, „usaldusleping“, „vara-
kogum“, „monopol“, „usaldusomand“ ja „trust“. Eestikeelne „trust“ seondub siinsele juristile 
eelkõige kartellide, monopolide ja konkurentsiõigusega. Vastet „usaldusomand“ on kasutatud 
näiteks Euroopa Liidu veebilehtede eestikeelsetes versioonides. Väitekirja autori hinnangul 
on aga „usaldusomand“ laiema tähendusega, hõlmates ka muid instituute peale angloameerika 
trust’i, mille puhul on tegemist pigem usaldusomandi kasutamise ühe väljundiga. Seepärast 
on autor varem trust’idest rääkides pidanud parimaks sõna „usaldusfond“, mida aga alates 
2016. aastast hakati investeerimisfondide seaduses kasutama usaldusühingu vormis asutatud 
lepinguliste investeerimisfondide tähenduses. Ka uue rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise 
tõkestamise seaduse eelnõus kasutatav „usaldushaldus“ ei ole ehk parim vaste, kuna „haldus“ 
viitab pigem korraldavale, organisatoorsele tegevusele ja valdamisele ega anna edasi seda, et 
trust’i puhul läheb usaldusisikule üle ka vara kuuluvus (omand). Seetõttu otsustas autor 
kasutada eestikeelses kokkuvõttes ingliskeelset sõna „trust“. 
234  Vt DCFR X. – 1:201; X. – 1:203; X. – 1:205. Samuti U&H, viide 2, lk 2. 
235  Autor on trust’ide kirjeldamiseks ja mõistmiseks võtnud peamiseks aluseks Inglise õiguse, 
kuna Inglismaa on trust’ide sünnikoht ning kuna Inglise trust’i-õigus on jäänud suhteliselt 
konservatiivseks, näiteks seoses eri poolte (ja nende võlausaldajate) huvide tasakaalusta-
misega. See võib aidata leevendada mõnesid trust’idega seonduvaid hirme, millel on tõe-
näoliselt rohkem pistmist offshore-lahendustega. Kontinentaalõiguse taustaga juristi jaoks on 
siiski raske täielikult haarata üldise õiguse kohtupraktikat, aga ka selle termineid, mõisteid ja 
mõtteviisi. Seetõttu on autor lisaks Inglise õigusele − kohtupraktikale, seadustele ja õigus-
kirjandusele − kasutanud paralleelselt ka DCFR-i, mis läheneb Inglise trust’i-mudelile tsiviil-
õiguslikult ja aitab mõista keeruka (Inglise) trust’i-õiguse aluseid kompaktsel kujul. Selleks 
et selgitada trust’i kontseptsiooni ja erisusi eri riikides, on töös siiski kasutatud ka teiste 
jurisdiktsioonide õigust ja võrdlevõiguslikku kirjandust. Nagu professor Hayton on öelnud, 
peavad Inglise kohtunikud võtma tänapäeval Inglise trust’i-õiguse kujundamisel arvesse 
muutuvat praktikat ja ka teiste riikide trust’ide karakteristikuid: võib öelda, et trust’i-õigus on 
üsna rahvusvahelise iseloomuga. 
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trust’iga seonduvate nõuete adressaadiks on usaldusisik, kes omakorda saab ise 
esitada trust’iga seotud nõudeid.  
Kuigi usaldusisik saab üldjuhul trust’i vara omanikuks, peab ta selle valitse-
misel, kasutamisel ja käsutamisel järgima asutaja poolt asutamisel antud juhiseid 
ja kasusaaja huve ning ei tohi üldjuhul kasutada vara iseenda huvides. Trust’i 
vara on eraldatud usaldusisiku isiklikust varast (nn erivara) ja usaldusisiku võla-
usaldajad ning üldjuhul ka asutaja ja kasusaaja võlausaldajad ei saa sellele 
sissenõuet pöörata. Asutaja võlausaldaja nõuete puudumise loogiline eeldus on, 
et asutaja ei saa pärast trust’i asutamist usaldusisiku tegevust oluliselt mõjutada. 
Kui vara kantakse üle (peagi saabuva) maksejõuetuse situatsioonis või kui esineb 
mõni heade kommete vastane asjaolu, on vara ülekandmine tühine või tagasi-
võidetav. 
Kasusaajatel on spetsiifilised nõuded (nn tracing) kolmandate isikute vastu, 
kellega usaldusisik trust’i kuuluva vara suhtes tehinguid teeb (eelkõige siiski 
juhul, kui vara käsutati tasuta või kolmas isik oli pahauskne).  
Trust’i kuuluvad esemed on harilikult ajas muutuvad ja asendatavad. See 
tähendab, et trust (sh kasusaajate õigused) laieneb ka trust’i esemete võõranda-
misel nende asemele saadud varale, samuti varalt saadavale kasule.  
Trust ei lõpe asutaja, kasusaaja või usaldusisiku surma või teovõimetuse korral. 
Järelevalvepädevus usaldusisiku tegevuse üle on kohtutel. Usaldusisik võib kind-
lates küsimustes ja otsuseid tehes küsida kohtult ka nõu või nõusolekut. Mõnedel 
asjaoludel on kohtul õigus trust’i tingimusi muuta ning vabastada usaldusisik 
ametist ja määrata asemele uus.  
Seega on trust’i näol tegemist süsteemiga, mis võimaldab eraldada isiku vara 
hulgast esemeid, et tagada nende säilimine ja (eelduslikult tulutoov) valitsemine. 
Samas võimaldab see garanteerida tulud kindlatele isikutele nii, et esemed pole 
ka nende vara koosseisus ja neil ei ole otsustusõigust vara saatuse üle. See võib 
olla vajalik olukorras, kus isik soovib välistada mingi varakogumi (nt ettevõtte) 
killustumise pärijate vahel või takistada vara asjatundmatut või vastutustundetut 
valitsemist pärast oma surma, soovides samas, et kasumlik tegevus jätkuks ning 
pärijad saaksid sellest tulu. Samuti on see sobiv näiteks olukorras, kus soovitakse 
tagada ajalooliselt suguvõsa omandis olnud kinnisasja säilimine ja kasutamise 
võimalus tulevastele põlvedele. Trust’e kasutatakse ka juhul, kui inimene muret-
seb selle pärast, et ei ole kõrgesse ikka jõudes enam suuteline tegema pädevaid 
otsuseid varalistes küsimustes, või tal on puudega laps, kes ei ole pärast vanema 
surma võimeline ise varalisi otsuseid tegema, või soovib vanem lükata lapse 
omanikuks saamist edasi kuni viimase täisikka jõudmiseni, või on vanemal alust 
arvata, et laps ei ole varasse puutuvates küsimustes usaldusväärne ka täisealisena 
(on narkomaan, hasartmängusõltlane või raiskaja). Keerulisi olukordi põhjus-
tavad ka segased pere- ja paarisuhted, näiteks kui abielulahutuse korral soovib 
üks vanematest varakogumi eraldamise teel kindlustada laste tuleviku, välistades 
samas teise lapsevanema otsustus- ja käsutusõiguse selle vara üle. Kokkuvõtlikult 
võib neid olukordi nimetada perevara hoidmiseks või haldamiseks. 
Toodud näidete näol on tegemist tüüpiliste perekonna huvides loodud 
trust’idega. Trust’ide kasutusspekter on aga palju laiem. Näiteks kasutatakse neid 
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investeerimisel, töötajatele mingite tagatiste loomiseks, heategevuseks või muudel 
avalikes huvides olevatel eesmärkidel ja tagatise andmisel. Lisaks eksisteerivad 
veel nn sekundaarsed trust’id, mis on tekkinud seaduse või kohtuotsuse alusel.  
Kuigi Eestis juba on õigusinstituute, millel on trust’idega sarnased funkt-
sioonid, on Eesti õiguses siiski keeruline leida perevara haldamiseks sobivat 
vahendit. Autori hinnangul puudub praegu optimaalne õiguslik lahendus, mis 
võimaldaks näiteks pärast ettevõtja surma jätkata olemasolevate (valdus)äriühin-
gute tegevust kaitstuna perekonnasisestest võimalikest lahkhelidest tulenevate 
rünnakute, mõne soodustatud isiku liigse tarbimise või riskijulguse ning võla-
usaldajate võimalike rünnakute eest. Samas on tegelik vajadus sellise lahenduse 
järele olemas ja muutub üha teravamaks. Tihti on isikud sunnitud otsima abi 
välisriikidest, kus sobivad õiguslikud lahendused eksisteerivad. 
Väitekirja eesmärk on leida vastus küsimusele, kas ning millises ulatuses 
võimaldavad trust’ide sarnased varahalduslahendused Eesti õiguses saavu-
tada trust’idele iseloomulikke eesmärke perevara planeerimise valdkonnas.  
Töö lisaeesmärk on juhtida tähelepanu muudatustele, mida oleks vaja teha 
kehtivates õigusaktides, et Eesti õigus hõlmaks ka nn pere-trust’ide funktsioone.  
Trust’i-sarnaste õiguslike üksuste Eesti õiguses eksisteerimise küsimus on 
praegu oluline ka rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise vastase võitluse seisukohalt. 
AMLD4236 kohustas liikmesriike tuvastama õiguslikke üksusi, mille struktuur või 
funktsioonid on sarnased trust’idega, ning usaldusisikuid koguma ja hoidma asja-
kohast, täpset ja ajakohastatud teavet selliste õiguslike üksuste tegelike kasu-
saajate kohta, tegema sellekohase teabe õigeaegselt kättesaadavaks pädevatele 
asutustele ja rahapesu andmebüroodele ning esitama asjakohase teabe keskregist-
rile (art 31 lg 1, 2, 4; art 3 lg 6 p c)). Seetõttu on töö teine lisaeesmärk hinnata, 
kas ja mil määral peaks teave Eesti õiguses eksisteerivate trust’i-sarnaste vara-
halduslahenduste kohta olema (avalikult) juurdepääsetav.  
Väitekirja moodustab ülevaateartikkel, mis omakorda põhineb viiel alltoodud 
teadusartiklil: 
 
1. “Legal Arrangements Similar to Trusts in Estonia under the EU’s Anti-
money- laundering Directive”, Juridica International, Vol 26 (2017), 56–65. 
2. “The Estonian Foundation – What is Missing for It to Be A Well-Designed 
Wealth-Management Vehicle for Local and Foreign High-Net-Worth Indi-
viduals?”, Juridica International, Vol 24 (2016), 96–104. Artiklil on kaks 
autorit: Katrin Sepp ja Urmas Kaarlep. Urmas Kaarlep panustas põhiliselt 
artikli maksuõiguse ossa (punkt 5) ja pakkus valemid, mille järgi arvutada 
mitteresidentide poolt Eesti eraõiguslike sihtasutuste kasutamise võimalik 
                                                 
236  20. mai 2015. aasta Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv (EL) 2015/849, mis käsitleb 
finantssüsteemi rahapesu või terrorismi rahastamise eesmärgil kasutamise tõkestamist ning 
millega muudetakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrust (EL) nr 648/2012 ja tunnis-
tatakse kehtetuks Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv 2005/60/EÜ ja komisjoni direktiiv 
2006/70/EÜ. − ELT L 141, 05.06.2015, lk 73−117.  
84 
mõju riigieelarvele (punkt 6); Katrin Sepp viis läbi uurimistöö artikli punktide 
3–4 tarvis, struktureeris artikli ning koostas ja muutis artikli teksti põhiosa. 
3. “Estonian ‘trust’ – same same but different?”, Trusts & Trustees, Vol 24, Issue 
9 (2018), 891–900. 
4. “Estate planning beyond the grave: legal instruments comparable to testa-
mentary trusts in Estonian law”, Trusts & Trustees, Vol 25, Issue 3 (2019), 
303–311. 
5. “Unblocking the bottlenecks of the Estonian wealth-management scene for 
private foundations”, Trusts & Trustees, Vol 24, Issue 6 (2018), 558–564. 
Artiklil on kolm autorit: Katrin Sepp, Urmas Kaarlep ja Turgay Kuleli. Urmas 
Kaarlep panustas artikli maksuõiguslikku ossa, Turgay Kuleli redigeeris 
käsikirja ja suhtles ajakirja väljaandjaga. Peamine autor oli Katrin Sepp, kes 
andis olulisima panuse uurimistöösse ning kirjutas ja redigeeris ka suurema 
osa artiklist. 
 
Esimene artikkel analüüsib trust’i mõistet ja võrdleb seda kahe õigusinstituudiga: 
Saksa Treuhand’i ja Prantsuse fiducie’ga, mida neis tsiviilõigussüsteemiga riikides 
kasutatakse trust’iga sarnastel eesmärkidel ja mida AMLD5237 otseselt nimetab 
trust’iga sarnaste õiguslike üksustena. Seejärel püüab autor leida Eesti õigus-
süsteemis instituute, mis võiksid kuuluda trust’iga sarnaste üksuste kategoo-
riasse. Käsitluse all on näiteks erinevad perekonna- ja pärimisõiguslikud insti-
tuudid, erinevad omandivormid (ühisused), käsundus- ja komisjonileping, väärt-
paberite vahendatud hoidmine ja usaldusomand tagatise andmise eesmärgil. Kuigi 
artikkel on kirjutatud rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise vastast võitlust 
puudutava regulatsiooni seisukohast, peaks see aitama mõista trust’i kontsept-
siooni ka üldisemalt. 
Artiklid 2–4 analüüsivad lähemalt Eesti õiguse instituute, mida võiks kasutada 
perekondlike varaküsimuste planeerimiseks või nn perevara hoidmiseks. Artiklid 
käsitlevad vastavalt sihtasutust, käsunduslepingut ja testamentaarseid korraldusi 
ning toovad esile nende instituutide aluseks oleva regulatsiooni puudused 
võrreldes trust’idega. 
Viiendas artiklis tehakse ettepanekuid sihtasutuste regulatsiooni muutmiseks, 
et kõrvaldada kitsaskohad, mis võivad takistada erasihtasutuste loomist Eestis.  
Autor on trust’ide olemust ja funktsioone analüüsides kasutanud peamiselt 
võrdlevõiguslikku meetodit ja käsitlenud trust’idega sarnaseid Eesti õigus-
instituute eelkõige Inglise õiguse taustal. Lisaks on autor lähtunud DCFR-ist, mis 
annab Inglise trust’i-õiguse põhitõed edasi kompaktsel kujul 116 artiklis. Et 
näidata trust’ide regulatsiooni erinevusi eri riikides, on toodud näiteid ka teistest 
jurisdiktsioonidest. 
                                                 
237  30. mai 2018. aasta Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv (EL) 2018/843, millega 
muudetakse direktiivi (EL) 2015/849, mis käsitleb finantssüsteemi rahapesu või terrorismi 
rahastamise eesmärgil kasutamise tõkestamist, ning millega muudetakse direktiive 2009/ 
138/EÜ ja 2013/36/EL. – ELT L 156, 19.06.2018, lk 43−74. 
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Töö autor on süstemaatiliselt analüüsinud trust’idega sarnaseid Eesti vara-
halduslahendusi. Võrdlemisel on autor lähtunud ühest küljest trust’i n-ö põhi-
komponentidest, mida tunnustatud autorid on pidanud oluliseks. Samas võivad 
eri riikides samadel eesmärkidel kasutatavad õigusinstituudid olla küll formaal-
selt, doktriiniliselt või struktuurselt erinevad, kuid täita siiski samu ülesandeid. 
Seega on autor Eesti õigusest sarnaseid lahendusi otsides lähtunud lisaks trust’ide 
n-ö põhielementidele ka funktsioonidest. Seejuures võib öelda, et suures osas on 
trust’i põhielemendid kantud selle funktsioonidest ja vastupidi. 
Eesti õiguse paremaks mõistmiseks on autor analüüsinud nii riigisiseseid 
õigusakte ja kohtuotsuseid kui ka õiguskirjandust. Kuna Eesti eraõigus põhineb 
enamjaolt Saksa õigusel, on autor toonud näiteid ka Saksa õigusest, sihtasutuste 
puhul lisaks Austria õigusest, kuivõrd kehtiva sihtasutuste seaduse väljatööta-
misel võeti suures osas aluseks just sealne regulatsioon. 
Doktoritöö eesmärkide täitmiseks on autor püstitanud neli uurimisküsimust. 
Järgnevalt esitatakse väitekirjas püstitatud uurimisküsimused koos analüüsi tule-
musel selgunud vastustega. 
 
 
1. Kas Eestis on pärimisõiguslikke instituute, mis võimaldaksid isoleerida 
pärandvara selliselt, et kolmandatel isikutel puuduks sellele otsene mõju? 
 
Eesti pärimisõigusest võib leida õigusinstituute (eelkõige testamenditäitja ning 
eel- ja järelpärija – vastavalt pärimisseaduse (PärS) 238 §§ 78–87 ning §§ 45–55), 
mis peaksid või võiksid hõlmata samu funktsioone nagu testamentaarsed trust’id 
nn trust’i-jurisdiktsioonides. Seda teemat ei ole Eesti õiguskirjanduses varem 
uuritud, kuid praktika näitab, et see valdkond võib olla problemaatiline. Eesti 
õiguse kohaselt ei ole selge, kas ja kuidas saab testaator teha pärimisõiguslikke 
korraldusi, mis tagaksid, et tema vara valitsemine pärast tema surma vastab tema 
soovidele – näiteks keelata (lõplike) kasusaajate osalemine otsustusprotsessis 
(vähemalt mingi ajavahemiku vältel), kaitstes üheaegselt vara nii kasusaajate kui 
ka usaldusisiku võlausaldajate eest. 
Põhimõtteliselt peaks testamenditäitja määramine (PärS § 78 lg 1, § 79 ja § 81) 
välistama pärijate osalemise pärandit puudutavate otsuste tegemisel ja nende 
õiguse vara käsutada – vähemalt nende esemete osas, mille puhul testaator on nii 
ette näinud.  
Samas põhjustab vastuolusid näiteks perekonnaseaduse (PKS)239 eestkoste 
regulatsioon, mille üldisem eesmärk ei tohiks küll olla isikute testeerimisvaba-
dusse sekkumine, kuid mis siiski võib praktikas tuua kaasa rakendamis-
probleeme. Näiteks ei ole üheselt arusaadav, kas testamenditäitjaks määratud isik 
saab testaatori korraldustest lähtudes tegutseda kohtu nõusolekuta ka siis, kui 
soodustatud isik on piiratud teovõimega.  
                                                 
238 RT I 2008, 7, 52; RT I, 10.03.2016, 16. 
239 RT I 2009, 60, 395; RT I, 09.05.2017, 29. 
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Kuigi seadusandja ei ole otseselt välistanud seda, et testamenditäitja võiks 
pärandvara valitseda ka pikema aja vältel, ega näe testamendi täitmiseks ette 
selget ajavahemikku, viitab regulatsiooni nappus olulistes küsimustes sellele, et 
testamenditäitja ametit on nähtud pigem ajutisena ja testamenditäitjat isikuna, kes 
jagab pärandvara vastavalt pärandaja korraldustele laiali ja viib protsessi 
suhteliselt lühikese aja jooksul lõpule. Näiteks ei tulene PärS-st otseselt, kas kohus 
peaks määrama uue testamenditäitja, kui eelmine sureb, muutub piiratud teo-
võimega isikuks, loobub ametist või kui kohus vabastab ta oma ülesannetest 
kohustuse täitmise olulise rikkumise tõttu.  
Segadust lisab ka see, et õigusdogmaatiliselt ei ole selge, kas testamenditäitja 
tegutseb enda nimel eraameti pidajana või pärijate esindajana. Mis puutub 
testamenditäitja tehtud, pärandaja viimse tahtega vastuolus olevatesse käsutus-
tesse, võib siiski järeldada, et pärijatel on lootust nõuda kolmandast isikust saajalt 
eseme väljaandmist nii juhul, kui testamenditäitja on ületanud esindusõiguse 
piire, kui ka siis, kui ta teeb käsutus enda nimel õigustamata isikuna.  
Kõige suurem probleem testamenditäitja regulatsiooni puhul on ilmselt see, et 
seadus ei reguleeri otseselt testamenditäitja valitseda määratud vara kaitset pärija 
võlausaldajate eest, kuivõrd pärandvarasse kuuluvate testamenditäitja valitseta-
vate esemete kuuluvus ei lähe üle testamenditäitjale, vaid nende omanik/omaja 
on pärija.  
Eel- ja järelpärija (PärS §§ 45–55) puhul on see küsimus selgem: kuni järel-
pärimise tingimuse saabumiseni on eelpärija küll pärandvara hulka kuuluvate 
esemete omanik/omaja, kuid vältimaks eelpärija isiklike võlausaldajate nõuete 
rahuldamist varast, mis tuleb järelpärimise tingimuse saabumisel anda üle järel-
pärijale, sätestab PärS § 48 lõige 3, et pärandvara hulka kuuluva eseme käsutus-
tehing, mis on tehtud sundtäitmise käigus või mille on teinud pankrotihaldur, on 
järelpärimise tingimuse saabumisel tühine, kui see välistab või kahjustab järel-
pärija õigusi. Kuni järelpärimise tingimuse saabumiseni on pärandvara ühtlasi 
kaitstud ka järelpärija võlausaldajate eest. 
Samas on eel- ja järelpärija instituudi puhul probleem, et ei ole kindel, kas ja 
mil määral on (numerus clausus’e printsiibist tulenevalt) võimalik eelpärija õigusi 
võrreldes seadusega kitsendada. Nimelt annab PärS eelpärijale kui omanikule/ 
omajale õiguse kasutada pärandvara hulka kuuluvaid esemeid ja neid oma 
oludele vastava tavalise tarbimise piires ära tarvitada. Samuti on tal õigus pärand-
vara hulka kuuluvaid esemeid käsutada (v.a kinnisasjad ja tasuta käsutused) ning 
talle kuulub ka pärandist saadud kasu.  
Lisaks on mõnetine ebakindlus seoses esemete lubamatu käsutamisega eel-
pärija poolt. PärS järgi on eelpärijal üldreeglina keelatud käsutada kinnisasju ning 
teha tasuta käsutustehinguid – sellisel juhul on eelpärija tehtud käsutustehing küll 
tühine, kui see välistab või piirab järelpärija õigusi, kuid seda alles tagantjärele, 
järelpärimise tingimuse või tähtpäeva saabumisel. Kui asi on siis veel kolmandast 
isikust saaja valduses, saab järelpärija selle temalt välja nõuda asjaõigusseaduse 
(AÕS)240 § 80 alusel. Kui tegemist on kinnisasjaga, on kolmandast isikust saaja 
                                                 
240  RT I 1993, 39, 590; RT I, 22.02.2019, 11.  
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kohta tehtud omanikukanne vale ning järelpärija saab nõuda kande parandamist 
AÕS § 65 alusel. Kui aga kolmandast isikust saaja on eseme omakorda edasi 
võõrandanud, on olukord mõnevõrra keerulisem – seadus sellise käsutustehingu 
kehtetust ette ei näe. Keerukust lisab asjaolu, et sel ajal, kui ese edasi võõrandati, 
ei pruukinud järelpärimise tingimus olla saabunud (ja eelpärija tehtud käsutus-
tehing oli veel kehtiv), seega ei ole selge, kas oli tegemist õigustatud või mitte-
õigustatud isiku käsutusega. 
Mõnel juhul võib kaaluda eri instituutide kombineerimist: testaator võib 
määrata nii eel- ja järelpärija kui ka testamenditäitja (kuni järelpärimise tingimuse 
saabumiseni). Sellisel juhul oleks vara kaitstud nii eel- kui ka järelpärija (samuti 
testamenditäitja) võlausaldajate eest. Lisaks ei saaks eelpärija pärandvarasse kuulu-
vaid esemeid käsutada.  
Kokkuvõttes jõuab autor järeldusele, et Eesti õigus ei võimalda täie kindlusega 
isoleerida pärandvara selliselt, et kolmandatel isikutel puuduks sellele otsene mõju. 
 
 
2. Kas käsunduslepingut saab kasutada perevara hoidmiseks trust’iga sarna-
sel viisil ja millised on sellise varahalduslahenduse peamised puudused? 
 
Trust’iga sarnaste lahenduste otsimisel tsiviilõigussüsteemiga riikides viidatakse 
tihti käsundisarnastele lepingulistele suhetele241. Senini ei ole analüüsitud seda, 
kas Eesti õiguse alusel sõlmitud käsunduslepinguga on võimalik saavutada 
trust’iga sarnast tulemust.  
Autori hinnangul võib võlaõigusseaduse (VÕS)242 alusel sõlmitud käsundus-
lepingust tuleneva õigussuhte hoolika planeerimise korral kujundada üsna trust’iga 
sarnaseks.  
Kuivõrd käsunduslepingu mõiste on väga lai – käsunduslepinguga kohustub 
üks isik (käsundisaaja) vastavalt lepingule osutama teisele isikule (käsundiandja) 
teenuseid (täitma käsundi), käsundiandja aga maksma talle selle eest tasu, kui 
selles on kokku lepitud (VÕS § 619) – võib käsundi anda igasuguse teenuse 
osutamiseks, mille hulka võib kuuluda käsundiandja mistahes asjade ajamine, 
nagu lepingute sõlmimine või vara valitsemine. Trust’i puhul antakse usaldus-
isikule üle trust’i vara koosseisus olevate esemete kuuluvus, usaldusisik teeb tehin-
guid oma nimel, mitte asutaja või kasusaajate esindajana. Sellest lähtudes on 
trust’iga sarnane komisjonileping, mis on üks käsunduslepingu alaliike ja millele 
erisätete puudumisel kohaldub käsunduslepingu üldregulatsioon. Komisjoni-
lepinguga on VÕS § 692 lõike 1 kohaselt tegemist siis, kui komisjonär kohustub 
tegema tehingu(id) oma nimel, kuid komitendi arvel (ja komitent maksma selle 
eest komisjonitasu).  
Kui trust’i puhul võib enamasti eristada kolme isiku rolli, siis käsunduslepingu 
sätted lähtuvad eelkõige kahe osalise, käsundiandja ja käsundisaaja olemasolust. 
                                                 
241 M. Graziadei, U. Mattei, L. Smith (eds.). Commercial Trusts in European Private Law. 
Cambridge University Press 2009, p 104 ff, 111 ff, 135 ff, 140 ff, etc. 
242 RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 08.01.2020, 10.  
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Samas on ka Eesti õiguse kohaselt võimalik saavutada trust’iga sarnane kolm-
nurksuhe, sõlmides lepingu kolmanda isiku kasuks (VÕS § 80). 
Võrreldes trust’iga on VÕS käsunduslepingu regulatsiooni puhul poolte 
üldine kohustuste ja õiguste jaotus siiski erinev. Trust’i puhul on peamine suhe 
usaldusisiku ja kasusaaja vahel; enamasti (välja arvatud juhul, kui asutaja on 
endale mingid õigused jätnud või on ise üks kasusaajatest) jääb asutaja pärast 
trust’i loomist tagaplaanile. Tal ei tohiks olla õigust anda usaldusisikule juhiseid 
ega kontrollida usaldusisiku tegevust. Seevastu VÕS käsunduslepingu regulat-
siooni kohaselt on keskne just käsundiandja ja käsundisaaja vaheline suhe, kus-
juures käsundiandjal on oluline roll kogu lepingu kestvuse jooksul. Käsundisaaja 
on kohustatud andma käsundiandjale teavet kõigi käsundi täitmisega seotud 
oluliste asjaolude kohta (VÕS § 624 lg 1), samuti on ta kohustatud esitama üle-
vaate kõigist käsundiga seotud tuludest ja kuludest koos asjakohaste tõenditega 
(VÕS § 624 lg 2). Ka on käsundiandjal õigus anda pärast lepingu sõlmimist 
käsundisaajale juhiseid selle kohta, kuidas lepingut täita, ning käsundisaajal on 
kohustus neid järgida (VÕS § 621). Käsundiandja võib ka lepingu vastavalt VÕS 
§-le 630 või §-le 631 lõpetada ning lepingus saab kokku leppida, et seda on 
võimalik muuta ja lõpetada vastavalt käsundiandja soovile või muutunud asja-
oludele. Käsundiandja on ka isik, kellel on õigus nõuda käsundisaajalt lepingu 
täitmist.  
Kolmandast isikust kasusaaja positsioon on seevastu VÕS sätete alusel vaiki-
misi nõrgem võrreldes trust’i kasusaajaga. VÕS § 80 lõike 2 punkti 3 kohaselt ei 
ole kolmandal isikul, kelle kasuks on leping sõlmitud, õigust nõuda lepingupoole 
kohustuse täitmist isegi siis, kui see kohustus tuleb täita tema kasuks. Seadus ei 
näe ette lepingupoolte kohustust teavitada kolmandat isikut lepingu sõlmimisest 
tema kasuks. VÕS § 80 lõike 6 kohaselt võivad lepingu pooled kolmanda isiku 
kasuks sõlmitud lepingut muuta või lõpetada ilma kolmanda isiku nõusolekuta, 
kui lepingust või seadusest ei tulene teisiti. Kui käsundiandja soovib, võib kasu-
saajale siiski anda tugevama positsiooni. Selleks, et kasusaajal oleks õigus nõuda 
käsundisaajalt lepingu täitmist, peab selle õiguse lepingus selgesõnaliselt ette 
nägema (VÕS § 80 lg 2). Sellisel juhul on kasusaajal õigus nõuda ka kahju 
hüvitamist ja viivist, kuid õigus nõuda lepingu täitmist ei anna talle õigust lepingut 
muuta või tühistada. Samas võib käsundiandja lubada tal seda teha käsundiandja 
esindajana ja ilmselt ka VÕS § 26 lõike 1 alusel, mis võimaldab jätta mõne lepingu-
tingimuse kolmanda isiku määrata – seega on poolte soovi korral ilmselt võimalik 
kokku leppida selliselt, et näiteks lepingu lõpetamine või lepingu tingimuste 
muutmine sõltub kolmandast isikust.  
Nagu eespool välja toodud, on trust’i vara eraldatud usaldusisiku isiklikust 
varast ja usaldusisiku võlausaldajad ning üldjuhul ka asutaja ja kasusaaja võla-
usaldajad ei saa sellele sissenõuet pöörata. Ka käsunduslepingu puhul on võimalik 
erivarast243 rääkida, kuid siiski mitte trust-idega võrdväärses mahus. Esiteks 
                                                 
243  „Kui seadusjärgse tüüpjuhtumina kuulub vara (olgu õiguste ja kohustuste või üksnes 
õiguste kogumine) mingile isikule tervikuna, siis reaalselt võib vara või osa sellest kuuluda ka 
mitmele isikule, samuti on teatud juhtudel ette nähtud, et samale isikule kuuluv vara allub 
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lõppeb Eesti õiguse järgi käsundusleping käsundiandja pankroti korral (VÕS 
§ 632 lg 2) ja vara tuleb tagastada käsundiandja pankrotivara hulka (VÕS § 626 
lg 1). Kuna käsundiandjal on õigus pärast lepingu sõlmimist anda käsundisaajale 
juhiseid selle kohta, kuidas lepingut täita, on see ilmselt ka loogiline, et käsundi 
esemeks olevat vara peetakse majanduslikus mõttes käsundiandja varaks ka siis, 
kui see on käsundisaajale üle kantud.  
Teiseks, rääkides käsunduslepingu objektiks olevate esemete eraldatusest 
käsundisaaja muu vara hulgast, näeb VÕS käsunduslepingu puhul ette üksnes 
osalise vara segregatsiooni põhimõtte: VÕS § 626 lõike 3 kohaselt ei kuulu nõuded 
ja vallasasjad, mille käsundisaaja omandab käsundi täitmisel oma nimel, kuid 
käsundiandja arvel, samuti käsundiandja poolt käsundisaajale käsundi täitmiseks 
üleantud nõuded ja vallasasjad käsundisaaja pankrotivarasse ja neile ei saa pöörata 
sissenõuet täitemenetluses käsundisaaja vastu. See säte ei näe ette kaitset käsundi-
saaja võlausaldajate eest kinnisasjadele või muudele õigustele peale nõuete (nt 
osaühingu osadele).  
Kui soovida välistada käsundisaaja võlausaldajate nõudeid talle usaldus-
omandina244 kuuluva kinnisasja suhtes, on võimalik kanda käsundiandja või 
kolmanda isiku kasuks kinnistusraamatusse eelmärge, millisel juhul oleksid hili-
semad käsutused, sh sundtäitmise käigus, pankrotihalduri poolt või kohtulahendi 
alusel tehtavad käsutused tühised, kui need kahjustavad isiku õigusi, kelle kasuks 
eelmärge on seatud (AÕS § 63 lg-d 3 ja 4). Muude objektide, näiteks osaühingu 
osa puhul võib käsundisaaja võlausaldajate eest kaitset pakkuda tingimusliku 
käsutustehingu sõlmimine (vastavalt tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse (TsÜS)245 
6. peatüki sätetele), sest TsÜS § 106 lõike 2 teise lause järgi on täitemenetluses, 
hagi tagamiseks või pankrotihalduri poolt tehtud käsutus, mis välistab või piirab 
tingimusega seotud õigusliku tagajärje saabumist, tühine. Lisaks võimaldab 
äriseadustiku (ÄS)246 § 149 lg 3 näha osaühingu põhikirjas ette, et osa 
                                                 
erinevatele õiguslikele režiimidele. Mõlemal juhul saab rääkida, et vara või osa sellest on allu-
tatud teatud erilisele õiguslikule käsitlusele ehk tinglikult saab rääkida n-ö erivarast. Erivara 
ühiseks tunnuseks on esmajoones võlausaldajate nõuete maksmapaneku erisused selle vara 
osas (s.t kas nõude realiseerimise piiratus erivaraga või eraldi täitedokumendi vajalikkus 
varale sissenõude pööramises). Erireeglid kehtivad ka erivara valitsemisel. Samuti kehtib üldi-
selt nn surrogatsiooni põhimõte, s.t erivarasse kuuluva vara arvel või asemel või hüvitisena 
omandatu kuulub samuti erivarasse. /.../ Osa isikule kuuluvast varast võib olla allutatud 
erireeglitele, näiteks lahusvara kõrvuti ühisvaraga, vara eraldamine vara valitsemisega seotud 
riskide hajutamiseks. Erivara on kasutusel eelkõige väärtpaberite valitsemisel, olgu käsundus-
lepingu (eelkõige komisjonilepingu) alusel (vt mh VÕS § 626 lg 3), esindajakonto vahendusel 
(EVKS § 6 lg-d 2 ja 3) (nt investeerimisfondidesse paigutatud vara puhul, vt investeerimis-
fondide seaduse § 105 lg 1), samas saab seda kokkuleppel luua ka muul juhul, andes vara 
valitsemise õiguse (s.t õiguse oma nimel, kuid võõra arvel tehinguid teha) üle teisele isikule 
(Treuhand, trust).“ − P. Varul et al. Tsiviilõiguse üldosa. Õigusteaduse õpik. Juura 2012, lk 315. 
244  Usaldusomand tähendab „asja või õiguse kuulumist n.ö väljapoole ühele isikule, kuid selle 
isiku toimimist esemega teise isikuga sõlmitud lepingu alusel tema juhiste kohaselt“. – 
V. Kõve. Varaliste tehingute süsteem Eestis. Doktoritöö. Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus 2009, lk 304.   
245  RT I 2002, 35, 216; RT I, 06.12.2018, 3.  
246  RT I 1995, 26, 355; RT I, 28.02.2019, 11.  
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võõrandamine on lubatud üksnes täiendava tingimuse täitmise korral, eelkõige, 
et osa võõrandamiseks on vajalik teiste osanike, juhatuse, nõukogu või muu isiku 
nõusolek. Vastava tingimuseta või nõusolekuta tehtud tehing on tühine.  
VÕS § 626 lg 1 sisaldab ka trust’idele omast surrogatsioonipõhimõtet: käsundi-
saaja peab käsundiandjale välja andma selle, mis ta seoses käsundi täitmisega on 
saanud või loonud, samuti selle, mis ta käsundi täitmiseks sai ja mida ta käsundi 
täitmiseks ei kasutanud. See põhimõte kehtib mitte ainult käsundiandja poolt 
käsundisaajale üle antud esemete suhtes, vaid ka uute esemete suhtes, mille 
käsundisaaja on käsundi täitmisel omandanud.  
Mis puutub käsundiandja ja kasusaaja nõuetesse kolmandate isikute vastu, siis 
asjaõiguslikke nõudeid käsunduslepingu regulatsioon iseenesest käsundiandjale 
ei tekita. Kui käsundiandja annab lepingu esemeks oleva(te) asja(de) 
omandiõiguse ja muude esemete kuuluvuse üle käsundisaajale, kuulub viimasele 
täielik õiguslik võim talle üle antud eseme(te) üle. Kui lepingus on ette nähtud 
täpsed tingimused, millal ja kellele tohib käsundisaaja eset võõrandada, kehtib 
see kokkulepe ainult nendevahelistes suhetes ega piira tema käsutusõigust 
kolmandate isikute suhtes (TsÜS § 76). Seega on tehinguga seatud käsutuskeelu 
vastaselt tehtud käsutustehing kehtiv (kui just ei esine muid kehtetuse aluseid) 
ning isik, kelle kasuks käsutus tehti, omandab selle eseme vaatamata tehinguga 
seatud käsutuspiirangule ning sõltumata tema hea- või pahausksusest kokku-
leppelise käsutuspiirangu olemasolu suhtes. 
Arvestades senist kohtupraktikat tundub, et ka käsundisaaja ja kolmanda isiku 
vahelise tehingu tühisusele tuginemine tulenevalt selle näilikkusest (TsÜS § 89) 
või vastuolust seadusega (§ 87), heade kommete või avaliku korraga (§ 86) on 
üsna kaheldav. 
Kui kolmandale isikule tehtud käsutus on kehtiv, võib hüpoteetiliselt olla 
võimalik tema vastu nõuete esitamine kahju õigusvastase tekitamise sätete alusel 
(VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p-d 7 ja 8). Sellisel juhul ei ole täielikult välistatud, et VÕS 
§ 136 lõike 5 kohaldamine võib viia tulemuseni, kus kolmas isik peab saadud 
eseme kasusaajale või käsundiandjale üle andma.  
Kasusaajale saavad kaitset pakkuda ka sellised kokkulepped, mida autor 
mainis eespool nn erivara kontekstis: kui lepingu esemeks on kinnistu ning kui 
käsundiandja ei soovi, et käsundisaaja müüks või pandiks kinnistu kolmandatele 
isikutele, siis saab ka sellise piirangu teha kinnistusraamatus nähtavaks, seades 
eelmärke käsundiandja või kolmanda isiku kasuks, millisel juhul on käsundisaaja 
tehtud käsutustehingud tühised (AÕS § 63 lg-d 3 ja 4). Osaühingu osa puhul saab 
usaldusisiku käsutusõiguse piirata põhikirjas (ÄS § 149 lg 3). Muude esemete kui 
kinnisasjade puhul on võimalik sõlmida tingimuslik käsutustehing TsÜS 6. pea-
tüki sätete alusel: pooled võivad kokku leppida, et kindla tingimuse saabumisel 
kandub ese automaatselt tagasi käsundiandjale (või edasi kasusaajale), millisel 
juhul on (TsÜS § 106 lõike 2 kohaselt) tingimusliku tehingu teinud isiku poolt 
hõljumisajal tehtud käsutustehing tingimuse saabumisel tühine, kui käsutustehing 
välistab või piirab tingimusega seotud õigusliku tagajärje saabumist. 
Viimaks on oluline märkida, et käsundi puhul on tegemist lepinguga, mille 
eesmärgi saavutamist võib mõjutada lepingupoole surm, muutused teovõimes või 
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ühepoolse lõpetamise õigus. Kohus ei saa määrata uut lepingupoolt. Seega tuleb 
lepingu sõlmimisel neile teguritele erilist tähelepanu pöörata. 
Kokkuvõttes leiab autor, et ehkki käsunduslepingu regulatsioon võlaõigus-
seaduses iseenesest ei sisalda kõiki olulisi elemente, mis oleksid vajalikud pere-
vara eduka haldamise jaoks usaldusisiku poolt, on seadust laiendavalt tõlgendades 
ja/või muid õigusaktidega ette nähtud vahendeid kasutades võimalik saavutada 
suhteliselt trust’i-sarnane õigussuhe. Samas ei ole ilmselt võimalik saavutada 
olukorda, kus vara oleks pankrotiolukorras samaaegselt kaitstud nii kolmandast 
isikust kasusaaja võlausaldajate kui ka käsundiandja võlausaldajate eest.  
 
 
3. Millised õiguslikud takistused on sihtasutuse kasutamisel perevara hoid-
miseks ja kasvatamiseks tulevaste põlvkondade huvides ning milliseid 
muudatusi kehtivates õigusaktides tuleks nende takistuste ületamiseks 
teha? 
 
Sissejuhatavas osas kirjeldatud pere-trust’idega sarnaste eesmärkide saavuta-
miseks on paljudes riikides kasutusel sihtasutused. Nii Euroopa kui ka muude 
riikide sihtasutuste turg on viimastel aastakümnetel jõudsalt arenenud ja muutu-
nud, et pakkuda enda ja välisriikide kodanikele võimalust tagada vara terviklik, 
turvaline ja tulus paigutamine, pakkuda lahendusi pärandiküsimustele ning 
vähendada muret maksude ja maailmamajandusega seotud küsimuste üle. 
Ka Eesti õiguskorras olemasolevatest instituutidest oleks sihtasutuste seaduses 
(SAS)247 reguleeritav sihtasutuse vorm sarnaste küsimuste reguleerimiseks ole-
muslikult ilmselt kõige loogilisem, kuid sihtasutusi on seni valdavalt kasutatud 
vara haldamiseks avalikes huvides või sotsiaalsetel eesmärkidel. Perevara 
planeerimisel kasutavad eestimaalased praegu pigem välismaiseid sihtasutusi ja 
trust’e, millega kaasneb kapitali väljavool, mh näiteks tasude näol välismaistele 
usaldusisikutele ja juhatuse liikmetele. Samuti võib kaasneda mõningane eba-
kindlus nii asutajate endi kui ka nende võimalike võlausaldajate, pärijate ning 
pereliikmete jaoks. Kapitali juurdevoolust – s.t Eesti atraktiivsusest varakate 
välismaalaste jaoks – ei ole selles kontekstis praegu üldse võimalik rääkida.  
Üks peamine takistus sihtasutuse vormi kasutamisel perevara haldamiseks on 
praegu ilmselt topeltmaksustamine. Sihtasutust on võimalik asutada nii, et selle 
eesmärk on hallata üleantud vara ning teha vara haldamisega teenitud tulu arvelt 
väljamakseid sihtasutuse põhikirjas määratud soodustatud isikutele. Praktikas on 
sihtasutusele üleantav vara tihtipeale äriühingu osalus ning sel juhul tehakse 
väljamakseid eelkõige äriühingult saadud dividendidelt ja muudelt kasumi-
eraldistelt. Topeltmaksustamine väljamaksete tegemisel sellise sihtasutuse kaudu 
väljendub kehtiva õiguse järgi järgnevas: 1) esiteks peab sihtasutuse hallatav 
äriühing, kes maksab sihtasutusele välja dividendi või muu kasumieraldise, 
maksma sellelt tulumaksu (tulumaksuseaduse (TuMS)248 § 50 lg 1), tulumaksu 
                                                 
247  RT I 1995, 92, 1604; RT I, 09.05.2017, 34. 
248  RT I 1999, 101, 903; RT I, 28.02.2020, 14.  
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peab hallatav äriühing maksma ka omakapitalist tehtud väljamaksetelt ning 
likvideerimisjaotistelt (TuMS § 50 lg 2); 2) teiseks toimub maksustamine 
sihtasutuse tasandil – siis, kui sihtasutus teeb väljamaksed soodustatud isikutele, 
kuna väljamakset tuleb eelduslikult käsitleda kingitusena (TuMS § 49 lg 1; kõne 
alla saaks tulla ka väljamaksete maksustamine ettevõtlusega mitteseotud kuluna 
TuMS § 51 lõike 3 alusel). Väljamakse füüsilisest isikust saaja tasandil maksusta-
mist sellisel juhul ei toimu (TuMS § 12 lg 2 ja § 19 lg 3 p 6).  
Teine probleem on praegune teabe ülemäärane avalikkus: sihtasutused regist-
reeritakse mittetulundusühingute ja sihtasutuste registris, kust sihtasutuse kohta 
käivad andmed on kõigile kättesaadavad. See hõlmab andmeid asutaja ja kasu-
saajate kohta, põhikirja sisu, sh väljamaksete tegemise tingimusi, ning majandus-
aasta aruannete kaudu teavet sihtasutuse sissetuleku, vara ja rikkuse kohta. Kui 
vaadata teiste riikide sihtasutuste regulatsioone, võib näha, et need pakuvad 
rohkem privaatsust. Kuigi rahvusvahelised rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise 
vastase võitluse regulatsioonid liiguvad suurema avalikustamise suunas, on Eesti 
praegune korraldus autori hinnangul siiski privaatsust ebaproportsionaalselt piirav. 
Rahapesu vastu võitlemiseks ei ole vaja, et igaühel oleks juurdepääs sihtasutuse 
põhikirjas sätestatud tingimustele, dokumentidele ja varalistele üksikasjadele – 
piisab sellest, kui vastavast registrist on võimalik saada tegelikke kasusaajaid 
puudutavat teavet.  
Kolmandaks probleemiks on see, et sihtasutuse juhtimise ja valitsemisega peaks 
tegelema vähemalt neli inimest, s.o vähemalt kolm nõukogu liiget ja vähemalt 
üks juhatuse liige – nii sätestab praegune regulatsioon (SAS § 16, § 17 lg 1, § 26 
lg 1). Erahuvides asutatud sihtasutuse puhul, eelkõige perevara hoidmise ja 
valdamisega tegeleva sihtasutuse jaoks on keeruline leida sellisel hulgal usaldus-
väärseid isikuid. Paljudes riikides ei ole nõukogu sihtasutuste puhul kohustuslik, 
samas on juhatuse tegevuse kontrollimise huvides üritatud leida muid toimivaid 
vahendeid. Näiteks Austrias on kõikide sihtasutuste puhul kohustuslik audiitor-
kontroll ja audiitori näol on tegemist sihtasutuse organiga, kellel on Eesti audiito-
rite tavapäraste ülesannetega võrreldes tunduvalt suurem pädevus juhatuse ja 
sihtasutuse tegevuse jälgimisel ning vajalike meetmete kasutusele võtmisel.  
Kokkuvõtlikult võib öelda, et sihtasutusi ei kasutata Eestis perevara halda-
miseks eelkõige seetõttu, et nendega kaasneb topeltmaksustamine ning sihtasu-
tustega seotud teave on registritest kõigile kättesaadav, samas kui välismaised 
sihtasutused või trust’id võimaldavad rohkem privaatsust. Samuti on välismaiste 
instrumentide struktuur tavaliselt lihtsam ning nende juhtimisse ning haldamisse 
ei ole vaja kaasata nii palju isikuid, kui nõuab kehtiv seadus 
Need probleemid oleks võimalik lahendada, kehtestades Eesti õiguses uue, 
eritüüpi sihtasutuse – piiratud majandustegevusega erasihtasutuse, mille doku-
mendid ei oleks avalikult kättesaadavad ning millele kehtiks kohustuslik audiitor-
kontroll, leebemad nõuded nõukogu osas ja eriline maksusüsteem. 
Autori esitatud muudatusettepanekud lähtuvad põhimõttest, et kindlat tüüpi 
sihtasutuste puhul peaks asutajal olema võimalik põhikirjas ette näha, et asutatava 
sihtasutuse dokumendid (põhikiri, asutamisotsus, sihtasutusele vara üleandmist 
tõendavad dokumendid ning majandusaasta aruanne ja sellega koos esitatavad 
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dokumendid) ei kuulu avalikustamisele, s.t ei ole registrist igaühele kätte-
saadavad. Sellist erandit võiks lubada erahuvides asutatud sihtasutuste suhtes. 
Erahuvides asutatud sihtasutusena tuleks mõista sihtasutust, mille eesmärk ei ole 
seotud üldiste huvide järgimise või avalikkusele või määratlemata isikute ringile 
hüvede pakkumise või teenuste osutamisega. Erahuvides asutatud sihtasutus oleks 
näiteks perevara hoidmiseks asutatud sihtasutus. Selliste sihtasutuste põhitegevus 
ei tohiks olla majandustegevuse kaudu tulu saamine. Kui sihtasutus majandus-
tegevusega ei tegele, tekib tal ka minimaalselt võlausaldajaid või muid isikuid, 
kellel võiks olla huvi saada registritest sihtasutusega seotud teavet. Kui siiski 
selgub, et sihtasutus, mille dokumendid ei ole põhikirja kohaselt avalikud, tegeleb 
põhitegevusena majandustegevusega, peaks olema võimalik otsustada siht-
asutuse sundlõpetamine vastavalt SAS § 46 lõike 1 punktile 1.  
Kehtiva õiguse kohaselt peab iga sihtasutus koostama ja esitama majandus-
aasta lõpus aastaaruande (SAS § 34), kuid audiitoripoolne raamatupidamise 
aastaaruannete ülevaatus või audit on kohustuslik ainult audiitortegevuse seaduse 
(AudS)249 § 91 lõikes 4 ja § 92 lõikes 21 nimetatud tingimustel. Autor on arva-
musel, et kõigi erasihtasutuste suhtes võiks kehtestada aastaaruande ülevaatuse 
kohustuse ning tagamaks, et erasihtasutus ei tegele põhitegevusena majandus-
tegevusega, võiks SAS-i täiendada sättega, mis näeb ette, et erasihtasutuse 
majandusaasta aruandele tuleb lisada audiitori arvamus selle kohta, kas erasiht-
asutuse tegevus on kooskõlas seadusega, s.t erasihtasutus ei tegele majandustege-
vusega, mis ei seostu otseselt vara hoidmise ja kogumisega soodustatud isikute 
huvides. 
Samuti võiks ette näha, et kui erasihtasutuse põhikirja kohaselt ei kuulu siht-
asutuse dokumendid avalikustamisele, hoitakse muidu avalikus toimikus säilita-
misele kuuluvaid dokumente (mis põhikirja kohaselt ei ole avalikud) registri-
toimikus, millele on ligipääs õigustatud huvi omavatel isikutel (mittetulundus-
ühingute seaduse (MTÜS)250 § 77 lg 4, kohtu registriosakonna kodukorra251 § 61). 
Selliseks õigustatud huvi omavaks isikuks oleksid eelkõige registriosakonna 
kodukorra § 61 lõikes 2 nimetatud isikud (kohus, pädev asutus, kohtutäitur, 
pankrotihaldur, ajutine pankrotihaldur, notar ja notari volitatud notaribüroo 
töötaja), soodustatud isik ja isik, kellel on põhjust arvata, et ta võib olla soodus-
tatud isik, sihtasutuse organite liikmed, sihtasutuse audiitor, asutaja, isikud, kellele 
on sellekohane õigus antud sihtasutuse põhikirjaga, ja AMLD-st tulenevad tegelike 
kasusaajate registriga tutvuma õigustatud isikud. Õigustatud huvi omavate isikute 
ammendavat loetelu ei ole ilmselt mõistlik õigusaktis anda, kuna selliste siht-
asutuste puhul, mis on küll asutatud erahuvides, kuid mille eesmärgi tõttu ei ole 
üheseid soodustatud isikuid (nt lemmiklooma eest hoolitsemiseks mõeldud 
sihtasutus), on vajalik, et õigustatud huvi omavate isikute ring oleks laiem, 
selleks et säiliks sihtasutuse organite üle kontrolli teostamise võimalus. Samuti 
                                                 
249  RT I 2010, 9, 41; RT I, 28.02.2019, 2.  
250  RT I 1996, 42, 811; RT I, 19.03.2019, 24.  
251  RT I, 28.12.2012, 10; RT I, 22.01.2020, 9.  
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on otstarbekas sätestada, et isiku õigustatud huvi tuvastamisel kuulab kohus 
võimaluse korral ära ka sihtasutuse juhatuse ja nõukogu liikmed.  
Nagu juba mainitud, ei ole autori hinnangul erahuvides asutatud sihtasutuse 
puhul ka põhjendatud, et selle juhtimise ja valitsemisega peaks tegelema vähe-
malt neli inimest. Eesti õiguskorra väljakujunenud loogikast lähtuvalt tasub 
autori hinnangul küll säilitada kohustuslik kaheastmeline juhtimisstruktuur 
(juhatus ja nõukogu), kuid erahuvides asutatud sihtasutuste puhul võiks seadus 
siiski lubada, et nõukogu võiks tegutseda ka üheliikmelisena.  
Selleks, et vältida topeltmaksustamist, oleks ilmselt otstarbekas sätestada 
TuMS § 50 lõigetega 11 ja 21 analoogsed erisätted selliste sihtasutuste puhuks, 
kelle põhikirjaline eesmärk piirdub sihtasutusele üleantud vara haldamisega ja 
sellelt teenitud tulu jaotamisega füüsilistele isikutele.  
 
 
4. Kas ja mil määral peaks teave nende varahalduslahenduste kohta olema 
EL-i rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise vastase võitluse regulatsioonist 
lähtuvalt (avalikult) juurdepääsetav? 
 
Nagu juba eelpool mainitud, kohustas AMLD4 liikmesriike tuvastama õiguslikke 
üksusi, mille struktuur või funktsioonid on sarnased trust’idega, ning usaldus-
isikuid koguma ja hoidma asjakohast, täpset ja ajakohastatud teavet selliste 
üksuste tegelike kasusaajate kohta, tegema sellekohase teabe õigeaegselt kätte-
saadavaks pädevatele asutustele ja rahapesu andmebüroodele ning esitama asja-
kohase teabe keskregistrile (art 31(1)(2)(4); art 3(6)c)).  
AMLD4 rakendamiseks vastu võetud rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise 
tõkestamise seaduse (RahaPTS252) § 9 lõikes 6 on trust’ide ja trust’idega sarnaste 
õiguslike üksustena nimetatud järgmised: usaldusfond (seletuskirja kohaselt 
kasutatakse terminit „usaldusfond“ siin „trust’i“ tähenduses, mitte investeerimis-
fondide seaduse (IFS)253 § 2 lõikes 2 sätestatud tähenduses), seltsing, ühisus või 
muu juriidilise isiku staatust mitteomav isikute ühendus. Nimetatud õiguslike 
üksuste puhul peavad kohustatud isikud tuvastama tegeliku kasusaaja (RahaPTS 
§ 20 lg 1 p 3, § 21 ja § 28), registreerima selle, et tehing tehti seltsingu, ühisuse 
või muu juriidilise isiku staatust mitteomava isikute ühenduse esindajaga või 
usaldusfondi või usaldusisikuga (§ 46 lg 2 p 6), ja säilitama kogutud andmed 
(§ 47). Samas ei kohusta seadus esitama andmeid selliste õiguslike üksuste tege-
like kasusaajate kohta mistahes registrisse.  
AMLD5 rakendamiseks koostatud RahaPTS muutmise eelnõus254 on § 9 
lõikest 6 eeltoodud nimekiri sellisel kujul ära kaotatud ning loetelusse on alles 
jäänud üksnes usaldushaldus (trust-i eestikeelse vastena) ning juriidilise isiku 
                                                 
252  RT I, 17.11.2017, 2; RT I, 19.03.2019, 78. 
253  RT I, 31.12.2016, 3; RT I, 04.12.2019, 6.  
254  Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise seaduse, audiitortegevuse seaduse ja teiste seaduste 
muutmise seadus. Eelnõu ja seletuskiri kättesaadavad: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main# 
bogZnv22 (23.1.2020).  
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staatust mitteomav isikute ühendus. Lisaks tehakse eelnõu kohaselt kasusaajate 
registreerimine kohustuslikuks ka Eestis elu- või asukohta omavate välismaiste 
trust’ide usaldusisikutele (eelnõu p 80). Usaldusfondide ja äriühingute teenuse 
pakkuja all mõistetakse eelnõu kohaselt isikuid, kes osutavad kolmandatele isi-
kutele „usaldushaldurina või seltsingu, ühisuse või muu juriidilise isiku staatust 
mitteomava isikute ühenduse esindajana või usaldusisikuna tegutsemise“ teenust 
(eelnõu p 13). Kohustatud isikud peavad selliste isikute või nende esindajatega 
tehinguid tehes ka edaspidi registreerima, et isikul on selline staatus. Eelnõu 
seletuskirja kohaselt on Eesti Euroopa Komisjonile teatanud, et Eesti õiguses 
puuduvad õiguslikud üksused, mille struktuur ja ülesanded sarnaneksid trust’idele 
piisavalt, et nende suhtes kuuluks kohaldamisele direktiivi artikkel 31.  
Arvestades seda, et nii käsunduslepinguid kui ka testamenditäitja ja eel- ja 
järelpärija instituute saab pidada trust’i-sarnasteks, kuna neid saab (mõnede ras-
kustega) kasutada varaplaneerimisel ja neil on ka teatud trust’idele iseloomulikud 
elemendid, tekib küsimus, kas neid instituute tuleks näha trust’i-sarnasena ka 
AMLD kontekstis. 
Autori hinnagul tähendab trust-ide sarnasus AMLD kontekstis seda, et õigus-
liku üksuse puhul esineb usaldusomandi element. See järeldus põhineb eelkõige 
AMLD5-s nimetatud trust’i-sarnaste üksuste (fiducie ja Treuhand) kõrvutamisel 
trusti-idega ning nende sarnasuste ja erinevuste esiletoomisel, et välja selgitada, 
mida seadusandja trust’i-sarnasete õiguslike üksuste all silmas pidas. Näiteks 
Treuhand-i puhul ei ole erinevalt trust-ist usaldusisikule üle antud esemed 
kaitstud asutaja võlausaldajate nõuete eest. Seega võib öelda, et vara eraldatus ei 
ole kohustuslik tunnus, käsitlemaks õiguslikku üksust AMLD kohaselt 
trust’i-sarnasena. Ka siis, kui usaldusisik on trust’i tingimusi rikkudes käsutanud 
eseme kolmandale isikule, on kasusaajate õigused kolmandate isikute suhtes 
trust’i puhul üldiselt tugevamad kui näiteks fiducie ja Treuhand’i puhul. Nii jäigi 
võrdlusel sisuliselt alles vaid üks ühisjoon: vara kuulub ühele isikule, kuid ta 
valitseb seda teis(t)e isiku(te) kasuks. 
Seega leiab autor, et kuigi testamenditäitja ning eel- ja järelpärija instituudid 
kannavad sama funktsiooni nagu testamentaarsed trust’id ning nende puhul 
esineb muid trust’ile omaseid elemente, võib tegelike kasusaajate registri kon-
tekstis need instituudid pigem välistada, kuivõrd nende puhul puudub varjatud 
omanik: kuigi testamenditäitjal võib olla õigus vara vallata, kasutada või käsutada 
(ning pärijal samal ajal puudub käsutusõigus), kuulub pärandvara siiski pärijale, 
kes registreeritakse omanikuna/omajana ka asjaomastes registrites. Kui on 
määratud järelpärija, kuulub pärandvara kuni järelpärimise tingimuse saabu-
miseni eelpärijale. Lisaks on saabuva järelpärimise fakt kantud kinnisasjade 
puhul kinnistusraamatusse (kinnistusraamatuseaduse (KrS)255 § 491), olles seal 
kõigile nähtav. Lisaks on selge, et nende lahenduste kasutamine võib leida aset 
üksnes kellegi surma korral, mis muudab need rahapesu jaoks ilmselt ebatõhu-
saks vahendiks. 
                                                 
255  RT I 1993, 65, 922; RT I, 13.03.2019, 89.  
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Käsunduslepingu puhul on aga lood teisiti. Nagu eelnevalt välja toodud, võib 
VÕS alusel sõlmitud käsunduslepingust tuleneva õigussuhte hoolika planeeri-
mise korral kujundada üsna trust’iga sarnaseks: 1) lepingu võib sõlmida selliselt, 
et selle esemeks olevad objektid kantakse üle käsundisaajale (tema kuuluvusse); 
2) vara on võimalik eraldada käsundisaaja isikliku vara hulgast (erivara); 
3) leping on võimalik konstrueerida selliselt, et soodustatud isikul tekib nõue 
kolmanda isiku vastu, kellele käsundisaaja on lepingut rikkudes vara üle 
kandnud. Ilmselt ei ole käsunduslepingu abil võimalik saavutada olukorda, kus 
vara oleks pankrotiolukorras samaaegselt kaitstud nii kolmandast isikust kasu-
saaja võlausaldajate kui ka käsundiandja võlausaldajate eest. Selle omaduse 
puudumine aga ei tähenda, et tegemist ei oleks trust’iga sarnase instituudiga 
AMLD mõttes, kuivõrd direktiiv nimetab trust’iga sarnase õigusliku üksusena ka 
Saksa Treuhand’i, mis samuti lõppeb Treugeberi’i pankroti korral, ning sellisel 
juhul saab usaldusisikule üle antud esemed võlausaldajate huvides temalt välja 
nõuda.  
Nagu varasemalt mainitud, võivad käsunduslepingu alusel osutatavad teenu-
sed olla erinevad ja tehingu eesmärgi hulka ei pruugi kuuluda esemete ülekand-
mine käsundisaajale. Kuna tegelike kasusaajate registreerimine ei puuduta selli-
seid õiguslikke üksusi, kus puudub varjatud tegelik kasusaaja, oleks käsundus-
lepingu trust’i-sarnaseks tunnistamise esimene kriteerium see, et lepinguga 
kaasneb usaldusomandi komponent.  
Lisaks tuleks arvesse võtta lepingu eset ja selle väärtust. RahaPTS nõuab praegu 
sõnaselgelt tegelike kasusaajate andmete esitamist registrisse juriidiliste isikute 
puhul. Seega, kui käsunduslepingu ese on näiteks osaühingu osa, on tegeliku kasu-
saaja registreerimine juba kehtiva regulatsiooni kohaselt kohustuslik. Nagu 
eelmises alapunktis märgitud, tuleb kinnisasjade puhul käsundiandja või 
kolmandast isikust kasusaaja õiguste kaitsmiseks käsundisaaja maksejõuetuse 
või väärkäsutuste eest teha käsundiandja või kasusaaja õigused nähtavaks 
kinnistusraamatus. Seetõttu ei pruugi olla otstarbekas seda avalikku teavet tege-
like kasusaajate registris kopeerida. Mis saab aga siis, kui lepingu objekt ei ole 
osaühingu osa ega kinnisasi? Üks võimalus on siduda registreerimiskohustus 
tehingu (objekti) väärtusega, lähtudes näiteks 15 000 euro künnisest, mille 
AMLD (ja RahaPTS) on kehtestanud hoolsusmeetmete kohaldamisele (AMLD 
artikkel 11 ja RahaPTS § 19 lg 1 p 2). 
Registreerimiskohustuse kriteeriumiks võiks seada ka tehingu pooled. Näiteks 
kui käsundisaaja on RahaPTS tähenduses kohustatud isik, kes peab tuvastama 
tegelikud kasusaajad, registreerima ja säilitama asjakohast teavet, hindama kliendi 
riskiprofiili, tegema riskianalüüsi, koostama protseduurireeglid ja korraldama 
sisekontrolli, teavitama kahtluste korral järelevalveasutust ja hankima oma tege-
vuseks tegevusloa, peaks rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise risk iseenesest olema 
juba väiksem.  
Lisaks võiks käsunduslepingu registreerimise kriteeriumide sätestamisel läh-
tuda ka lepingu kestusest ja proportsionaalsusest tegelike kasusaajate regist-
reerimiskohustuse ja selle täitmise kontrollimisega seotud kulude vahel, samuti 
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peaks arvesse võtma kodanike eraelu puutumatuse õiguse rikkumist ning 
võrdlema seda potentsiaalsete registreerimisest saadavate kasuteguritega. 
Kokkuvõtlikult võib öelda, et kui testamenditäitja ning eel- ja järelpärija 
instituudid võib tegelike kasusaajate registri kontekstis pigem välistada, siis 
käsunduslepingud tuleks lisada trust’i-sarnaste õiguslike üksuste loendisse 
RahaPTS-s. Kuid see, milliste lepingute puhul teave tegelike kasusaajate regist-
risse esitada, ei peaks siiski põhinema üksnes (formaalsel) lepingu liigil, vaid 
tuleks kohaldada lisakriteeriume lähtuvalt lepingu sisust, objektist, hinnast ja 
osapooltest.  
Erasihtasutuste tegelike kasusaajate esitamise osas vastavale registrile on 
RahaPTS § 76 lg 3 punktis 4 tehtud erand: seda kohustust ei kohaldata sihtasutuste 
seaduses sätestatud sihtasutusele, kelle majandustegevuse eesmärk on põhikirjas 
määratud soodustatud isikute või isikute ringi huvides vara hoidmine või kogu-
mine ja kellel puudub muu majandustegevus. Seega ei tulene sihtasutuse andmete 
liigne avalikustamine mitte rahapesu- ja terrorismi rahastamise vastase võitlusega 
seonduvatest aktidest, vaid eraõiguslikest aktidest; seetõttu on sihtasutustega 
seonduvat avalikustamist käsitletud 3. uurimisküsimuse all. Kokkuvõtlikult võib 
siiski üle korrata, et kuigi rahvusvahelised rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise 
vastase võitluse regulatsioonid liiguvad suurema avalikustamise suunas, on Eesti 
praegune korraldus autori hinnangul siiski privaatsust ebaproportsionaalselt piirav.  
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